It may be easily said that this idea, which is not a new one, is impracticable, but it is better than the idea that war can be stopped by language, by speech-making, by vain agreements which no one would carry out when the stress came, by denunciations of war and laudations of peace, in which all men agree; for these methods are not only impracticable, but impossible and barren of all hope of real result. It may seem Utopian at this moment to suggest a union of civilized nations in order to put a controlling force behind the maintenance of peace and international order, but it is through the aspiration for perfection, through the search for Utopias, that the real advances have been made. At all events, it is along this path that we must travel if we are to attain in any measure to the end we all desire of peace upon earth. It is at least a great, a humane purpose to which, in these days of death and suffering, of misery and sorrow among so large a portion of mankind, we might well dedicate ourselves. We must begin the work. with the clear understanding that our efforts will fail if they are tainted with the thought of personal or political profit or with any idea of self-interest or self-glorification. We cannot possibly succeed in any measure if we mix up plans for future peace with attempts to end this war now raging. We must be content to work within rigid limitations. We may not now succeed even in this restricted way, but I believe that in the slow process of the years others who come after us may attach to it some result not without value. At least we can feel that the effort and the sacrifice which we make will not be in vain when the end in sight is noble, when we are striving to help mankind and lift the heaviest burdens from suffering humanity.

1

A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 1

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

[A. Lawrence Lowell (1856- ) was educated at Harvard, taught political science there from 1897 to 1909, and has since been its president. His chief writings are "Governments and Parties in Continental Europe" (1896) and "The Government of England" (1908). The present selection illustrates very well the careful working out of an argument in favor of a cause, with emphasis upon the most serious objection to it.]

In spite of its ominous sound, the suggestion of a league of nations to enforce peace has no connection with any effort to stop the present war. It is aimed solely at preventing future conflicts after the terrific struggle now raging has come to an end; and yet this is not a bad time for people in private life to bring forward proposals of such a nature. Owing to the vast number of soldiers under arms, to the proportion of men and women in the warring countries who suffer acutely, to the extent of the devastation and misery, it is probable that, whatever the result may be, the people of all nations will be more anxious to prevent the outbreak of another war than ever before in the history of the world. The time is not yet ripe for governments to take action, but it is ripe for public discussion of practicable means to reduce the danger of future breaches of international peace.

The nations of the world to-day are in much the position of frontier settlements in America half a century ago, before orderly government was set up. The men there were in the main well disposed, but in the absence of an authority that could enforce order, each man, feeling no other security from attack, carried arms which he was prepared to use if danger threatened. The first step, when affrays became unbearable,

1 From Atlantic Monthly, September, 1915. Reprinted by permission.

was the formation of a vigilance committee, supported by the enrollment of all good citizens, to prevent men from shooting one another and to punish offenders. People did not wait for a gradual improvement by the preaching of higher ethics and a better civilization. They felt that violence must be met by force, and when the show of force was strong enough, violence ceased. In time the vigilance committee was replaced by the policeman and by the sheriff with the posse comitatus. The policeman and the sheriff maintain order because they have the bulk of the community behind them, and no country has yet reached, or is likely for an indefinite period to reach, such a state of civilization that it can wholly dispense with the police.

Treaties for the arbitration of international disputes are good. They have proved an effective method of settling questions that would otherwise have bred ill-feeling without directly causing war; but when passion runs high, and deeprooted interests or sentiments are at stake, there is need of the sheriff with his posse to enforce the obligation.

There are, no doubt, differences in the conception of justice and right, divergencies of civilization, so profound that people will fight over them, and face even the prospect of disaster in war rather than submit. Yet even in such cases it is worth while to postpone the conflict, to have a public discussion of the question at issue before an impartial tribunal, and thus give to the people of the countries involved a chance to consider, before hostilities begin, whether the risk and suffering of war are really worth while. No sensible man expects to abolish wars altogether, but we ought to seek to reduce the probability of war as much as possible. It is on these grounds that the suggestion has been put forth of a league of nations to enforce peace.

Without attempting to cover details of operation (which are, indeed, of vital importance and will require careful study by experts in international law and diplomacy), the proposal contains four points stated as general objects. The first is

that before resorting to arms the members of the league shall submit disputes with one another, if justiciable, to an international tribunal; second, that in like manner they shall submit non-justiciable questions—that is, such as cannot be decided on the basis of strict international law — to an international council of conciliation, which shall recommend a fair and amicable solution; third, that if any member of the league wages war against another before submitting the question in dispute to the tribunal or council, all the other members shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against the state that so breaks the peace; and fourth, that the signatory powers shall endeavor to codify and improve the rules of international law.

The kernel of the proposal, the feature in which it differs from other plans, lies in the third point, obliging all the members of the league to declare war on any member violating the pact of peace. This is the provision that provokes both adherence and opposition; and at first it certainly gives one a shock that a people should be asked to pledge itself to go to war over a quarrel which is not of its making, in which it has no interest, and in which it may believe that substantial justice lies on the other side. If, indeed, the nations of the earth could maintain complete isolation, could pursue each its own destiny without regard to the rest; if they were not affected by a war between two others or liable to be drawn into it; if, in short, there were no overwhelming common interest in securing universal peace, the provision would be intolerable. It would be as bad as the liability of an individual to take part in the posse comitatus of a community with which he had nothing in common. But in every civilized country the public force is employed to prevent any man, however just his claim, from vindicating his own right with his own hand instead of going to law, and every citizen is bound when needed to assist in preventing him, because that is the only way to restrain private war, and the maintenance of order is of paramount importance for every one. Surely

the family of nations has a like interest in restraining war between states.

It will be observed that the members of the league are not to bind themselves to enforce the decision of the tribunal or the award of the council of conciliation. That may come in the remote future, but it is no part of this proposal. It would be imposing obligations far greater than the nations can reasonably be expected to assume at the present day; for the conceptions of international morality and fair play are still so vague and divergent that a nation can hardly bind itself to wage war on another, with which it has no quarrel, to enforce a decision or a recommendation of whose justice or wisdom it may not be itself heartily convinced. The proposal goes no further than obliging all the members to prevent, by a threat of immediate war, any breach of the public peace before the matter in dispute has been submitted to arbitration; and this is neither unreasonable nor impracticable. There are many questions, especially of a nonjusticiable nature, on which we should not be willing to bind ourselves to accept the decision of an arbitration, and where we should regard compulsion by armed intervention of the rest of the world as outrageous. Take, for example, the question of Asiatic immigration, or a claim that the Panama Canal ought to be an unfortified neutral highway, or the desire by a European power to take possession of Colombia. But we ought not, in the interest of universal peace, to object to making a public statement of our position in these matters at a court or council before resorting to arms; and in fact the treaty between the United States and England, ratified on November 14, 1914, provides that all disputes between the high contracting parties, of every nature whatsoever, shall, failing other methods of adjustment, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent international commission, with a stipulation that neither country shall declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted.