be enfored in admiralty by an action in personam.1 This view seems to have been taken by Mr. Justice Brown in The Corsair. He says: "If it (the local law) merely gives a right of action in personam for a cause of action of a maritime nature, the district court may administer the law by proceedings in personam."

The law may therefore briefly be stated to be, that in the absence of a statute, either federal or state, conferring a lien, no action in rem can be maintained in admiralty for negligently causing the death of a human being upon the navigable waters of the United States or the high seas. That where a lien is given, it may be enforced in admiralty, where the cause of action arises within the operation of the statute. That in cases where the local statute gives a right of action in personam for a cause of action of a maritime nature, not embraced in the general maritime law, the district courts may take jurisdiction of such actions in proceedings in personam. That where the cause of action arises beyond the reach of the statute, the general maritime rule prevails, and no action is maintainable in the absence of a federal statute on the subject. Upon this latter question there is still some uncertainty, the subordinate courts having decided both ways.3

1 The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. R. 98; 61 Fed. R. 364.

2145 U. S. 335, 347; The H. E. Willard, 62 Fed. R. 387; The St. Nicholas, 49 Fed. R. 671; The Manhassett, 18 Fed. R. 918; McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546; Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U. S. 610; The Chinese Cabin Waiter, 13 Fed. R. 256.

3 In the case of The E. B. Ward, Jr., 17 Fed. R. 456, the circuit court of the eastern division of Louisiana decided in 1883, in a case involving the question of jurisdiction, where the cause of action, the negligent killing of a human being,

arose on the high seas, that the law of the home port of the vessel in fault applied, and that when it provided a remedy an admiralty court would apply it, on the ground that the vessel was a part of the territory of the state and subject to its laws, even though on the high

seas.

In order to give admiralty jurisdiction over an action for negligently causing death, the injury must have been received upon navigable waters; and where an injury resulting in death occurred on land, admiralty cannot enter

Sec. 16. Various torts cognizable in admiralty. The admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts extends to the tortious conduct of the ship's officers and crew wherever the act is committed, when the injury does not result in death, whether inflicted on the high seas or within the body of a county.1

Fouling anchor: Where a vessel casts her anchor at a distance in shallow water, without a buoy or other indication to mark its presence, it has often been held to be such negligence as will hold the vessel in damages for injuries sustained by another running foul of it.2

Sec. 17. Personal injuries by a collision.- Admiralty has jurisdiction over actions for personal injuries against the offending ship wherever the owner of the vessel on which such persons are injured can maintain an action for damages done to it. And where there is a joint liability on the part of two or more vessels he may proceed against them all in the same libel, and in case of recovery the damages are ap

In the case of The Sea Gull, Chase's Dec. 145, Chief Justice Chase makes a distinction between that class of cases arising under a state statute giving a lien to the personal representatives of a deceased person against a vessel for wrongfully causing death, and those cases where the libelant sues for a direct and personal injury to himself as the result of the negligent killing of another; as where a father sues for damages for loss of services of a minor child, or where a husband sues for loss of services and society of his wife.

portioned among the offending vessels. He may proceed against either vessel separately and recover his full damages against it alone, and in case of mutual fault the vessel proceeded against may recover from the other its proportion of the damages assessed.1

The right of recovery for personal injuries resulting to any member of the ship's company from a collision against the offending vessel is governed by the same principles that enable the ship to which he belongs to recover for damages sustained by it. When it can recover for damages sustained by it, he may in like manner maintain an action for personal injuries sustained in the same collision, unless there is a degree of personal negligence involved that is not applicable to his vessel.

A different question, however, is presented in the matter of one of the offending vessel's company seeking redress against his own ship for injuries sustained by him while aboard, resulting from her negligent management. Whether there is redress for such injuries, that admiralty courts can afford, is a question not yet authoritatively settled; the decisions on the question being somewhat at variance. Prior to the case of The Titan, decided by the circuit court for the southern division of New York, admiralty courts have uniformly held that the navigation of ships consists of a common undertaking, for which all the ship's company in their several stations are alike employed, and that in embarking upon the voyage, each takes the risk of the others' negligence in the performance of his duties in the common employment; and that in respect to the details of the common undertaking, the ship's company, as fellow-servants, take the risk of each others' negligence; and that in the ordinary work of navigation, no recovery can be had by a seaman against his vessel for her negligence; that neither the vessel, nor its owners, owe any duty to its crew, in respect to the practical navigation of the vessel, that they do not owe to

1 Briggs v. Day, 21 Fed. R. 727.

243 Fed. R. 413.

each other, except that the owners of the vessel are bound to provide safe and usual appliances for the navigation of the ship; and for a collision resulting from neglect in these particulars the vessel and her owners are liable.'

There has never been any question as to the liability of the vessel for the crew's wages for the voyage and for the expenses of the sickness attending personal injuries resulting from the ship's negligence; but further than this the courts have never gone until the case of The Titan, before referred to, in which the court there seeks to establish a different rule, or at least to greatly modify the former holdings of the courts. In this case the court held that the master of a vessel (here a pilot) sustains to his crew the relation of viceprincipal, and that the vessel and its owners were liable for his negligent acts in the navigation of the vessel. Here the injury was inflicted upon a deck-hand, who was at the time off duty, and had no part in the navigation of the vessel. The court does not state in positive terms that this fact made any difference in the matter of the vessel's liability, or that of its owners. The case rests upon the authority of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Ross,3 a case in which the conductor of a railway train was held to be the vice-principal in respect to the practical running of his train, and not a fellow-servant with the other employees on it. It is doubtful whether the doctrine here announced is applicable to actions of a maritime nature, where the relations of master and crew to their ship are based upon entirely different conditions than those of the employees of a railroad train to their employer.

Where, however, the owner of a ship is in command in person, and personally orders a line of conduct to be pursued by the ship, which is negligent, and injuries to his crew result, there is good reason for holding him and his vessel

1 The Bernina, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 14; The Queen, 40 Fed. R. 694; The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. R. 390;

Quinn v. Lighterage Co., 23 Fed. R. 363.

223 Fed. R. 413.

3112 U. S. 377.

liable in damages; but in the usual course of navigation, where the owners are not present and have nothing to do with the navigation of the vessel, it is very doubtful if the doctrine of The Titan will be sustained by the higher courts. It would be absurd to say that the owners of a vessel owe a duty to the seamen aboard their ship, to see that she runs only at a certain rate of speed, or that under certain conditions she should luff, or lay to,- these are all duties belonging to the ordinary work of navigation; and the master and crew are common servants of the owner in the enterprise; and in engaging in such service, the crew are bound to know that the ship-owners cannot personally see that all the details of navigation are conducted in a lawful manner, and they are bound to know that errors and mistakes are frequently made by masters in navigating; and in accepting service they assume this risk, in common with other perils of their vocation. As to third persons aboard the vessel at fault, but not connected with it in such manner that they assume the risks of navigation, the ship and its owners are liable for negligence resulting in their injury;1 though

1 The Queen, 40 Fed. R. 694.

In the case of Quinn v. The New Jersey Lighterage Co., 23 Fed. R. 363, the circuit court for the eastern district of New York held that where the master of a vessel was engaged in a class of work not distinctly within his line of work as master, but was performing the duty of a common laborer, his negligence was not that of a viceprincipal but of a co-laborer, and no liability ensued for an injury resulting from his negligent acts.

The claims of master and seamen for loss of personal effects through a collision, share with the faults of their ship. If both vessels are in fault and one is lost, her crew can recover of the other for but half

of their damage for loss of personal effects. The City of New York, 25 Fed. R. 149.

In a collision between a steamboat and a skiff resulting in the drowning of libelant's minor son, and injuries to the father, it was held that the libelant could recover for damage to his skiff, for its use, for libelant's doctor bills, for his sufferings, and for an estimated amount of earnings of his minor son, of which he was deprived by reason of his death. Miller v. W. G. Hewes, 1 Wood, 363.

Relatives of persons whose lives have been lost by reason of collision upon the high seas are entitled to recover under the general admiralty law from the offending