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the Great Powers chiefly self-denying ordinances. The reference to Alsace-Lorraine is carefully phrased so as to exclude the annexation of the Saar basin, for it is the wrong of 1871 and not the wrong of 1815 which is to be righted. Italy's portion conspicuously ignores strategic considerations; the Russian section avoids mention of the border nations, and except for the establishment of Poland, assumes a reconstitution of the former boundaries of the Empire. Serbia is promised the outlet so long denied her, but Jugo-Slavia is not mentioned because the Austro-Hungarian, Empire's integrity is presupposed. Rumania retains her old boundaries vis-à-vis Hungary. The Czecho-Slovaks do not appear at all. The dismemberment of Turkey is not specified, and the only new state definitely demanded is Poland. Here the phrase "indisputably Polish populations” expressly precludes those geographical fantasies which reach into Lithuanian and Ukrainian territory.
Finally the Fourteen Points do not deal with the mechanism of economic life which the shortage of ships, food and materials compelled the Allies to organize in 1918. That mechanism
barely existed when the Points were formulated. Its bearing upon the whole peace was not understood then except by a few far-sighted men like Mr. Dwight Morrow and Mr. George Rublee. Its bearing is not adequately realized today, as the constitution of the League indicates. Mr. Wilson's ideal, then as now, both in international and in domestic affairs was that New Freedom which is the Old Manchester. But even the fighting edge of that ideal—“the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers” has been blunted by the discovery that not much removal is possible.
(The practice of international coöperation in trade advanced extraordinarily in 1918. But the political appreciation of it lags behind, and we approach the modern period with a new politics and an unrevised industrialism. Not all of our thinking is as swift as events.
D EFORM, not reconstruction, was the in
tention a little over a year ago. But Germany under Ludendorff had no such tame ambition. Facing towards the East she assessed the materials of empire from Finland to Turkestan. Instead of the comparatively modest project of Hamburg to Bagdad she toyed with a bewildering choice of routes and markets and materials and jobs across the Ukraine to the Caucasus. Such a jig-saw puzzle of thrones and concessions never delighted the mind of the craziest diplomat. The only difficulty was that the Allies on the west had hold of Germany's coat tails. To shake them off Ludendorff determined to strike in Picardy for the Empire of the East.
His margin of reserves and materials was too small; a superiority of a little over 300,000 bayonets was not enough to complete the break
through. But it was enough to frighten the Allies into unity, and bring America enormously to France. By June fifteenth, in spite of the defeat in Champagne, Foch commanded more fighting men than Ludendorff, and the superiority was steadily growing. The German government undoubtedly knew the figures, and a little over a week later Kühlmann made his extraordinary speech renouncing military victory while the German army was bombarding Paris. The aggressive faction in Allied circles had guessed a German weakness from the diminished intensity of the June battles west of Soissons, and so a counter-offensive was planned. It was even believed at the end of June, and so prophesied, that the German collapse might occur by the end of September. Three objectives were laid down
-the reduction of the salients at Montdidier, the Marne, and St. Mihiel. Then through excellent intelligence work on the part of the French, the German attack of mid-July was completely foreseen, and brilliantly smashed by General Gouraud's army. The Allied offensive opened immediately, with extraordinary results.
Concurrently, the diplomacy of the Allies was being rearranged on the axiom of a complete victory. The references to Austria-Hungary made by Mr. Lloyd George and the President during the winter had depressed the groups working for the “victoire intégrale." These groups had always been as radically anti-Hapsburg as they were anti-Hohenzollern. Their organ was The New Europe, and they made it the one most indispensable periodical in the English-speaking world. Its contributors were gathered from all parts of Europe, and many of them were themselves leaders in the work by which Allied and American diplomacy was turned during 1918 from the policy of compromise with Austria to that of dismemberment. Masaryk, Benes, Trumbic, Steed, Seton-Watson and others led the way with a skill, an expert knowledge, and a vision which made the rest of us their pupils and their debtors.
Their task was to form a working partnership between the nationalist forces of Central Europe and the Allied cause, to disrupt middle Europe from within while the German army was held and finally beaten in France. They realized