Sweden_-_

United Kingdom.. Japan

European regional.

Fiscal year 1963-Continued [In millions]

Poland---

Sweden_-_

Amount

United Kingdom..

$4.2

Japan----

18.8

European regional___

15.0

0

2.2

23

Amount $10.8 None 11.2 172.9 211.9

The funds listed here for Belgium41.0 Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are virtually all military. For Italy, too, over $72 million of her aid is military. They are able to support themselves. If they wish to buy from us, I do not seek to prevent that, but I do not believe we should give them aid money.

0 105.3 14.8

0

27.5 141.8 173. 1

The figures I am using are for all forms of aid. They include food for peace, Export-Import Bank loans, and other forms of aid that are not covered in the Foreign Assistance Act. It is also true that my amendment, banning further aid to them under the Foreign Assistance Act, would not affect the food-for-peace program, not Export-Import operations. But the great bulk of this money is still under the foreign aid program now under consideration. More specifically, the great bulk of it is in the form of military aid, and most of that is grant aid. But not all. We are also making loans for military assistance that would not be affected by the language in the

committee bill.

I also point out that throughout the fiscal years since 1960, we have been sending aid, so we are told, "to carry out previous commitments." In a moment, I shall discuss the aid figures for fiscal 1963, and it will become evident that these previous commitments are apparently indefinite. Unless we direct the President to renegotiate and revise downward our "previous commitments," we will not be able to terminate our aid to Western Europe as the committee obviously desires to do.

I call attention to the aid figures for fiscal 1963 as they affect these countries. They show that little, if any, improvement was made over the previous year. The total for Western Europe was $705.7 million, with another $172.9 million for Japan. That is a total of $878.6 million.

The substantial increase over the previous year is due in part to large loans to Austria, Italy, and Japan from the Export-Import Bank, which would not be affected by my amendment. But the military aid programs showed little difference from the previous year, and in many cases were higher than in 1962. The breakdown is as follows: Fiscal year 1963 [In millions]

Austria.

Belgium-Luxembourg--.

Denmark__.

Finland---

France_.

Germany

Iceland.

Ireland_
Italy_-_
Netherlands___
Norway--

I predict that unless Congress does three things in this area, the figures for fiscal 1964, which are now classified, will turn out to be almost the same as for fiscal 1963. The three things we must do are to specify the countries that are not to receive any more aid, extend the ban to loan aid, and direct a downward revision of our existing commitments. My amendment does the first by directing that no further aid is to go to the list of nations found by the United Nations to be economically developed. As I have already said, these are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Rumania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To this list I have added the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland, which are not members of the United Nations.

Unless we are specific, the Pentagon and our AID administrators will continue to find justification for these programs. The committee language does, after all, leave it up to the President, which is another way of saying it is up to the administrators of the program, to determine what countries are economically developed and able to finance their own defenses. You will inevitably find that when the Pentagon is anxious to have a country engage in some military activity that it is reluctant to finance itself, there will be a finding that the said country is unable to finance its defense.

Therefore, I believe it is important that we name these countries.

The language added by the committee says that "no assistance shall be furnished on a grant basis under this Act to any economically developed nation capable of sustaining its own defense burden and economic growth," and then it makes two further exceptions, one for commitments entered into before July 1, 1963, and orientation and training ex$31.4 penses for military purposes up to $1 million per country.

as well as grants. As I have pointed out, we are making loans to nations of Western Europe for military purposes. There is nothing in the committee bill that would put a stop to that practice.

Those nations are capable of financing their own military commitments. Furthermore, I believe our loans should go to other parts of the world, where they are most sorely needed. That is why I am a strong supporter of increasing our loans on a specific project basis to Latin America, to name one area.

The third thing Congress must do is direct the President to revise downward our existing commitments to these countries. There are some who feel that my language goes too far in that direction, and I am perfectly willing to listen to suggestions for its revision. But if there is not some renegotiation, the grants will continue to flow into Western European nations, and perhaps into Japan, as well.

left up to our administrators, my answer would be that we have waited for several years for the AID administrators to turn off this particular spigot. They have not done so, and I can only reach the conclusion that they never will.

If I should be told all this should be

My second response is to take a look at what new plans are being pressed right now in the Departments of State and Defense for Western Europe. After the ugly experience we have had in trying without success to get our NATO partners to meet their commitments, after the continuation of military aid to them long after they were able to pay their own way, the American policymakers decided we should embark on a whole new NATO program for which the United States would pay 40 percent.

This was the proposal for the NATO surface fleet. This was not a proposal that was initiated among our allies. It was not something we decided to go along with reluctantly. To the contrary, it was our own idea. It was our idea that if the alliance began to look a little shaky, it could always be repaired with American money.

So we proposed a nuclear fleet for which we would pay 40 percent. We have tried to sell this plan to NATO. We have, to put it another way, tried to persuade our NATO Allies to let the United States pay for much more than our share of a new nuclear force which would belong to the alliance. We want them to allow us, to permit us, to do this for them.

That approach, and that attitude, has characterized our whole NATO policy ever since we first sent troops to Europe in large numbers in the early 1950's. It is why I have no confidence at all that financial and military aid to them will stop unless Congress itself stops it.

In some respects, our allies have used better judgment themselves. Last Friday morning's New York Times published the story that the Military Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Conference has recommended against the nuclear surface fleet. It rightly called it military superfluity and therefore a waste.

I surely welcome this indication that the American taxpayers may not, after

all, get stuck for another multibilliondollar outlay representing the American share of what Great Britain, France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands should be doing for the alliance. I believe the 40-percent proposed payment is outrageous.

Apparently they have saved us from that fate, when our own policymakers were determined to go ahead with it.

This is why I believe my amendment is necessary if Congress is to see the termination of U.S. aid to these countries.

Mr. President, I rest my case at this point on my amendment. I hope if the discussion which will take place on the floor or in the cloakrooms in the next hour or so results in adjustments to this amendment that Senators believe should be made, we can at the same time protect its objective. I believe this is the time when we should say that American aid money should no longer go to selfsufficient NATO countries, but should go to the truly underdeveloped areas of the world where it is so important to us, on a project-to-project basis, to be of help to governments willing to help them

selves.

Mr. President, I was Mr. MUNDT. amazed to read in the Washington Post for Tuesday, November 5, a story that the U.S. Government, through the medium of the Export-Import Bank, will underwrite the credit risk involved in the recent sale of corn to Communist Hungary. This story states that the Federal Government has decided to underwrite all the credit risks for American banks engaged in financing the sale of $6 million worth of surplus U.S. corn to Hungary, which, of course, is a member of the Communist bloc. It was my understanding that at the time the President made the announcement that this Government would approve applications for licenses for private corporations to negotiate sales of wheat and other grains to the Soviets and their satellites, he implied that the carrying out of these negotiations would be through private channels, with the grain trade negotiating the sales and the sales being consummated for cash or gold or short term credit extended through private channels. There was no indication that the American taxpayer would be called upon to underwrite the credit risk involved in export sales to Communist countries, at

the time the President made his statethe time the President made his statement on radio and television about the wheat sale.

I was not alone in this understanding of the proposal made by President Kennedy, because I hold in my hand the November 1963, Washington newsletter, No. 242, issued by the Friends Committee on National Legislation in which the organization comments with some caution, but with commendation on the detion, but with commendation on the decision to sell wheat to the Communist countries. However, it also appears to be laboring under a misapprehension about the manner in which it is now proposed to finance these sales to the Communist bloc countries.

I quote from the Friends newsletter: In order to avoid legislative restrictions and rally public support, the President has specified that the sales would be (1) made through private dealers, (2) for dollars or through private dealers, (2) for dollars or gold

I repeat the second category, Mr. President, because we heard much about that when we were discussing the wheat

sale

term credit; (4) not diverted to Communist (2) for dollars or gold; (3) for cash or short

China or Cuba, and (5) carried in available American ships, supplemented by ships of other countries. This last requirement is still being modified because of the high level of U.S. shipping rates.

In view of the general understanding involved in the Presidential announcement that we were about to start selling grain to Communist countries, I was understandably shocked to read in the Washington Post for November 5 an article under the byline of Vincent J. Burke, under the heading "Government Will Underwrite Credit Risk in Sale to Hungary."

I read a portion of that news release:

The Federal Government has decided to underwrite all the credit risks for American banks engaged in financing sale of $6 million worth of surplus U.S. corn to Communist Hungary.

tees will be extended to the pending $250 It is expected that similar credit guaranmillion sale of wheat to the Soviet Union.

I call that to the attention of the Senate because we now have opportunity to do something about the complete switch in the understanding of the people of this country that this sale was to be made for cash to what now appears to be a program to have the American people underwrite all the bad debts the Communists may accumulate in connection with the sale.

I read this rather startling announcement because it is pertinent to an amendment I propose to offer to the foreign aid bill. It is expected that similar guarantees will be extended for the $250 million wheat sale to the Soviet Union. I quote again from Mr. Burke's article in the Washington Post of November 5: In announcing a month ago that the Government would permit the sale of wheat to the [Soviet] Union, President Kennedy said it would be sold by private dealers for American dollars or gold, either cash on delivery or normal commercial terms.

If that were all that were involved, it would be bad enough. I submit that sales of this type, even if they were made

to Communist countries for cash, involve a switch in our American foreign policy, because they provide, instead of a policy of trying to restrict export of supplies to strengthen Communist countries, one of actually encouraging shipment of supplies to strengthen the Communist countries so as to give them extra weapons, extra power, extra energy enabling them to continue to intimidate the neutral countries of the world and countries of the free world, in order to compel the continuation of the necessary appropriation of moneys such as we are called upon to authorize today in the foreign aid bill.

It would be bad enough if the administration were to undertake this action even on sales for Communist gold by Executive decree without consultation with Congress. However, when, instead of that, we are now told that these sales are to be made for credit, instead of cash or gold, that is something quite different. When we are now told that the credit risk is being underwritten by the Export-Import Bank, which is financed exclusively by American funds, I which is utterly indefensible. believe that we confront a situation

I point out another statement in the Washington Post article:

Actually, it is customary for the ExportImport Bank, a Government agency, to guarantee one-half of the short-term credit ex

tended by private commercial banks on sale of big shipments of American goods abroad. The agency's chief purpose is to promote foreign sale of American products.

Departing from its usual 50-50 practice the Export-Import Bank has agreed to guarantee all

Let me repeat that, because I want Senators and the country generally to understand what we are confronted with in this situation

Departing from its usual 50-50 practice, the Export-Import Bank has agreed to guarantee all

A-1-1

all the short-term credit extended by banks to finance the sale of corn to Hungary.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: GOVERNMENT WILL UNDERWRITE CREDIT RISK IN SALE TO HUNGARY

(By Vincent J. Burke) The Federal Government has decided to underwrite all the credit risks for American banks engaged in financing sale of $6 million worth of surplus U.S. corn to Communist Hungary.

It is expected that similar credit guarantee will be extended to the pending $250million sale of wheat to the Soviet Union. When and if that happens, informed sources licans is preparing to attack the Kennedy said yesterday, a group of House Repubadministration's handling of the sale.

In announcing a month ago that the Government would permit the sale of wheat to the Union, President Kennedy said it would be sold "by private dealers for American dollars or gold, either cash on delivery or normal commercial terms.”

Actually, it is customary for the ExportImport Bank, a Government agency, to guarantee one-half of the short-term credit extended by private commercial banks on sale

above the rates in non-American ships. Certainly it is not a privilege to allow the buyer to pay $5 or $6 a ton more than the going rate.

Mr. MUNDT. It is certainly a privilege if the recipient country is in a position in which it needs to use American ships.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But they do not want to carry it in American ships. This is not a privilege they are seeking.

Mr. MUNDT. They are getting the benefit, however, of the fact that we are giving Communist countries a specific rate reduction.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not interested in whether they use American ships or not. I merely thought the facts as to the actual situation should be fairly stated.

Mr. MUNDT. I think the facts will all be better clarified when we get from the administration a specific statement, first, as to what will be the new special rate to Communist countries, and second, who will absorb the difference. Will the American shipping companies make a smaller profit, or will the men who work on the ships receive a smaller wage? Or are we going to shuffle off the difference on the American taxpayer in the form of some new kind of subsidy? There are facts we all want to have in that connection.

published in the October 31 issue of the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune. It said in part:

"When Governor Averell Harriman was in Moscow, Nikita S. Khrushchev twice assured him that all Russian troops would eventually be brought home from Cuba. 'Why should we keep them there?' Khrushchev asked, and added that the men of the Red army did not like being there either because of the steamy Cuban climate.”

The interesting thing about this dispatch is that the Kremlin seems to be reverting to type and is now saying it reverting to type and is now saying it did not say what most observers said it did say some time ago. The merrygo-round goes round and round, and we are still dealing with Communist operations.

Mr. MUNDT. It seems to me that that statement emphasizes at least the fact that we received no quid pro quo from that we received no quid pro quo from the Communists in turn for our willingness to bail out Soviet Russia from the serious problems that confront them, because of their failure to be able to establish a collectivist farm program and make it successful.

It would appear that the spirit of Moscow is reverting to the spirit of Moscow B.D.S.-before the death of Stalinbecause I saw none of this fine, conciliatory aspect in what the Senator has read, and which we sometimes read in language that is uttered by Khrushchev.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Would the Senator say that the spirit of Moscow should more properly be called the specter of Moscow?

Mr. MUNDT. I think that would be much more appropriate.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Perhaps what I am about to say is somewhat collateral to the Senator's very interesting, informative speech. However, I just took from the news ticker an interesting piece of information which might be of interest to the Senator in his discussion. It is a UPI dispatch from Moscow, with reference to Cuba. It reads:

The Government newspaper Izvestia

I interpolate that Izvestia has never been known, so far as I am aware, to print anything that did not have the approval of Moscow.

Mr. MUNDT. I am sure that is a correct statement.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I continue to read:

The Government newspaper Izvestia said tonight the Soviet Union never promised the United States to withdraw all Russian troops

from Cuba.

It said the question of Soviet troops in Cuba "is a problem between the Soviet Union and Cuba" and no one else.

A leading Izvestia article signed "Observer" referred to a claim attributed to U.S. special envoy W. A. Harriman that Premier Khrushchev promised him that all Russion troops would be pulled out of Cuba. "It is difficult to say with whom this version originated, with Harriman himself or the New York Herald Tribune which quoted him," Izvestia said.

The Soviet newspaper apparently referred to a Washington column by Joseph Alsop

Mr. President, I continue with the point I am trying to make about the import of the amendment which I have sub

by the Senate overwhelmingly, or perhaps the Committee on Foreign Relations will accept it and obviate the necessity of a yea-and-nay vote, because it seems to me it is a perfectly logical, necessary, and sound amendment.

Is it not odd that just a few weeks ago we were asked to advise and consent on a test ban treaty, whose major provisions were already effective in this country through the President's proclamation at his American University speech on June 10, which precluded our testing of nuclear weapons?

On this issue, already decided by Executive decree, the Senate was asked to advise and consent.

The decision to sell wheat and other grains to Russia and the Communist bloc was made in the executive branch of the Government-without any advice or consent by the Congress. In my opinion, Mr. President, our ratification of the test ban treaty proposal and the decision to approve sales of wheat and grains to the Communist bloc demonstrate significant needs for changing the guidelines estabneeds for changing the guidelines established as a basis for our American foreign lished as a basis for our American foreign policy-if indeed it does have established policy-if indeed it does have established guidelines. Both of the above instances have a bearing on the decisions we are now making on this foreign assistance now making on this foreign assistance legislation. While we are asked yearly legislation. While we are asked yearly to authorize the appropriation of billions of dollars for foreign aid to strengthen the economy and the muscle of the free

world, it is only in those instances where it helps the propagandists of this administration that we are asked to "advise and consent." Congress was not-and I repeat, not-asked to express its thoughts in any form on the approval of the sale of wheat to Russia and the Communist bloc nations.

Mr. President, to compound even further the seeming contempt for an expression of Congress on the wheat sale approval, the administration has now made a decision to use the dollars of American taxpayers to guarantee American banks extending credit for these sales so that if the Russians or any of their satellites default on their payments on credit extended, the Export-Import Bank, which is financed wholly by American dollars, will reimburse these private banking institutions suffering losses.

In no other instance according to the Washington Post report does the Export-Import Bank go that far. We would grant to the Communists by this decision a consideration we deny other countries, anywhere in the world.

This

is another instance of most-favored-nation treatment; and to me, for some inexplicable reason, the "most favored nation" is to be one in the Communist bloc, instead of one of our allies or our friends.

It is proposed that our Government guarantee the full payment of the loans. What a strange departure from the original White House statement, which was that we were to be paid in gold or in cash or in short-term credits. But Uncle Sam, not the private lending institutions, is to take the risk of these sales. The private lenders, however, instead of Uncle Sam, will make the profit on them.

If there is a default on any credit extended for the sale of this wheat, it will be the American taxpayer, or good old "Uncle Sucker," who will take the loss, not the private banking institutions, since they will be protected by the administration's decision from any loss of dollars. My amendment would prohibit this kind of financial shenanigan. It would prohibit the Export-Import Bank or any other agency of Government from guaranteeing repayment of these credits extended by private American banking institutions to Communist countries. It would insure that the wheat and other grain sales are strictly consummated through private channels, as the President said they would be; and without Government support, as the President said would happen; and that the grain trade and private credit institutions would be undertaking and entering into such sales contracts at their own risk and for their own profit, not at the risk of the unsuspecting American taxpayers.

The American taxpayer should not be asked or required to pick up the very substantial risk in these sales which many private grain traders now want to exploit. My amendment would protect tect the overburdened taxpayers of America and would place American financial institutions who provide the credit in this instance on notice that these grain sales will be conducted on the same basis as sales negotiated in this country. Private credit will take the

risks, make the profits, and stand the losses if losses occur for any reason whatsoever. My President, I hope that when my amendment is offered, it will be adopted, so that sales of grain to the Communist bloc will not be at the expense of the U.S. taxpayers in case the Communists default on their payments and violate still another one of their promises.

Mr. President, if we are to continue to spend billions of dollars to strengthen the capacity of the free world to defend itself against Communist subversion and aggression, the least we can do as Senators and as guardians of the interests of the American people is to make sure that our fellow taxpayers are not also charged with the expense of providing supplies to the Communist countries whose persistent attacks against free world security make these AID appropriations or some other type of foreign assistance program necessary. My amendment would do precisely that-no more and no less. It would protect the American taxpayers against the very probable contingency that he will have to pay through the Export-Import Bank for the credits defaulted by Communist countries to which our wheat and grain are being sold.

In my opinion, the whole concept of strengthening our enemies by selling them the supplies they need on credit terms which will safeguard their Communist economies, while at the same time spending billions of dollars strengthening the capacity of our friends to resist the encroachments of aggressive, atheistic communism, as we are being asked to do by means of the present foreign aid and assistance bill, is a highly questionable and sadly inconsistent concept. It clearly indicates the need for the evolvement of a new type of U.S. foreign policy. Our constituents have the right to expect more constructive and more consistent action from their Senators than mere endorsement of such an inconsistent self-defeating program as involved in our prevailing foreign policy.

Surely, the long record of broken promises by the Communists does nothing to give them a high-grade credit rating. Once they have our merchandise, they can and will default on their payments with the same contemptuous disdain that they have demonstrated in their failure to pay the just debts they owe to us for previous credits and to pay the debts which today they owe to the United Nations and to the other free sectors of the world. It does not make good sense-in fact, it makes no sense at all-to use the funds of the United States to guarantee the credit and to underwrite the financial "good intentions" of the Communists. This is even more startling than appeasement; this is an endorsement of the checks and the notes to be utilized by the Communists in purchasing supplies to strengthen their capacity to attack us. It is a startling anomaly. If we must sell them food and merchandise which I very much doubt the least we can insist upon is that they

pay cash for what they buy, or that those seeking a quick profit by selling to the Communists on long term credit assume responsibility for their own losses and for their failure to collect on credits exfor their failure to collect on credits extended to those who so often have demonstrated their bad faith in one program strated their bad faith in one program and one promise after another.

Let those who would make the profit assume the risk, Mr. President. Let us not try to compel all the taxpayers of the United States to underwrite the bad faith of the Communists, who seek to obtain from us the supplies, the food, and the fabric required in order to strengthen them in their mad desire to bury the free world and to destroy Christendom.

I shall have more to say on this subject when I call up my amendment. At this time I merely make this preliminary statement in the hope that Senators will read and study the amendment and acquaint themselves with the facts, and in order that the country generally may know what will be provided by the succession of appeasing actions favorable to the Communists unless we take the opportunity provided by my amendment opportunity provided by my amendment to call a halt to a suicidal program of that kind.

Mr. President, I urge the adoption of my amendment in order to protect the American taxpayers against the necessity of being called upon to finance both sity of being called upon to finance both sides of the cold war at the same time. It is bad enough that we are now beyond the $100 billion mark in helping to finance the free side of the cold war. But now, when we are asked to go beyond the $100 billion mark and to appropriate additional billions, we are told priate additional billions, we are told that the American taxpayers not only are to underwrite and support to that extent the free world, but also they are to finance the Communist side of the cold war by guaranteeing any debt the Communists incur in purchasing supplies from the United States. I ask Senators from the United States. I ask Senators to consider seriously the ultimate consequence of such a reckless squandering of our country's resources. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, some of the statements which have been made are quite inaccurate and are among the strangest interpretations of the facts I have ever heard on the floor the facts I have ever heard on the floor of the Senate.

I have had prepared a memorandum based upon an inquiry made some days ago of the Export-Import Bank. Last week I received an inquiry relative to an article published in the Washington Post.

Mr. President, I shall read the last paragraph of the memorandum, in order to indicate what I mean:

The Export-Import Bank stresses that there is nothing new in these arrangements-aside from the fact that a shortterm credit risk is being covered with respect to a Soviet bloc country. In fact, the Bank has been making similar arrangements, on more liberal terms, with respect to sales of cotton ever since the Bank was established. In last July, for example, a $60 million sale of cotton to Japan was covered by 100-percent political and credit guarantees; no downpayment was asked and a lower interest rate was involved.

The remainder of the memorandum deals with the specific conditions of these sales. I shall not take the time of the Senate to read the entire memorandum at this time, inasmuch as the amendment to which it is relevant is not now pending; but I believe it will be helpful, for the information of the Senate, to have the memorandum printed in the RECORD; and no doubt this question will be discussed further when the amendment is before the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the memorandum be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEMORANDUM: EXPORT-IMPORT BANK GUARANTEES OF SALES TO BLOC, NOVEMBER 6, 1963 The story in yesterday's Washington Post concerning the Export-Import Bank's guarantee of a sale of corn to Hungary, and the Bank's readiness to extend similar terms with respect to other commodity deals with the Soviet bloc, contains at least two errors. First, as will be seen from the detailed account below, the Bank is not covering 100 percent of the financing of the corn deal of about $6 million with Hungary. Second, there is no "usual 50-50 practice" concerning guarantees, contrary to the newspaper story.

U.S.

The Export-Import Bank has announced terms which would be extended, if accepted, to any of the deals between American suppliers and Soviet bloc purchasers of commodities. These arrangements are as follows: The Bank is ready to issue guarantees through commercial banks. The Bank itself will not grant any credits. It will issue 100 percent guarantees against the political risks and full coverage of certain credit arrangements which are made. However, these terms depend completely on the following conditions being met first: (1) The purchasing country must pay 25 percent of the purchase price in dollars to the commercial bank representing the supplier prior to shipment of the commodity; (2) a maximum of 18 months credit for the balance may be extended by the commercial bank; and (3) the balance of 75 percent of the purchase price must be paid in three equal installments at 6-month intervals during those 18 months—an interest charge of 5 percent is levied on this balance. In connection with the above account, it should be understood that the buyer has to make contact with the American supplier, who then turns to a U.S. commercial bank, which in turn would go to the Export-Import Bank.

The Export-Import Bank stresses that there is nothing new in these arrangements— aside from the fact that a short-term credit

risk is being covered with respect to a Soviet bloc country. In fact, the Bank has been making similar arrangements, on more liberal terms, with respect to sales of cotton ever since the Bank was established. In last July, for example, a $60 million sale of cottc 1 to Japan was covered by 100 percent political and credit guarantees; no downpayment was asked and a lower interest rate was involved.

PROPOSED PAY INCREASE UNREAL

ISTIC

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, within a short time the Post Office and Civil Service Committee of the House of Representatives will issue a report recommending salary increases for all