them, instead of presuming to try him himself. But as to writings on general subjects, which are not charged as an infringement on the rights of individuals, but as of a seditious tendency, it is far otherwise. When, in the 5 progress either of legislation or of high national justice in Parliament, they who are amenable to no law are supposed to have adopted, through mistake or error, a principle which, if drawn into precedent, might be dangerous to the public, I shall not admit it to be a libel in 10 the course of a legal and bonâ fide publication to state that such a principle had in fact been adopted. The people of England are not to be kept in the dark touching the proceedings of their own representatives. Let us therefore coolly examine this supposed offence, and see 15 what it amounts to.

First, was not the conduct of the right honorable gentleman, whose name is here mentioned, exactly what it is represented? Will the Attorney-General, who was present in the House of Commons, say that it was not? Did not 20 the Minister vindicate Mr. Hastings in what he had done, and was not his consent to that article of the impeachment founded on the intention only of levying a fine on the Zemindar for the service of the state, beyond the quantum which he, the Minister, thought reasonable? 25 What else is this but an impeachment of error in judgment in the quantum of a fine?

So much for the first part of the sentence, which, regarding Mr. Pitt only, is foreign to our purpose; and as to the last part of it, which imputes the sentiments of 30 the Minister to the majority that followed him with their votes on the question, that appears to me to be giving handsome credit to the majority for having voted from conviction, and not from courtesy to the Minister. To have supposed otherwise I dare not say would have been 35 a more natural libel, but it would certainly have been a

greater one. The sum and substance therefore of the paragraph is only this: that an impeachment for error in judgment is not consistent with the theory or the practice of the English Government. So say I. I say without reserve, speaking merely in the abstract, and not mean- 5 ing to decide upon the merits of Mr. Hastings's cause, that an impeachment for an error in judgment is contrary to the whole spirit of English criminal justice, which, though not binding on the House of Commons, ought to be a guide to its proceedings. I say that the 10 extraordinary jurisdiction of impeachment ought never to be assumed to expose error, or to scourge misfortune, but to hold up a terrible example to corruption and wilful abuse of authority, by extra-legal pains. If public men are always punished with due severity when the 15 source of their misconduct appears to have been selfishly corrupt and criminal, the public can never suffer when their errors are treated with gentleness. From such protection to the magistrate, no man can think lightly of the charge of magistracy itself, when he sees, by the lan- 20 guage of the saving judgment, that the only title to it is an honest and zealous intention. If at this moment, gentlemen, or indeed in any other in the whole course of our history, the people of England were to call upon every man in this impeaching House of Commons who 25 had given his voice on public questions, or acted in authority, civil or military, to answer for the issues of our councils and our wars, and if honest, single intentions for the public service were refused as answers to impeachments, we should have many relations to mourn for, and 30 many friends to deplore. For my own part, gentlemen, I feel, I hope, for my country as much as any man that inhabits it; but I would rather see it fall, and be buried in its ruins, than lend my voice to wound any Minister, or other responsible person, however unfortunate, who 35

had fairly followed the lights of his understanding and the dictates of his conscience for its preservation.

Gentlemen, this is no theory of mine; it is the language of English law, and the protection which it affords. 5 to every man in office, from the highest to the lowest trust of government. In no one instance that can be named, foreign or domestic, did the Court of King's Bench ever interpose its extraordinary jurisdiction by information against any magistrate for the widest depart10 ure from the rule of his duty, without the plainest and clearest proof of corruption. To every such application, not so supported, the constant answer has been, Go to a Grand Jury with your complaint. God forbid that a magistrate should suffer from an error in judgment, if his 15 purpose was honestly to discharge his trust. We cannot stop the ordinary course of justice; but wherever the court has a discretion, such a magistrate is entitled to its protection. I appeal to the noble judge, and to every man who hears me, for the truth and universality of this 20 position; and it would be a strange solecism indeed to assert that in a case where the supreme court of criminal justice in the nation would refuse to interpose an extraordinary though a legal jurisdiction, on the principle that the ordinary execution of the laws should never be 25 exceeded but for the punishment of malignant guilt, the Commons, in their higher capacity, growing out of the same Constitution, should reject that principle, and stretch them yet further by a jurisdiction still more eccentric. Many impeachments have taken place, be30 cause the law could not adequately punish the objects of them; but who ever heard of one being set on foot because the law, upon principle, would not punish them? Many impeachments have been adopted for a higher example than a prosecution in the ordinary courts, but 35 surely never for a different example. The matter, there

fore, in the offensive paragraph is not only an indisputable truth, but a truth in the propagation of which we are all deeply concerned.

Whether Mr. Hastings, in the particular instance, acted from corruption or from zeal for his employers, is what I 5 have nothing to do with; it is to be decided in judgment; my duty stops with wishing him, as I do, an honorable deliverance. Whether the Minister or the Commons meant to found this article of the impeachment on mere error, without corruption, is likewise foreign to 10 the purpose. The author could only judge from what was said and done on the occasion. He only sought to guard the principle, which is a common interest, and the rights of Mr. Hastings under it. He was, therefore, justified in publishing that an impeachment, founded in 15 error in judgment, was to all intents and purposes illegal, unconstitutional, and unjust.

Gentlemen, it is now time for us to return again to the work under examination. The author having discussed the whole of the first article through so many pages, 20 without even the imputation of an incorrect or intemperate expression, except in the concluding passage (the meaning of which I trust I have explained), goes on with the same earnest disposition to the discussion of the second charge respecting the princesses of Oude, which 25 occupies eighteen pages, not one syllable of which the Attorney-General has read, and in which there is not even a glance at the House of Commons. The whole of this answer is, indeed, so far from being a mere cloak for the introduction of slander, that I aver it to be one of the 30 most masterly pieces of writing I ever read in my life. From thence he goes on to the charge of contracts and salaries, which occupies five pages more, in which there is not a glance at the House of Commons, nor a word read by the Attorney-General. He afterward defends 35

Mr. Hastings against the charges respecting the opium contract. Not a glance at the House of Commons; not a word by the Attorney-General; and, in short, in this manner he goes on with the others, to the end of the 5 book.

Now, is it possible for any human being to believe that a man, having no other intention than to vilify the House of Commons (as this information charges), should yet keep his mind thus fixed and settled as the needle to the 10 pole, upon the serious merits of Mr. Hastings's defence, without ever straying into matter even questionable, except in the two or three selected parts out of two or three hundred pages? This is a forbearance which could not have existed, if calumny and detraction had been the 15 malignant objects which led him to the inquiry and publication. The whole fallacy, therefore, arises from holding up to view a few detached passages, and carefully concealing the general tenor of the book.

Having now finished most, if not all, of these critical 20 observations which it has been my duty to make upon this unfair mode of prosecution, it is but a tribute of common justice to the Attorney-General (and which my personal regard for him makes it more pleasant to pay), that none of my commentaries reflect in the most dis25 tant manner upon him; nor upon the Solicitor for the Crown, who sits near me, who is a person of the most correct honor, far from it. The Attorney-General having orders to prosecute in consequence of the Address of the House to his Majesty, had no choice in the 30 mode; no means at all of keeping the prosecutors before you in countenance, but by the course which has been pursued. But so far has he been from enlisting into the cause those prejudices which it is not difficult to slide into a business originating from such exalted authority, 35 he has honorably guarded you against them; pressing,