CHAPTER XV.

OF DURATION AND EXPANSION CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

SECT.

1. Both capable of greater and less.

2. Expansion not bounded by matter.

3. Nor duration by motion.

4. Why men more easily admit infinite duration than infinite expansion.

5. Time to duration is as place to expansion.

6. Time and place are taken for so much of either as are set out by the existence and motion of bodies.

7. Sometimes for so much of either as we design by measure taken from the bulk or motion of bodies.

8. They belong to all beings.

9. All the parts of extension are extension; and all the parts of duration are duration.

10. Their parts inseparable.

11. Duration is as a line, expansion as a solid.

12. Duration has never two parts together, expansion all together.

1. Number, the simplest and most universal idea.

2. Its modes made by addition.

3. Each mode distinct.

4. Therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise. 5, 6. Names necessary to numbers.

7. Why children number not earlier.

8. Number measures all measurables.

1. Infinity in its original intentions attributed to space,

duration, and number.

2. The idea of finite easily got.

3. How we come by the idea of infinity.

4. Our idea of space boundless.

5. And so of duration.

6. Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.

7. Difference between infinity of space and space infinite.

8. We have no idea of infinite space.

9. Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.

lxv

10, 11. Our different conception of the infinity of number, dura

tion, and expansion.

12. Infinite divisibility.

13, 14. No positive idea of infinity.

15, 19. What is positive, what negative, in our idea of infinite. 16, 17. We have no positive idea of infinite duration.

18. No positive idea of infinite space.

20. Some think they have a positive idea of eternity, and not
of infinite space.

21. Supposed positive idea of infinity, cause of mistakes.
22. All these ideas from sensation and reflection.

SECT.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF OTHER SIMPLE MODES.

1, 2. Modes of motion.

3. Modes of sounds.

4. Modes of colours.

5. Modes of tastes and smells.

6. Some simple modes have no names.

7. Why some modes have, and others have not names.

SECT.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF THE MODES OF THINKING.

1, 2. Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, &c.
3. The various attention of the mind in thinking.

4. Hence it is probable that thinking is the action, not
essence of the soul.

SECT.

CHAPTER XX.

OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

1. Pleasure and pain simple ideas.

2. Good and evil, what.

3. Our passions moved by good and evil.

4. Love.

5. Hatred.

6. Desire.

7. Joy.
8. Sorrow.

9. Hope. 10. Fear.

11. Despair.

12. Anger. 13. Envy.

VOL. I.

18. These instances do show how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection.

SECT.

CHAPTER XXI.

1. This idea how got.

OF POWER.

2. Power active and passive.

3. Power includes relation.

4. The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.

5. Will and understanding, two powers.

6. Faculties.

7. Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.

8. Liberty, what.

9. Supposes understanding and will.

10. Belongs not to volition.

11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary.
12. Liberty, what.

13. Necessity, what.

14-20. Liberty belongs not to the will.

21. But to the agent or man.

22-24. In respect of willing, a man is not free. 25-27. The will determined by something without it.

28. Volition, what.

29. What determines the will.

30. Will and desire must not be confounded.

31. Uneasiness determines the will.

32. Desire is uneasiness.

33. The uneasiness of desire determines the will.

34. This the spring of action.

35. The greatest positive good determines not the will, but

uneasiness.

36. Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to happiness.

37. Because uneasiness alone is present.

38. Because all, who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them not. But a great uneasiness is never neglected.

39. Desire accompanies all uneasiness.

40. The most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will. 41. All desire happiness.

42. Happiness, what.

43. What good is desired, what not.

44. Why the greatest good is not always desired.

45. Why, not being desired, it moves not the will.
46. Due consideration raises desire.

OF

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

An inquiry into the understanding, pleasant and useful.

§ 1. SINCE it is the understanding, that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

Design.

2. This, therefore, being my purpose; to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assentI shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine,

VOL. I.

B

wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those persuasions, which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted, somewhere or other, with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained-may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

Method.

§ 3. It is, therefore, worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent, and moderate our persuasions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following method.

First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to him