Thomas F. Wilkinson, of Albany: I move the consideration of the proposed amendment to the Constitution be deferred until to-morrow's session. Henry L. Bogert, of New York: The first amendment is the one which Mr. Jones was interested in, the other is a purely formal matter, and might be gotten out of the way while we have a few moments to spare. It is merely harmonizing the present Constitution with itself, it strikes out an admission fee, it is purely a verbal amendment. Thomas F. Wilkinson, of Albany: On the suggestion of the gentleman I will confine my motion to the consideration of the first proposition. (The motion as amended was then put and carried.) The President: We will now take up the amendment to the Constitution and By-Laws, to strike out the words "admission fee," from line 15 of Article III of the Constitution and from line 7 of Article VII of the By-Laws. The question will come up first on the amendment to amend the Constitution by striking from line 15 of Article III the words" admission fee," which, I judge, takes out unnecessary verbiage. Abner Robertson, of Salem: May I ask someone who is familiar with the proposition to' explain? Henry L. Bogert, of New York: The reason for proposing that amendment was that there is no admission fee to this Association, and, therefore, a reference to it in the Constitution and By-Laws in the form in which it now appears seems to be surplusage; a proposition unnecessary and, perhaps, unwise, therefore, I made the motion in question. The President: There never has been an admission fee, I believe. Mr. Bogert: Never. The President: The Constitution and By-Laws refer to an admission fee which has never been imposed, which has never been lived up to. Loran L. Lewis, Jr., of Buffalo: Can we have the two articles read? The Secretary: Article III of the Constitution, after providing for delegates, etc., says: "Any member of the legal profession in good standing, residing, etc., shall, upon open nomination after a report of the Committee on Admissions, be admitted, and, on subscribing to this Constitution, or otherwise in writing, notify the Secretary of his acceptance of membership, and within the period limited by the ByLaws and paying the admission fee and annual dues of the current year." Under the proposed amendment the section would be, "paying the annual dues of the current year." Mr. Lewis: What does the By-Law say? The Secretary: "And if any person elected does not within three months and after notice thereof pay his admission fee and dues, etc., he shall be regarded as having declined to become a member." The President: Both provisions require an admission fee to be paid, so that if these amendments are carried it makes the requirement simply the payment of annual dues in accordance with the practice of the Association from the beginning. The question first arises on the amendment to the Constitution by striking out from line 15 of Article III the words "admission fee;" the Constitution provides that it may be amended by a two-thirds vote of all the members present at a meeting of the Association. John Brooks Leavitt, of New York: I would like to inquire whether there is any By-Law giving the Executive Committee the power to impose an admission fee. It may be that this provision should be read in connection with such a By-Law. I do not know whether there is another By-Law referring to it. The President: I do not know of any except the one we are amending. The amendment was adopted by a unanimous vote. The President: Now the question arises on the amendment to the By-Laws by striking out the same words from line 7 of Article VII of the By-Laws. The By-Laws may be amended by a vote of two-thirds of those present. Henry L. Bogert, of New York: I move the amendment be adopted. The motion was duly seconded and the amendment was adopted by a unanimous vote. The President: Is there any other matter any gentleman would like to bring up at this time before we adjourn to the afternoon session at 2 o'clock? Raphael J. Moses, of New York: I move we take a recess until 2 o'clock. Recess. (Carried.) AFTERNOON SESSION. The President: TUESDAY, January 20, 1903. Gentlemen, the subject of my address is a familiar one to this Association. So recently as the last annual meeting, it was the theme of an ideal and exhaustive paper. My only excuse for bringing it to your attention again is its pressing practical importance at this time. (Applause.) THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE. Gentlemen.— The subject of my address is a familiar one to this Association. So recently as the last annual meeting it was the theme of an able and exhaustive paper. My only excuse for bringing it to your attention again is its pressing and practical importance at this time. It is admitted on all sides that the statute law of the State is in a state of chaos. This is partly due to its volume, partly to the haphazard processes of its growth, and partly to an arrested revision and consolidation. It is a reproach to the law-making power and to the bar that such a state of things exists wherever the blame may really belong. I include the bar because its province is legal affairs, within ment. which its influence should be constant and powerful. The bar is not merely a body of lawyers engaged in the work of a profession for its rewards. The broader and nobler view is that it is an institution responsible in a large measure for legal conditions. The function of law is the regulation of conduct through the definition and enforcement of rights and duties. Obedience to its rules is a fundamental requirement of social and political organization. The rules themselves are the substance of the law; the mode of their expression is its form. One would One would say that excellence in its form, consisting of order, lucidity and accessibility, was indispensable. Especially is this true in an age when legislation is the machinery of legal developWhen the law grew in the main through the decision of particular cases, reflecting with the minuteness of actual transactions the changes in social conditions, the mode of its expression was necessarily indirect and obscure. But when legislation is the main agency of lawmaking, which means its direct expression in statutes instead of its indirect expression in judicial opinions, there is no reason why that portion of the body of the law which is statutory in form should not be coherent, systematic and accessible. That is the standard by which a system of statute law must be judged if the public welfare is the measure of its efficiency and utility; and judged by that standard the system of this State lacks every essential quality. A prolonged period of legislative activity inevitably produces a vast mass of miscellaneous statutes constituting a body of law without any structural unity or plan. There have been enacted in this State over fifty thousand statutes since the Revolution. The additions every year are numbered by the hundred. The printed volumes form a goodsized library. Each act contains legislation on some new |