common sense of the country that considered the war ended three years ago; this huge intricate afterthought of Reconstruction, on which the South is daily tortured and the whole country hung in suspense.

It is plainly, essentially the afterthought of party; the destructive device of "confusion worse confounded," in which a sinister faction may hide and accomplish their ends; an artificial necessity created for revolutionary and deadly designs. It is thus intelligent men of the South esteem the problem of Reconstruction. They remember how slowly it was invented by Congress; how many delays and changes took place from December, 1865, when the South first presented the issue by sending representatives to Congress, until the Radical plan was finally evolved in its present shape of subjecting the South to the probation of military rule, and the cardinal condition of Negro supremacy; how in this long interval of time there were changes of programme and shiftings of policy and altered devices to the present date of the latest scheme of Reconstruction and its accessories. These, of themselves, are marks of party industry and machinery; not evidences of a straightforward disposition to deal with a plain and obvious necessity. The history of Reconstruction in Congress has been that of the halting and hesitating plot of faction; surely not that of a plain consultation of remedies for a simple, avowed evil.

But for this history we must ask the separate and close attention of the reader before we relate further the condition and temper of the South.

HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION.

Need of a popular history of Reconstruction-Declaration of the objects of the war in 18-Practice of the war as to "existing State institutions "-Cases of Tennessee and Louisiana-Three conditions of restoration-President Lincoln on the white basis"-Extraordinary proposition of Congress to disfranchise the Negro-Reconstruction policy of President Johnson-Happy condition of the country under it-Gen. Grant's testimony-Necessity of the Republican party- Its revolutionary sentiment and education-Six months of fruitless debate in Congress-Violent premise of Reconstruction-Dogma of forfeited rights-Constitutional Amendment, No 14Hidden designs of this measure-Trap of Thaddeus Stevens on universal suffrageA trick on Southern opinion-President Johnson's re-assurances to the SouthReconstruction law of March 2nd, 1867-President's veto-Gen. Grant's interpretation of Reconstruction-History of the Convention elections in the South-Remarkable frauds in the registration-The attempt of Congress upon the President, as part of the Reconstruction scheme-Analysis of this attempt-Three violent measures-A historical remark on the Tenure-of-office law-The significance of impeachment of the President-Its logical identity with Reconstruction.

We propose to write a plain and popular history of Reconstruction. The subject needs such a treatment. It has been so complicated by the multitude of legislative measures, so confused by debate that the public has, in fact, lost all clear and consistent information of it. Scarcely one in a hundred men, even among zealous partisans and those who talk busily of Reconstruction can give an orderly and consecutive narrative of the measures comprised in the topic. We shall endeavour here to give such a narrative, and to disentangle the difficult web of party ingenuity and passion.

The narrative logically and justly commences with the resolution of Congress to which we have referred as adopted in the first year of the war. In this resolution, passed on the 19th July, 1861, it was proclaimed to the world, and immediately noticed to the South

"That this war is not waged for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing the Constitutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, with

all the rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease.

The history of this resolution is remarkable for the deliberation with which it was accomplished, and the peculiar emphasis it obtained from circumstances. It was the first sober thought of the war, the first deliberate judgment that emerged from the confusion and extravagance of passions in which hostilities had commenced. It was also remarkable for its unanimity. The resolution was adopted unanimously by the Senate, and there were only two dissenting voices in the House. It was accepted by the country as expressing honestly and truly the object of the war. It was fortified by the practices of the government, and supplemented by other declarations in the Executive department. The announcement of the war, as to foreign nations, made through Mr. Seward's dispatches, disclaimed the intention of interfering with "existing State institutions," carefully divested it of a single revolutionary design and industriously represented it as a limited and incidental affair of arms that would in no way change the structure of the government. As the war progressed, the practice of the Government was that as its armies advanced over the country that country immediately reverted to its old condition, and was entitled to civil government, and to be represented in Congress. Even when it captured Alexandria, and the flag of the insurgents was actually within sight of the Capitol at Washington, Congress received senators and representatives from the State of Virginia, elected by the people within the Federal lines. As the armies of the Government passed further over the South, there was continued recognition of the legal existence of the States; district attorneys and marshals were appointed; revenue officers collected the tax, and it is remark

able that the Internal Revenue laws describe as States what Congress for other purposes insists now as regarding as waste and conquered territory-willing to recognize these States for financial needs but not for political rights, although the two are inseparable, and their union was consecrated by the blood of 1776.

The first essay of Reconstruction, the first opportunity to test and apply the truth of the declaration referred to, dates from the appointment of Andrew Johnson as Military Governor of Tennessee. The situation then was that the Government had

generally resolved to except Slavery from the "institutions" of the Southern States, but in no other respect to impair or diminish the resolution of July 1861. The conditions which then attached to restoration to the Union were only those which implied the extinction of the war and of the measures peculiar to it; this was the boundary, and beyond it no design of interference was ever breathed to suspicion. The status quo was to be disturbed only to the extent of abolishing slavery and terminating the war in the sense of abandoning its political measures as well as its arms. Thus the conditions of restoration were distinctly named: that the State should abolish slavery, should repeal the ordinance of secession, and should repudiate the rebel debt. Congress never interfered with this re-organization or reconstruction of the State of Tennessee. The policy was sustained by the Convention which renominated Mr. Lincoln, and by the party which re-elected him in 1864. The definition of the policy was very distinct: it entertained no design upon the local affairs of the State, it did not assume to fix the qualifications of voters or to form Constitutions, it had no other care than that those, who voted and took part in restoring the machinery of government under their Constitu

tions, had fully, and to the extent of all logical incidents, renounced their rebellion.

The same policy was practically repeated in the case of Louisiana; but it is remarkable that at the time of Mr. Lincoln's death it was suspended by a particular question that had arisen between the President and Congress.

The head of controversy was first raised in the case of Louisiana; it was the first assumption of Congress to take the question of Reconstruction out of the hands of the President. But it was an assumption of the most limited nature and of the most curious effect. It is remarkable that whatever points of difference there were between the President and Congress in the case of Louisiana, there was then no question as to the policy of Reconstruction on the white basis; and that so far from such being the case, Congress expressly excluded the Negro from the right of suffrage in voting for the men who were to frame the new constitutions necessary for admission into the Union. Mr. Lincoln refused to sign the bill to this effect, for other reasons than the exclusion of Negro suffrage; on this point his policy was coincident with that of Congress; and had not the latter been checked as it were by accidental circumstances, it would have committed itself, even beyond the President, to the policy of Reconstruction on the white basis and have shut the door to all its later schemes of Negrophilism.

There was no solicitude for the Negro, beyond what had already been accomplished by Congress in setting him free. "If," confesses a leading Republican-Governor Morton of Indiana—“Mr. Lincoln had not refused to sign that bill, there would be to-day an act of Congress on the statute-books absolutely prohibiting Negroes from participating in the work of re-organization, and pledging the Government in advance to