EXAMPLES OF TAX PAYMENTS VERSUS RETIREMENT BENEFITS

1. Worker retired in 1940, wife same age. Before retirement, worker and employer had paid social security taxes for 3 years. Total tax combined—$180. Since retirement, this man and wife have been drawing benefits for 221⁄2 years, totaling $24,973.

2. Worker who retired last January 1 after paying maximum social security tax since 1937, total combined with his employer$2,868. Add interest at 3 percent and this contribution to the trust fund would come to $3,714. Pension from now on will bring him and his wife (same age) $32,074.

3. College graduate started working in 1962, paying maximum social security tax until retirement in year 2005. Total combined tax with employer-$18,564. Add interest at 3 percent and this contribution to the fund would come to $36,226. Pension for him and his wife (same age) would bring total of $33,664.

4. Young man gets job in 1968 and pays maximum tax from then until retirement in year 2011. Total combined tax with employer-$19,092. Add interest at 3 percent

and this contribution to the trust fund would come to $37,954. Assuming this man is widower, with no dependents, and lives only 2 years after retirement, benefits would total $3,048.

SENATE crab-an entirely new marine food resource has become a nationally known and prized delicacy. It is increasingly being marketed.

Now, the Russians are invading these king crab fishing grounds, have destroyed the traps of our American fishermen, and the United States is apparently doing nothing about it.

It is true that many of these traps are outside the 3-mile limit and therefore in international waters. Two remedies, of course, are immediately available: The first would be to extend the fishing limits for all fisheries to 12 miles, and the second-and even more pertinentwould be to extend the limits for the taking of crustacea and shellfish to the Continental Shelf, which would be a wholly proper procedure since crab and shellfish exist on the bottom of the sea. And thereafter a little display of strength and energy by our Federal Government to enforce our rights would be most helpful.

In recent weeks, in addition to the taking of the crab traps, Russian vessels have penetrated within the 3-mile limit, have taken whales there, and have apparently been indifferent to the fact that they were violating our waters.

I have urged, and repeat my request, that the President station some faster vessels in Alaskan waters in order to indicate to these Russians that they cannot continue these illegal practices with immunity. Our Coast Guard vessels are not sufficiently fast to overtake some of the Russian ships, which are modern, up to date and, of course, subsidized by the Russian Government. I hope the President and Secretary of State will realize how bitter the feeling among Alaskan fishermen is becoming and that he will

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 5, 1963] RUSSIANS' ARMOR BALKS U.S. CONVOY ON THE AUTOBAHN-AMERICAN TRUCKS ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH, BUT ARE HELD AT THIRD BARRIER-WASHINGTON WATCHFUL-SAYS DETENTION OF FORCE ON ROAD TO BERLIN IS OF "SERIOUS DIMENSIONS"

troop convoy was blocked by three Soviet BERLIN, Tuesday, November 5.-A U.S. armored personnel carriers late last night when it attempted to break through a blockade at the Marienborn checkpoint on the autobahn to West Berlin.

Soviet guards had held up the convoy of 12 vehicles and 44 men since early yesterday. An official American announcement said the Russian action was a "flagrant violation of the Western allies unrestricted rights of access to Berlin."

The statement warned the Soviet Union that it must bear "the full responsibility for any consequences."

(In Washington, State Department officials said that the blockade had "assumed

quite serious dimensions." Earlier, administration officials had appeared confident that the incident resulted from a misunderstanding by Soviet troops of American procedures and would be settled shortly.)

TRIED TO END DEADLOCK

The confrontation came after the U.S. convoy attempted to break the 15-hour deadlock at the East-West German border point and continue its trip to Berlin.

The Army said that the Russians moved three armored personnel carriers and three Army sedans across the autobahn shortly before midnight "to block any further movement of the U.S. convoy."

"An unknown number of Soviet personnel carriers have also been stationed on the right flank of the U.S. convoy" the Army statement added.

The convoy was delayed at about 9 a.m. yesterday after the Americans refused to submit to a Soviet demand that 15 soldier

FISHERMEN SHOULD BE STOPPED

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a great many Americans nourished the hope that the signing of the test ban treaty with Russia and its ratification by the U.S. Senate would usher in a period of diminishing tensions in the cold war. It was hoped that other steps indicating a departure from Premier Khrushchev's announced purpose to "bury us" would follow. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, this seems not to have been the case. We now have the shocking situation of another blocking of a U.S. troop convoy in Berlin, actions which could not have taken place without the knowledge and approval of the Kremlin, and indeed must have been by its orders. At the same time we have another situation which concerns the people of Alaska greatly, and indeed should concern all Americans, and that is the ruthless invasion of Alaska's crab fishing grounds by Russian fishing vessels and the pulling up and destruction of American fishermen's crab traps.

The development of the Alaska king crab industry was a great pioneering achievement, attributable almost wholly to the initiative and determination of two Alaskan brothers, Howard and Lowell Wakefield. Since that time, in the last decade and a half, Alaska king

which will help protect these resources which have been so painstakingly developed under conservation practices which the Russians do not follow. One of our fishermen, the victim of the Russian raid upon his traps, come alongside a Russian trawler recently and saw what he estimated to be about 10,000 crabs on its deck. It included female and immature crabs which are not taken under American conservation practices. Our crab fishermen, when they find either female or immature crabs in their traps or pots throw them back overboard alive. The Russians do not do that. They take everything.

I hope there will be vigor, initiative, and energy enough in our administration to meet this issue head on. Such action is now overdue.

I ask unanimous consent that two

articles from the New York Times of today, one entitled entitled "Russians' "Russians' Armor Balks U.S. Convoy on the Autobahn" together with a subsequent dispatch from Washington headed "United States Files Protest," as well as an article by Lawrence E. Davies, the west coast correspondent of the New York Times, en"Soviet titled Crab Raid Haunts Alaskans: Future Russian Action Is Subject of Deep Concern," be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

a head count.

The convoy commander said that the demand conflicted with Allied procedures. U.S. Army spokesmen said that the Soviet command in Berlin had been informed of these troops submit to a count, and that there was no chance of a misunderstanding.

procedures, involving conditions under which

The American, British, and French commanders in Berlin met this afternoon to discuss the Soviet move. A statement said that the three generals had decided "on how

to deal with the situation."

hours a 3-day field exercise that was to have The U.S. Army later postponed for 24 taken the entire American garrison to the Grunewald Forest tomorrow morning. All Allied troops in Berlin were placed on an alert.

It was reported that the U.S. Army intended to send a convoy to stand by at Marienborn near the East-West German border.

The delayed convoy consists of 12 vehicles with 44 men, of whom 20 are passengers. The Russians demanded that seven men rid

ing in the back of one truck and four each

in two others should get down to be counted.

The convey commander, 1st Lt. John Lamb, refused. Then the Soviet officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel Spiridonov, said

that it was "the Soviet and not the Allied authorities who determine convoy processing procedures."

This position was disputed by the Ameri

cans.

The troops detained at Marienborn consisted of men from Company C of the 2d

Battalion, 6th Infantry. They were returning to Berlin from a training exercise in West Germany.

Lieutenant Lamb, 25 years old, the convoy commander, is from North Augusta, S.C. At nightfall the American vehicles remained parked at the roadside.

The Army rejected as untrue an East German charge that the convoy was obstructing civilian traffic on the East-West highway.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 5, 1963]

UNITED STATES FILES PROTEST WASHINGTON, November 4.-The United States formally protested today against the delay by Soviet troops of an American military convoy attempting to enter West Berlin early in the day.

The convoy of 12 vehicles, carrying 20 passengers, was held up at 3 a.m. Washington time at the Marienborn checkpoint of the autobahn leading into Berlin through East Germany. It was still blocked at nightfall.

Administration officials nevertheless ap

peared confident that the incident resulted from a misunderstanding by Soviet troops of American procedures. They believed the issue would be settled soon without damaging East-West efforts to ease cold war tensions.

The

[Ranking American officials in Berlin said that there was no question of a misunderstanding since the Russians had been notified in writing of Allied procedures. harassment was viewed there as a deliberate attempt by the Soviet command to whittle away Western rights on traffic between Berlin and West Germany.]

EARLIER CONVOY BLOCKED

A 2-day blockade of an American convoy last month was viewed at first as indicating a hardening of Soviet policy. Later, however, it was acknowledged to be the result of independent action by Russian commanders unfamiliar with regulations governing autobahn traffic.

Then, as today, the Soviet officials insisted that American troops leave their vehicles to be counted before entering the city.

American commanders have instructions not to allow their men to dismount if the convoys carry fewer than 31 passengers, not counting drivers and assistant drivers.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the administration's concern over the blocking of the convoy at a 10-minute mid-morning meeting with Georgi M. Korniyenko, counselor at the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Rusk had previously discussed the incident with President Kennedy and Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Ambassador at Large and former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow.

It was understood that a mild representation was agreed on as the first step and that it would become firmer the longer the blockade remained effective.

ENVOYS MAY MEET

In contrast to Washington's reaction to the last blockade October 11, the administration did not call for an emergency session of the four-power ambassadorial steering committee on Berlin affairs.

A high State Department source said tonight that the group, composed of representatives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, would probably

be convened tomorrow if the blockade continued.

The first protests against the blockade were made this morning by U.S. officials to Soviet commanders at the Marienborn checkpoint.

U.S. military commanders in Berlin were also ordered to protest the incident at the Soviet Army headquarters in Potsdam.

REAFFIRM WEST'S RIGHTS

The American representations were primarily intended to reaffirm Western rights of access to Berlin. They also were to remind

the Soviets of procedures jointly agreed on after Soviet forces delayed the American convoy for 52 hours last month.

The Western allies notified the Soviet commanders in Berlin on October 29 that a new procedure had been established under which troops in large convoys would be dismounted for inspection.

It was stressed that this was for the "information and convenience" of the Soviet guards and that the dismounting was a matter of "courtesy" and not of Soviet rights.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 5, 1963] SOVIET CRAB RAID HAUNTS ALASKANS—FUTURE RUSSIAN ACTION IS SUBJECT OF DEEP CONCERN

(By Lawrence E. Davies) ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, November 3.-The Soviet Union's future policy toward Alaska's rich crab fishery is a subject of deep concern

in the 49th State.

State and Federal officials, the Coast Guard, crab fishermen and communities dependent for jobs on this $12-million-a-year industry for jobs on this $12-million-a-year industry are watching every development in a delicate and potentially explosive situation.

A segment of a big Soviet fishing fleet irked Alaskan crabbers late last summer with a

damaging sortie into the Kodiak area. Seven Russian trawlers, using a type of dragnet outlawed for Alaska crab fishermen, included in their "catch" Alaskan crab pots valued at from $20,000 to $25,000.

The incident brought threats of retaliation from Kodiak crabmen, along with protests to the State Department.

The crab fishermen, however, realize that under existing laws the Federal Government is unable to terminate fishing by foreign craft, Russian or Japanese, in the crab-rich waters.

PRESIDENTIAL ACTION SOUGHT

Nevertheless, a campaign continues to try to persuade the Kennedy administration to declare the Alaskan king crab a resource of the continental shelf. The shelf and many other fishing sites extend far beyond the 3-mile limit, where the Soviet fishing has been done.

State officials, including Gov. William A. Egan and Attorney General George N. Hayes, contend that all governments would respect a simple declaration by the President to that effect.

Mr. Hayes recently noted at Juneau that a 1958 Geneva convention, which provides that a nation may declare what is found on the floor of the continental shelf to be a resource of the contiguous nation, now has 21 of 22 signatures necessary to make it

international law.

The bulk of the Soviet fleet of large trawlers and fish-processing vessels has now retired beyond the Aleutians. The total strength of both Russian and Japanese fleets in Alaskan waters is now estimated to be about 50 vessels. However, the Russians alone are believed to have had 180 fishing vessels in the eastern Bering Sea and North Pacific last summer.

Crab fishing is done the year-round, and the winter months are often among the most

productive. Mayor Pete Deveau of Kodiak, a fisherman who operated a crab cannery for 9 years, says the crabmeat taken from December through March is prime.

There is speculation, therefore, that the Soviet fleet has retired only temporarily. The Coast Guard, under the supervision of Rear Adm. G. D. Synon, commandant of the 17th District with headquarters at Juneau, is maintaining an aerial and surface surveillance.

"We regard the Alaska fishermen as people who are entitled to our help and protection rather than as objects of our law enforcement," the admiral said in an interview. "But we still require that the law be observed under all conditions."

His comment was made against the background of reports that some Kodiak fishermen were trying to obtain war surplus weapons for their vessels.

NO WEAPONS FOUND

The law empowers the Coast Guard to board ships for enforcement of Federal marine laws. A number of the crab fishing boats have been boarded, but no illegal weapons have been found.

Ronald C. Naab, the Federal Government's fisheries management supervisor for the Alaskan region, said the Russian fleet moved through the Unimak Pass in the Aleutians and fished for Pacific perch at Portlock Bank, directly east of Kodiak, in late July. Then, in reduced numbers, it headed for Albatross Bank to the southwest about mid-August, he said.

Finally, Mr. Naab continued, seven trawlers moved into a favorite Kodiak fishing ground, Alitok Bay, "apparently for crab."

Alitok Bay is an area where Americans have been fishing for crabs for 15 years, carefully nurturing the fishery, officials say, under protective statutes. The law requires them to use crab pots and prohibits the dragging of nets along the ocean floor.

As a further conservation measure, Alaskan fishermen are required to throw back all female crabs and those male crabs that measure less than 7 inches across the body.

DAMAGE TO CRABS CITED

According to testimony at an official hearing conducted at Kodiak afterward, the Russians kept everything they swept up with nets, leaving many injured crab on the bottom.

Alaska crabmen use fishing vessels from 35 to 110 feet long. The large boats are in the minority.

The vessels set out at 1 or 2 a.m. the year round, carrying crews of two to four men depending on the size of the vessel and the distance offshore to be fished.

"Real large vessels-100 feet or more-stay right out 3 or 4 days," Mayor Deveau said. "They lay out there till they get a load. Small boats fix their pots and gear, come back into port and go back maybe the next day."

In the Kodiak area each boat is limited to 30 crab pots, steel frames with webbing around them. The pots measure about 10 feet long, 4 to 5 feet wide and 3 to 4 feet deep. They cost, complete with plastic buoys that float on the surface, $150 to $300 each. The buoys are attached by lines to the pots on the ocean floor, sometimes at depths of 900 feet.

"We use frozen herring as bait," Mayor Deveau continued. "The crabs smell it in plastic containers inside the pot and they crawl toward it through a tunnel. I've seen some big pots come up with 125 to 150 crabs in them."

A record crab, he said, weighed 26 pounds and measured more than 6 feet from the tip of one leg to another. It takes a male crab 7 or 8 years to grow to acceptable size.

The Russian trawlers, on the other hand, are equipped to stay on the fishing grounds months at a time.

The incident in which the seven Soviet vessels invaded an area where Kodiak crab fishers were numerous occurred not far in advance of North Pacific Treaty renegotiation talks held by the United States, Canada, and Japan in Tokyo.

Lowell Wakefield, who operates a processing plant at Port Wakefield 40 miles northwest of Kodiak, and who was an American adviser at the Tokyo sessions, said the Soviet fishermen might have acted "to force us to invite Russia to join in."

He suggested that in most cases where crab pots had been lost, the Soviet actions had not been deliberate. However, he told a recent meeting of the State chamber of commerce at Juneau that the situation was one

"By destroying some of the gear the Russians apparently felt the Americans would pack up and go home," he declared.

Mr. Hayes and other officials asserted, however, that they did not think the maneuvers were "necessarily directed by Moscow."

Oscar Dyson, one of the witnesses, testified that he and his fishing partner were "going to find some means-what it is I don't know of taking care of our own property in our own way."

Mr. Dyson indicated he had nothing specific in mind beyond such steps as "urging our Government to give some protection for our gear."

"Most American fishermen feel our Government in the last 10 years has taken a more or less weakened position in the fishery question," he said.

THE ATLANTIC'S FUTURE:
EUROPE'S CHOICE

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I invite the attention of my colleagues to a singularly interesting and provocative article entitled "The Atlantic's Future: Europe's Choice" by the able and thoughtful senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] which appears in the current November issue of Harper's magazine.

Senator CHURCH has always been a man with a fine and far-reaching intellect. More important, he has never been afraid to use it. In the changing and fast-moving world in which we live, this ability to explore and probe for openings, to seek out new policies which might be more effective and advantageous to the United States, is an excellent quality.

Our national policies must be the servants of our national interests. When policies become stultified by a changing world, then the policies must change, because we certainly cannot roll back the tide of world events, nor should we want to do so. Too often our adherence to outdated policies remind me of the man who, with considerable effort, has lost a great deal of weight. He then finds his suits do not fit him, so what does he do? Instead of buying new suits, or cutting the old suits down to his present size, he feels he must immediately regain weight in order to fill out his old suits.

Senator CHURCH points out that two sensible alternatives face Western Europe today. The European can either develop an all European multilateral nuclear deterrent, in which case there is no more need for us to remain in Europe. Or they can rely on the American nuclear deterrent, in which case they must carry more of the financial burdens, leadership and manpower responsibilities in the free world. But the Europeans

must make one choice or the other.

I ask unanimous consent to insert this remarkably thoughtful article, and an article with which I find myself in general agreement, in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ATLANTIC FUTURE: EUROPE'S CHOICE (By Senator FRANK CHURCH) (NOTE. FRANK CHURCH, the guest in the easy chair this month, has been U.S. Senator from Idaho since 1957 and is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was keynoter of the Democratic National Convention in 1960, and a military intelligence officer in World War II.)

If the partial test ban treaty is the first crack in the glacier we call the cold war, it should serve to remind us of how massive and

prolonged a thaw is yet required before the danger of nuclear disaster finally melts away. In the years immediately ahead, the treaty in no sense diminishes the importance of our defensive alliances, chief among which is NATO.

Yet NATO is now drifting into a deepen

ing crisis that our European allies seem either unwilling or unable to counteract. Everyone agrees, on both sides of the Atlantic, as to the fact that a crisis exists. Paradoxically, it is the very success of NATO in accomplishing its original objectives which has led to the present impasse.

NATO was originally established to prevent Western Europe, the heartland of our common civilization, from falling under Russian rule. For over 14 years, NATO's shield has included large numbers of American troops, whose presence in Europe has been proof of the American commitment to invoke her nuclear power, as NATO's sword, in the event of a Communist attack. American arms of both conventional and nuclear character were required to make NATO work; that is, to keep the Russians at bay while the countries of Western Europe, battered and broken in the aftermath of the war, were regaining their

health and strength.

welcomed into a

I do not believe that either the American people or the Senate of the United States, which ratified the treaty establishing NATO, regarded our entry as an arrangement for stationing American forces permanently in Europe. Firemen are household threatened by fire, but they are not expected to remain inside indefinitely as residents. So it ought not to be surprising-in view of the remarkable recovery in Western Europe which has occurred that some Europeans should begin to ask, "How much longer are the Americans to stay?" or that some Americans should begin to inquire, "How much longer will we be wel

come?"

We have come to the end of the era for

which NATO was created. The circumstances have changed. We must remold the alliance to fit present conditions, or the crisis within it will grow. NATO cannot remain static and stay relevant; it must be transformed or abandoned; it will adapt to the new era as a useful instrument to serve the

objectives we hold in common with our allies, or it will come apart from the stress of mounting internal pressures. So we must clearly identify those changes in circumstances which have rendered NATO, as originally conceived, obsolete.

To begin with, there has been a change in the relative strength and hence in the credi

bility, of the American nuclear deterrent. This change has taken place in three phases. In the first phase, only the United States possessed massive strike capability with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union could oppose us with conventional land power alone. Our deterrent was believable and, therefore, effective, so long as the Soviets in fact understood that it would be used to prevent, or to punish intolerably, a march by them on the West. In the second phase, the Soviets, too, possessed weapons of mass de

struction. But the ones which could reach

and damage the American Continent were few in number and vulnerable to neutralization by the enormously superior and diversified nuclear weapons system which we had by then developed. While the risks to the United States had been greatly increased, there was room to suppose that we could, if necessary, obliterate Soviet power without suffering mortal damage in return. Now in the third and present phase, this assumption can no longer be made. Each nuclear giant possesses weapons sufficient in number, in diversification, in concealment, or in invulnerability, to insure that it could withstand a first strike by its adversary and thereafter inflict nearly total destruction upon him.

The consequence of this third phase is that Europeans must ask themselves-for the first time-if it is really believable that the American nation would suffer immolation in their defense. And the question is not whether we, the Americans, believe that we would do this, or whether the Europeans believe we would do it. For it is evident that a deterrent has failed if it has to be used, and it follows from this that it is only the Russian belief about the conditions under which it would be used-not our belief or that of our allies, or even the objective fact itself-which is ultimately determinative.

I know of no way to remove, absolutely, the doubts which some Europeans have raised about the answer to this question. The cornerstone of American policy has been, and remains, that the defense of the West is indivisible. Our President has recently reaffirmed, in Germany, that our forces will remain so long as they are wanted and needed; that we will put our cities to the hazard in defense of theirs. He spoke with absolute sincerity and conviction, and with the support of the American people. Still, the proposition itself is without precedent in human history. It cannot be tested or proved in advance. While it may be convincing to the Soviets, it evidently is no longer convincing to all Europeans, for, if it were, there would clearly be no need for France to pursue the effort now in progress to create, at great difficulty and expense, a separate national nuclear capability.

This brings me to the second fundamental change in circumstances which accounts for the crisis in NATO. It is that Europe now has, for the first time, the capacity to create for itself an alternative to reliance upon American power. I make a distinction here between nuclear capability of modest dimensions, useful chiefly as a means of augmenting the prestige or bargaining power of its possessor-perhaps having the potential of invoking, under some conditions, the use of American power-and a genuine nuclear deterrent, capable of massive or controlled response in a variety of strategic situations. It is the latter which free Europe now has the population, the economic base, the technological resources, and the developing political institutions to create and command, if it chooses. In most of these categories, Western Europe now surpasses the Soviet Union itself. If Europe determines that the effort is necessary or desirable, it can in due course equip itself to match the Soviet Union, bomb for bomb, rocket for rocket. It would then, of course, be free from dependence upon a nuclear deterrent provided and controlled by the United States.

The present drift in free Europe points toward the eventual development of separate national nuclear systems, even though this course represents the most unstable, costly, and inefficient method for achieving nuclear self-sufficiency. Perhaps this is inevitable, as long as Western Europe remains a loose association of wholly sovereign states. The possession of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from the sovereign power to command them, for they represent in today's

world the instruments of life or death-for the country which has them, for its adversaries, and quite probably for its allies.

What I have thus far said carries the implication that there is an inherent incompatibility in this new state of affairs between sovereignty, if that sovereignty involves possession and control of nuclear weapons, and alliance. I think this is the case, and that this single concept summarizes and explains the reasons for the crisis in NATO.

The continued expansion in Europe of nuclear capability under national control will expose the United States to intolerable risks, so long as our troops are there, and so long as we are committed to regard any attack upon our European allies as an attack upon ourselves. In these circumstances, every additional national finger upon the nuclear trigger means one more country other than the United States with power to decide what Americans will die for. While the risks involved in sharing this fateful power with a single independent European state, or with a suitable command structure representing all of Western Europe, might be acceptable, it is too much to ask that we share it with every European country stocking a nuclear arsenal of its own, each with its own sense of destiny and order of priorities.

In short, the present drift toward proliferation in the control of nuclear weapons unless it is checked, will eventually force the United States to withdraw from Europe. Time is running out on the NATO alliance. The 1960's will tell the tale.

What then of the future? How are we to reconcile the conflicting positions on control of nuclear weapons which now plague the alliance? I think we must begin by recognizing that no device or technical arrangement designed to gloss over the differences, without really changing anything, will suffice. As strongly as De Gaulle feels that France must have its own deterrent, we feel just as strongly that we must retain control over the risks to which we are exposed-so long as American forces are committed in Europe and we supply the nuclear means for meeting or preventing an attack against it. It is possible to share a master plan for programing and targeting, but the core decisions about the use of American nuclear weapons must be made by Americans.

I think there are, however, alternative solutions to the problem. The first is for Europe-not France or Germany or even Great Britain, but Western Europe to undertake a unified effort to arm itself with a genuine nuclear-deterrent capability. To do this would require an integrated program, not merely because of the expense, but chiefly because it would be necessary to create a unified command structure with the sovereign power to invoke the use of its nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. It seems to me that it would be in the interest of the United States to encourage and assist Europeans to make this effort. We could then withdraw our forces from the Continent in an orderly fashion, leaving Europe with its own defense, and both Europe and America could thus minimize the risks inherent in the proliferation of separate national defenses.

This course need not involve, as might be first supposed, a return to isolationism on the part of the United States. On the contrary, the creation of a European entity capable of assembling and commanding a unified European nuclear deterrent could contribute to a stronger partnership, spanning the Atlantic, for the defense and development of our common civilization. I say it could contribute, because partnership is illusory if one partner is in a position to dominate the others. Just as there can be no authentic European entity under the hegemony of France, so there can be no equal

partnership across the Atlantic until Europe has achieved cohesion to match and balance the unified power of the United States.

In addition to this advantage, there would be others incidental to Europe's assuming full responsibility for its own defense. The American adverse balance-of-payments problem would then lend itself to ready solution. It is entirely possible, also, that the vexing problems resulting from the artificial division of Europe between East and West, which do not seem amenable to negotiations between Washington and the Kremlin, could be approached from new perspectives by Europeans negotiating with Europeans.

If the problem of attaining a sovereign, integrated European Nuclear Defense Command proves to be insuperable, and this further step toward a more perfect union among the countries of Western Europe is not taken, there is the other alternative: Let Europe forgo nuclear armament and continue, so long as the cold war makes it necessary, to rely upon the United States to furnish the nuclear deterrent against a Soviet attack upon the Continent.

From our national point of view, this alternative is to be preferred; but I think that if we Americans are to be Europe's nuclear sentinels, stationed there for indefinite duty, then we have a right to ask our allies for fairer arrangements.

Let it be understood that we are there as invited guests, not as intruders; that our presence in Europe is no longer a rescue mission, extended by the strong to the weak, but simply a division of responsibility, as between rich equals, for mutual adIf we furnish our nuclear devantage. terrent for the defense of Europe, as well as our physical presence to make this deterrent convincing to the Soviets, then Europe must make fair exchanges, including at least two elements:

1. No further diffusion of nuclear arms, for this will involve intolerable risks, both to us and to Europe itself. If we are to

ing Chancellor Adenauer and Berlin Mayor Brandt.

Although I spoke only my personal views at Tutzing, the reaction to my speech caused me to feel that the United States ought to acknowledge openly that Europeans have their choices to make.

If nuclear parity for Western Europe becomes their chosen course, then it can be realized only through the creation of a genuine European deterrent. This would be a great step toward European union, even if it had to be undertaken initially without De Gaulle. An empty chair could always be left for France to occupy eventually.

We must never forget that the most critical test of a deterrent is its credibility. A substantial nuclear retaliatory force, able to survive and strike back lethally at an aggressor-commanded by Europeans-is the most believable deterrent that can be posed against any future threat to attack Europe. Its existence would minimize the risk that the Soviets might someday mistake our intention or our will to defend Europe as our own homeland, and thus reduce the chance of war.

Further, the establishment of such a force in Europe would enable us to restore normalcy to our relationship with the continent. History has a way of abhorring anomalies. It is as unnatural for American troops and weapons to be stationed indefinitely on European soil, as it would be for French, British, or German soldiers to be permanently billeted here in the United States.

Finally, the deliberate substitution of a European nuclear force would permit the orderly withdrawal of American power from Western Europe, under conditions of our rope's security or our own. own choosing, without impairment of Eu

I must report, however, that German reaction seemed heavily to favor the second of the alternatives I suggested-a confining reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. If other

2. Equitable financial and economic arrangements to assist us in solving our adverse balance-of-payments problem. In this

connection, it is notable that our military

disbursements abroad contribute five times as much to the drain on our dollar resources as do all of our foreign-aid programs. There is no good reason why the force levels of American troops quartered in Europe should not be reduced, and the difference made up by an added commitment of European troops to the NATO command. It is essential, too, that European trade barriers against American agricultural and industrial products be reduced or removed as speedily as possible. Finally, we have a right to ask that Europe assume an increased share of the cost of aiding the underdeveloped countries of the world in those needy regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America where the struggle with communism is yet to be won.

There are heavy burdens and responsibilities, for Europeans as well as for Americans, whichever alternative is chosen. And the choice, after all, is Europe's. Either course would seem acceptable to the United States. What is not acceptable is a continuation of present trends which point toward the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance, leaving a vacuum of policy and power, with diminished security for all.

These thoughts were largely the substance of an address I delivered this June at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, Bavaria, before a gathering of lay leaders representing various professional, business, and labor groups. The conference was attended by numerous German political leaders, includ

German belief that Europe is not yet prepared to form a single nuclear command, it seems all the more important to me to confront the Europeans with the fact that they do have such an alternative within their reach and that this choice is theirs.

Our failure to do just this is helping to widen the gulf between the developing attitudes in Washington and the capitals of Western Europe. As James Reston recently observed in his column in the New York Times:

"The leaders in London and Bonn increasingly talk as if they were spectators rather than participants in the conflict between the giant nations.

"Britons see nothing odd in the fact that America should conscript its men to defend Europe while Britain has not only abandoned conscription but is hoping to bring its army back from Germany.

"The widely held assumption in West Europe is that Europe can be both protectionist and prosperous, self-sufficient economically and dependent on the United States militarily, and that Washington will go on putting 11 percent of its gross national product into defense and foreign aid while some of the allies are doing less than half as much proportionately.

"How this attitude of mind developed in Europe is clear enough. In the early postwar years of poverty and reconstruction, Western Europe not only came to rely on the United States but gradually accepted the idea that power in the modern world had become proportional to mass, and therefore that only gross material size (population, area, and raw materials) could be effective in world politics. There is now less evidence of poverty and unemployment anywhere in Western Europe than in many parts of the United States but this attitude persists and,

what is more disturbing, seems to be growing."

Once the Europeans realize that we are not imposing our presence upon them for purposes of our own defense, and that their continued reliance upon our nuclear power is the result of their own decision, then they will see the justice in assuming an increased burden in conventional arms, as their share of the common effort, and in helping us to solve some of our financial problems which are directly related to the cost of our presence in Europe.

Moreover, for Europeans to make this choice consciously will reduce the appeal of de Gaulle's resistance to American leadership on the Continent, and render more acceptable our insistence that other European nations must forgo separate nuclear armaments of their own.

After I had spoken at Tutzing, one of the Germans in the audience said to me, "Senator, you have made a hard speech, but an honest one. To us, this is the best evidence of real friendship."

Another said, "As I see it, you have told us we will have to pay more. I think you are right."

THE WHEAT DEAL-WHO IS
CONCEDING TO WHOM?

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, since President Kennedy's announcement of this Nation's willingness to sell wheat to

The same suggestion was made last week in Lincoln, Nebr., by Dr. Galen Saylor, chairman of the University of Nelor, chairman of the University of Nebraska's Department of Secondary Education.

Dr. Saylor, who has spent considerable time in Finland, reminded the Lincoln Kiwanis Club that Russia insists on political guarantees from Finland in order that the Finns may gain trade agreements with the Soviets.

Why not turn the tables on Russia now that she needs the wheat? If she balks at our conditions, let her go elsewhere for wheat. The sale of a mere fraction of our surplus wheat is not so important as to justify a a compromising, timid attitude towards international relations on our part.

It is interesting, Mr. President, that Dr. Saylor used the word "compromising," Saylor used the word "compromising," because that is exactly the word Sunday's

New York Times used in its headline over a story by William M. Blair which relates that the administration is backing away from its initial insistence that the wheat be shipped to Russia in American vessels.

discussion as to whether the United States should not demand appropriate political concessions in return.

A thoughtful discussion of this matter appeared in this Sunday's edition of the Washington Post in an article by Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and professor of public law and government at Columbia University.

Professor Brzezinski points out that the sale of wheat to the Soviets cannot be justified on humanitarian grounds:

First of all, there is no famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis. It could certainly divert some of its resources from heavy industry to better agricultural management and it is still capable of providing the basic staples to meet Russian needs.

The wheat deal, says this expert on

Russian affairs, is vital to the Kremlin

for two reasons:

The first is the stability of the collective agricultural system itself. Over many years, that system has failed to deliver the goods, at least so far as the Soviet consumer is concerned. Yet to the political leadership, the collective system is essential.

Secondly, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political

reasons.

Thus, Mr. President, since the wheat deal is so clearly in the interests of supporting and maintaining the present Communist system, it seems particularly strange that the administration appears completely unwilling to follow the course suggested by Professor Brzezinski:

This wheat deal ought to be viewed in a political perspective and U.S. negotiators ought to seek political concessions from the Soviets in return.

CIX-1327

concessions.

Last week, speaking to a Nebraska that Russia's principal purpose in makaudience about the wheat sale, I stated that Russia's principal purpose in making the purchase was to resell the wheat to other nations for a profit. Her concern, in other words, was not to relieve any hunger within her own borders, but to fulfill wheat export obligations to the Eastern Europe satellites, to Latin satellites, to Latin American nations and elsewhere. In this fashion Russia clearly intends not only to get back the $250 million she would pay to the United States for the wheat, but also to reap a profit by the transaction.

Is it not curious that with our own commodities and cooperation, the same nation which has boasted she will bury expend a $1 billion a week, every week us-and which therefore compels us to in the year, to maintain an invincible defense posture-is assured of getting a profitmaking $250 million wheat sale without giving any concessions on her One could say this is a own part? mighty poor showing for well-known Yankee shrewdness. I only hope that the Kennedy round elsewhere is more successful.

Last Friday night in my home city of Omaha, a White House spokesman attempted to reply to the portion of my remarks about Russia's use of the wheat purchased for resale to other nations. In part, he stated:

Possibly Senator HRUSKA has information ment of State, and the Department of Agrithe Central Intelligence Agency, the Departculture do not have. From the best information that could be gathered, the Russians do need wheat for internal commitments.

Mr. President, the information upon which this Senator based his statement

came from the State and Agriculture Departments. Speaking in the Senate on October 2, Senator COOPER told of the joint meeting which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Agriculture Committee held on September 30. Present in addition to the members of the committees were the Under Secretary of State George Ball, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, and Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges. Senator CoOPER attended the meeting. He told this body:

If the proposal were to relieve hunger in Russia, I have no doubt that there would be no great objection by the Congress and the people generally, because the relief of hunger wherever it may occur has been the traditional policy of our country But it is not claimed by the executive branch of our Government that the wheat is needed to relieve hunger in Russia.

And at another point in his thoughtful remarks, Senator COOPER declared:

I conclude by saying that the proposed sale of wheat may not be a major transaction. On the other hand, it would not relieve hunger in the Soviet Union. It would enable the Soviet Union to meet its trade commitments.

These conclusions were reached by the Senator from Kentucky after listening to the discussions of the Under Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce. If the administration were not so averse to Cabinet meetings, perhaps the White House spokesman to whom I have referred would have learned what is generally known and accepted in the Capital and which Mr. Brzezinski put in these words in his Washington Post article:

First of all, there is no famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the Government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis.

Second, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political reasons.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD Professor Brzezinski's article from the November 3 edition of the Washington Post, an account of Dr. Saylor's speech which the Lincoln Journal, and Mr. Blair's arappeared in the November 1 edition of ticle from the November 3 New York Times.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Nov. 3, 1963] POLICIES OF WHEAT DEAL GIVES UNITED STATES

UPPER HAND

(By Zbigniew Brzezinski)

It has been argued that the wheat deal with the Soviet Union is desirable on humanitarian grounds. If Russian people are starving, the United States should not stand back, said former President Truman on the

radio, and he has been echoed by some clergymen and by various people of good will.

Others have suggested that the wheat deal is purely a matter of economics. The Russians need our wheat; we can use their gold. Their food needs will be met; our food surpluses will be diminished. We both gain equally.

The humanitarian argument can be dismissed quickly. First of all, there is no