far too unwieldy and miscellaneous a body to deal satisfactorily with any difficult question of legislation, even if strictly under the control of the Ministry; while the frequent changes which the latter undergoes are a fatal impediment to a consistent policy and systematic course of legislative improvement. As a consequence of this, nearly all the changes in our laws and in our foreign and Colonial policy have been the result of popular clamour, and not owing to a conviction of the necessity for the changes in our Legislature.

The proposed remedy is, that the House of Commons should be divided into a number of permanent committees, each of which would have to deal with a particular class of subjects, and would therefore be composed of such members of the House as are most fitted to deal with those subjects. For example, there would be a committee of foreign affairs composed of such members of the House as had given special attention to that subject, a finance committee composed of the most eminent financiers and political economists in the House, and committees similarly constituted for dealing with military, naval, colonial, ecclesiastical affairs, crime, public works, law amendments; in short, there would be a committee for every important class of subjects.

Of course, the political party that had a majority in the House would through the Ministry settle the composition of the committees, but there would no doubt be a constantly increasing tendency to choose the members more on account of their special knowledge and ability than their political opinions. By this plan the large amount of intellect which undoubtedly exists in the House of Commons would be utilised for the benefit of the country instead of being, as it now is in great part,

absolutely wasted. In order, however, that these committees should have any real influence in the House, it would have to be enacted either by an alteration of the standing orders of the House or by a special Act of the Legislature that the House should have no power to alter the details of any measure submitted to it by a committee. It would have either to accept or reject it entirely. Committees of the whole House, which are at present the chief obstacle to rapid and systematic legislation, would in fact be abolished. But surely this need not be regretted. It will be uni versally admitted that there would be a better chance of obtaining good laws from a body of men who had made a special study of the subject on which they had to legislate than from the present vast and unwieldy number, the greater part of whom must necessarily be quite incapable of dealing with the multitude of questions that come before them, yet are allowed in the present constitution of the House to delay the proceedings and frustrate the designs of men whose views are more valuable than their own. The ulterior object of this measure would in fact be one which seems to be becoming more and more of vital necessity, if the existing state of society and civilisation is to be preserved-namely, to place the power of government and legislation as far as is possible in the hands of specially qualified men and removing it from the control of those who are not so qualified. The history of Europe during the last few years ought to open the eyes of everyone on this point. The nation that alone among its neighbours entrusts its affairs to a specially qualified class of men must in the end obtain the mastery over them.

In course of time it might be expected that these committees would become so influential that their measures would always be agreed

to by the House, whose assent would, in fact, become as much a matter of form as that of the Crown now is. And thus the work of legislation would be gradually withdrawn from the hands of the Ministers, and left to bodies of men who would be able to devote their whole time to it. When such a system was once firmly established, we might well hope that the country would enter upon a course of rapid and systematic legislative improvement hitherto unknown to it; while the Ministers, under the present state of things altogether overworked, would be able to give all their energies to the business of administration and the management of the House of Commons.

It only remains to point out that the proposed change is in accordance with previous changes in the English Constitution, and is but a slight development of a practice that has hitherto been gaining ground in both Houses of Parliament. It has been clearly shown by various writers that the English Government has for centuries past been undergoing a process of development, of which one of the chief features is the continual division and subdivision of functions and the organs requisite to perform those functions. Thus out of the comparatively simple form of a king acting by advice of a council, and carrying on in his own person the legislative, administrative, and judicial business of the country, has grown by slow degrees the present complex system of government, in which not only are the above three great functions of government performed by separate bodies, almost independent of one another, but each of the three has been constantly undergoing division as the work to be done became greater in amount and more varied in kind. Instead of a single council of advice, we have a House of Lords and a House of Commons. Instead of a single Minister di

recting the whole affairs of the country, we have fifteen or twenty Ministers, each presiding over a separate department, and each more or less independent of the others, and responsible for his own department only. Instead of a single judge or court of justice to deal with cases of every kind, we have now half-a-dozen different courts, each dealing with a different class of cases. It will be seen, then, that in making a division of the legislative body, we should only be carrying out a process that has been in constant operation for centuries.

Again, the practice of referring Bills to select committees of the House has been growing of late years, and is found to relieve the latter of a great deal of work. The proposed measure would only be an extension and systematisation of this practice by giving greater power to the committees, and rendering them permanent and more carefully constituted. There seems, then, to be nothing in the scheme which should cause it to be opposed by either Liberals or Conservatives. So far from weakening the House of Commons, it would strengthen it by increasing its efficiency for legislative purposes, while, on the other hand, a House of Commons thus constituted would be less likely than it now is to countenance rash and subversive schemes of legislation.

The third measure which appears necessary to complete the renovation of the English Government is one for a reform of the House of Lords. It must be clear to everyone who has watched the recent course of events, that this body has been losing influence in the country at a rate which should alarm those who believe that a second Chamber, if properly constituted, has important functions to fulfil. The only measure that seems likely to restore it to anything approaching to its former influence, by giving it that estimation in the public opinion

which it has of late years so much lost, and without which it is powerless, is one for gradually changing its constitution, and transforming it into a House composed practically of life members. In order, however, to do this in a satisfactory manner, the qualification for membership should be rigorously defined, so that the Ministry of the day would be able to make a selection from only a limited number. For example, all persons who had been ministers of the Crown for a certain number of years-judges, military and naval officers of specified grades, ex-ambassadors and Colonial governors-all who had been at the head of the principal departments of the Civil Service, and perhaps some others, might be deemed eligible for membership of the House of Lords. But in every case they should be required to have filled their offices for a given number of years, so that there could be no evasion of the law by an unscrupulous Ministry. When this system was completely established, there would be a body of men in the House of Lords of great experience in public business, and who would therefore have the thorough confidence of the country, and would also obtain in the House an amount of influence out of all proportion to their numbers. In the next place provision should be made for prevention of any further addition to the hereditary peerage. It might either be arranged that henceforth no further additions should be made to it, or that for the future a creation should be made only on the extinction of a certain number of the existing titles, as is the case now with the Irish peerage. But whichever principle was adopted, the result would, doubtless, in a short time be the same.

Public opinion would refuse to sanction any further addition to the hereditary peerage, and Ministers would act in accordance with it. In order, however, that the Govern

ment might not lose the control which it now has over the House of Lords through its power to create peers indefinitely, it might be enacted that a Ministry should, on an address to the Crown by the House of Commons, be able to recommend the creation of as many peers, without any fixed qualifica tion, as it might think sufficient. And the knowledge of there being this power in the background would restrain the House of Lords from disregarding the opinion of the House of Commons. Besides it

should be remembered that the power of creating life-peers ont of the whole number of those qualified would be unlimited, and that number would be not inconsiderable. So that a Ministry would probably be able to effect its purpose without resorting to the extreme measure of getting the House of Commons to sanction an extra creation. As a matter of fact, an Upper House constituted as above described would be much more likely to act in harmony with the other House than as it is at present constituted, and there would really be very little probability of any quarrel arising between them.

If this reform were carried out, there can be little doubt that in the course of a generation or two the hereditary peers would cease to take any part in the work of legislation, just in the same way as they have ceased to exercise their judicial functions. Legislation would then have become the work of men who had special qualifications for it, just as the judicial power of the House has passed into the hands of men specially qualified to exercise it. And thus the proposed change would be really little more than an extension of the principle involved in the former case. In order, however, to compensate the hereditary peerage for their loss of influence in the Upper House, the law should be altered so as to enable any peer to be

come eligible for a seat in the House of Commons. The effect of this change would doubtless be to hasten the conversion of the House of Lords into a working body composed of life members only, as it seems highly probable that all the ablest of the peers would prefer sitting in the House of Commons to sitting in the Upper House, and those who remained, thus deprived of their leaders, would rapidly lose all influence, and probably soon cease to exercise their rights at all. This measure, however, ought to meet with no opposition from the House of Lords and the Conservative party, as the additional influence they would gain in the House of Commons by the admission of peers to that body would more than compensate for the loss of what small power is yet left to the separate Chamber; and the establishment of such an Upper House as has been above described would be for the real interests of the Conservatives throughout the kingdom.

These, then, are the three measures which suggest themselves as being calculated to stay the growing weakness and incompetence of our governing institutions, and to give to the British Empire such fresh energy as would enable it, beyond all question, to hold its own against any hostile power or combination of powers that might choose to attack it, besides enabling it to deal satisfactorily with the innumerable and complicated problems that our society offers. Now is the best opportunity we can expect to have for settling these great questions. England is at peace with all the world; but no one can say how

long that peace may last. There is

no immediate danger to be feared

from the internal evils of the State; but no one can say that some of those evils may not soon become really and immediately dangerous. The standstill policy of the Conservatives cannot enable us to hold our ground against the competition with other nations that are continually improving their institutions and strengthening the hands of their Governments. Neither is salvation to be looked for from the traditional policy of the Liberals, for that has always been directed towards the weakening of institutions and governments. Some policy, therefore, must be devised which will secure the co-operation of both these great parties, by not being directly antagonistic to the views of either, and that shall at the same time be, in a great measure, in accordance with the historical development of our Constitution. The object of this paper has been to propose such a policy; and unless some similar, if not necessarily identical, scheme be carried out within the next few years, it is to be feared that the ever-changing course of events may sweep away the opportunity for ever. The Colonies may break away from us; the House of Lords may become utterly powerless; and even the House of Commons may become hopelessly discredited in the eyes of the nation. Should such be the case, the days of England's prosperity, and even of her independence, are numbered, and her fate will be that of other nations which, obstinately closing their eyes to the signs of the times until it is too late, have been overwhelmed and swallowed up in the great catastrophes they were unable then to avert.

VOL. VIII.-NO. XLVII. NEW SERIES.

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MONG the wonderful eccentricities that have occasionally afflicted the different nations of Europe, and tempted the investigation of the thinker, none was ever more perplexing than the religious frenzy that seems to have seized France in the very midst of a political crisis, and which at present makes this severely tried country little better than the laughing-stock of the world. Under the influence of a party the more ardent and clamorous from the fact that its principles of governmental autocracy, linked to religious absolutism, have long ago lost their raison d'être in these times of freedom of conscience, the priesthood has borne down upon France, and commenced a reaction with an energy which clearly shows how important they deem the present juncture in their affairs, how precarious their supremacy even among nations of warmer blood and more superstitions temperament than thrive under a northern sun. Italy discards with ever increasing energy the rule of Ultramontanism; indeed, Italy jeers at Paray-le-Monial and Marie Alacoque, and regards with sentiments of distrust a neighbour who, for aught that can be surmised, may again attempt to defend the Syllabus with the chassepôt. Spain for the first time has questioned the supremacy of its priestcraft; and finally, driven from Germany, the pith of Catholicism, the purist upholders of Papal infallibility, the saints of the Calendar, the miraclemongers, cataleptic illuminés, and lunatics who, by a singular provision, are usually chosen as intermediaries between Divine Will and their more healthy brethren; in a word, the full paraphernalia of Ultramontane Catholicism, have

emigrated-whither? To the land that has always plumed itself on its exalted position in the history of human thought, that has striven more than any nation to refute the teachings of fanaticism, that has furnished the most formidable adversaries of superstitionPascal, Diderot, Voltaire, JeanJacques Rousseau. By a singular irony, it is the compatriots of these pioneers of free thought that the Roman Church chooses as fit champions for the diffusion and triumph of its doctrines. France, after being the platform whence reason protested against ignorance and superstition, bids fair to be come the chosen land of superstition and ignorance; already Europe is habituating itself to look there for a little amusement in the contemplation of religious mas querades; and while Notre-Dame d'Auray is proceeding to the miraculous regeneration of France through the medium of certain grave members of the Versailles Assembly, there is unhappily no dearth of faithful to believe in these monstrous impositions. As to the sceptics, it has long been the habit of the class of sensible Frenchmen who discard the pretensions of Ultramontanism to overlook its agitations as too futile to engross any serious attention. Deputies, peasants, townsmen follow the procession of pilgrims; the authorities duly afford the devout every opportunity of gratifying the prescriptions of the Church. Meanwhile, the fate of the country is more than ever undefinable: France remains in a rude and stagnant intellectual condition, altogether in harmony with the worship of fourlegged saints and miraculous wells. The priesthood are not content with such outward tokens of revival of faith; they grasp more tightly all