Mr. Calhoun, whose aid was indispensable to carry the measure, but who would not vote for it unless the hard-money clause should be inserted. It was inserted accordingly; and then the friends of the administration, for the first time, shouted in all quarters, "Hard money!" "Hard money!" "Hard money!"

By this cruel necessity, the government was driven to a measure which it had no more expected than you expect to sec your houses on fire to-night. But such are the expedients, the miserable expedients, of a baffled and despairing administration, on which they have thrown themselves as a last resort, always hoping, and always deceived, and plunging deeper and deeper at every new effort.

I have said, and it may be proper enough, and involve no great self-complacency to say it, that there were some of us who never ceased to warn the government and the nation, that the deposit system must explode, as it has exploded. But what was our reward? What was the boon conferred upon us for thus apprising the administration of its danger? We were denounced as enemies to State banks, as opposed to State institutions, as anti-State-rights men, whom nothing would satisfy but the spectacle of a great national institution, riding over and treading down the institutions of the States.

But what happened? The whole State bank experiment, as I have said, utterly failed; and what did gentlemen of the administration do then? They instantly turned about, and, with the utmost bitterness of remark, reviled the banks which their experiment had crushed. They were vile, corrupt, faithless, treacherous institutions, leagued from the very beginning with the opposition, and not much better than British Whigs! And when we, who had opposed the placing of the national treasure in these banks, declared that they had failed only because they were applied to a purpose for which they never were calculated, and had perished in consequence of a rash and unwise experiment, we were instantly told, "You are bank aristocrats; you are leagued with a thousand corrupt banks, and are seeking, by the power of British gold, to destroy the purest administration that ever breathed the air of heaven!" Thus, when we said that State banks, though good for some purposes, were not good as a substitute for a national bank, we were denounced as the enemies of banks; but when we wished to shield

these same banks from misapplied censure, and protect them from being totally destroyed by acts of bankruptcy, then we were reviled as "bank aristocrats."

I ask you, Gentlemen, as merchants, what confidence can you place in such an administration? Do you see any thing that they are disposed to do to restore the times you once enjoyed? (Loud cries of "No!" "No!") I perceive that your opinion corresponds with my own, and that you cannot lend your support to men who turn their backs on the experience, the interests, and the institutions of their country, and who openly declare that they will not exercise the powers which have been conferred on them for the public good.

Now, Gentlemen, I will observe to you further, that it appears to me that this administration has treated the States, in reference to their own affairs, just as it has treated the State banks. It has first involved them in the evils of extravagance (if any extravagance exists), and has then abused them for the very thing to which its own course has strongly invited them. Commencing with the messages of Mr. Van Buren himself, and then looking at the reports of his Secretaries, and the resolutions and speeches of Mr. Benton and Mr. Grundy in the Senate, and at the outcry of the whole administration press, there appears to be a systematic attempt to depress the character and credit of the States. It is everywhere said, that "the States have been rash and extravagant"; "the States will yet have to repent of their railroads and canals, and projects of internal improvements." This is the burden of the President's message, of the reports of his Secretaries, and of the resolutions of his friends. Now, I seriously ask, Is not the tendency of such a course of measures virtually to affect the credit of the States that have outstanding bonds and obligations in the market?

Let us look into this matter a little. Let us see under what circumstances it was that the States were induced to contract these large debts which now embarrass them. And here let me call your attention to a few facts, dates, and figures. And first, Gentlemen, in your presence, I charge upon the administration of the general government those great expansions and those sudden contractions of paper money, which have so deranged our affairs. I propose to prove the charge; and with that view now proceed to lay before you facts, and dates, and

transactions, which must carry conviction to every honest and candid mind.

Let us go back to the year 1832, when it was perfectly settled by the veto of President Jackson, that the Bank of the United States would not be rechartered. Suppose we take a series of years by tens, and trace the history of the creation of State banks in this country. From 1820 to 1830, a period of ten years, there were created in the United States twenty-two new banks; and their creation added to the banking capital of the country but eight millions of dollars. During this period, the Bank of the United States was in full operation, and nobody entertained a doubt that it would be continued. How was it in the next ten years? From 1830 to 1840, the increase of banks, instead of twenty-two, as in the preceding ten years, was three hundred and forty-eight; and the increase of banking capital, instead of eight millions, amounted to two hundred and sixty-eight millions. Such has been the progress of bank expansion during the charming, the successful years of the experiment. But further, not only was there this great augmentation in the number and in the capital of the State banks, but when the extraordinary proceeding of the removal of the deposits in 1833 took place, it was declared by the government to be the duty of all its deposit banks to lend the public money freely to the commercial community. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his circular, issued, I think, in September, 1833, told these institutions expressly, that it was their duty to discount freely, and laid it down as a maxim, that the money of the government, between the periods of its collection and disbursement, ought to be at the service of the public. I remember, indeed, to have heard it said by the cashier of one of the banks in this street, that "he hardly knew what to do, for he was ordered to lend more of the public money than he could get security for." It is from this increase of banks, and this increase of issues, and from this alone, that the expansion so injurious to the country really

sprang.

I know it may be said that there were expansions and contractions during the existence of the Bank of the United States. This I do not deny. The administration of that institution, I admit, was not always perfect; but I say, taking the whole period, of nearly half a century, during which such a bank ex

isted, the country was freer from violent and sudden extremes of contraction and expansion than it has ever been since that time. Why will not a fair reasoner draw his conclusions from the entire history of his country as a whole? In his late speech from this place, Mr. Wright said he would not look back to the history of the first Bank of the United States; he said that under the second national bank there were great evils; but did he deny that, taking the whole forty years together, the country was less liable to fluctuations than it has since been? Not at all. Well, in the midst of this great expansion of banks and banking capital came the Specie Circular, whose tendency was to produce, and which did in fact produce, great and sudden contractions. This violent action and reaction, superinduced on a previous state of pecuniary expansion, is fairly chargeable to the administration itself, and is to be traced to the action of the government more than to all other causes.

But to return. How does it stand with respect to the States? Under what patronage, and at whose recommendation, did they contract the large and onerous debt of two hundred millions of dollars? Who induced this? Under what circumstances at home was it done? From 1820 to 1825, the aggregate of State debts amounted to twelve or thirteen millions. From 1825 to 1830, it stood at thirteen millions; but during the period from 1830 to 1835, it rose to forty millions. The effect of the increase of circulation did not begin fairly to develop itself in the country till 1834 and 1835. Then the State debts were augmented to forty millions; and between 1835 and 1840, they rose to one hundred millions.

It appears, from tables supposed to be accurately compiled, that the amount of stock issued by the several States, for each period of five years since 1820, is as follows, viz.:—

From 1820-1825, somewhat over $12,000,000;

66 1825-1830, 66

13,000,000;

Of this amount of one hundred and nine millions, nearly the whole was issued during 1835 and 1836, and part of 1837; that is to say, in the most palmy time of the experiment.

So it appears that these "extravagant" State debts were con

tracted when the currency was most redundant; when the States, in common with all the country, were urged, and goaded, and lashed on to borrow; and when all sorts of extravagant hopes and schemes were indulged among the people. To this very redundancy, thus caused by the government itself, in the vast multiplication of banks, and the free extension of loans, are to be traced these rash engagements of the States, for which they have been reviled in all quarters, from the head of the gov ernment down to its lowest agency. There were one hundred millions of debts created in 1835 and 1836, in the very midst of the glow and flow of the deposit system. It was in these very years, distinguished, as the administration say, for prudence and public prosperity, that the creation of the State debts kept pace with the bank creation and accommodation. The bank creation and accommodation kept pace with the government experiment, and the government experiment kept pace with the most rapid delusion which ever characterized any administration upon earth, or ever carried away an intelligent people.

And now I am on this subject, I must say a word or two on another topic, which it naturally suggests. One of the charges of the day is, that the opposition to the administration has come out with a project for the assumption of all these State debts by the general government. This charge was broached, as a subject of attack on the Whigs in the Senate, early in the last session. Let us look a little into facts. I have said that the general government encouraged the States to contract debts by making the currency plentiful; but they have also done this in another manner. It has been one of the favorite projects of the administration, since the removal of the deposits, to vest the surplus revenue, and the increased funds of the United States, in State bonds. I do not say this is an assumption of the State debts, but I do say that the general government did encourage the States to issue bonds, and did endeavor to give them all the credit it could.

In 1836, the project was taken up of distributing the surplus revenue among the States. This was not, indeed, a favorite measure of the leading men of the administration, but was carried rather against their wishes. In May of that year, it was moved by Mr. Wright of New York, then and now a prominent leader of the administration party in the Senate, that this sur