commonly referred to as the Clay Committee, offers to Congress a unique opportunity at this time to be instrumental in reassessing the foreign aid program. The Clay Committee was appointed on the highest official level, and its conclusions and recommendations should be carefully considered by the Members of Congress. And yet, few, if any, of its recommendations have been included in the bill which is now pending before this body.

Mr. President, I request the attention of my colleagues to one specific portion of H.R. 7885, concerning which too little has been said. The provision to which I make reference is section 402 of the foreign aid bill. This provision would authorize the President to give the benefit of U.S. trade agreement reductions in tariff duties to products imported from Communist countries when: First, he determines such treatment would be "important to the national interest"; second, he determines such treatment would promote "independence" of the Communist countries "from domination or control by international commucommunism"; and, third, he reports these determinations and his reasons to the Con

gress.

To understand the reason for the inclusion of this provision in the foreign aid bill, it is necessary to briefly discuss the background of the tariff legislation with which it is concerned.

The basic tariff act setting forth the duties applicable to goods imported into the United States is the Tariff Act of 1930. Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, and the 11 extensions of that act, the President was authorized to reduce the rates of duty set forth in the Tariff Act of 1930. Most rates of duty have been reduced one or more times and the majority of them have been reduced several times. The total impact of these duty reductions has been to lower the ad valorem equivalent of U.S. duties from approximately 50 percent in 1930 to about 12 percent in 1962.

Under a provision of the trade agreements law, known as the most-favorednation rule, tariff reductions granted by the United States to one country are uniformly applicable to goods imported from other countries. The mostfavored-nation clause is customarily found in treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation and in reciprocal trade agreements. Under a mostfavored-nation clause, each of the contracting countries promises to give to the other contracting countries tariff treatment as good as it accords to any third country, subject to specified exceptions in most instances.

The Congress enacted the most favored-nation rule into the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 by providing that the duties proclaimed by the President under the act should apply uniformly to articles brought into the United States from the country with which the particular agreement is made and from other countries generally. One qualiOne qualification of the policy of equal tariff treatment based on the principle of the mostfavored-nation clause stems from a pro

vision of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 authorizing the President to suspend the application of trade agreement rates of duty to products of countries which discriminate against the commerce of the United States or which pursue policies tending to defeat the purposes of the Trade Agreements Act. Under this particular provision, reduced trade agreement rates on duties were withheld in pre-World War II years from imports of German products.

Despite these particular exceptions, the State Department in years past has persuaded the President that it would serve a useful purpose for U.S. trade agreement concessions to be made available to Yugoslavia and Poland. In recent years, articles imported from those countries have received the benefit of all U.S. tariff rate reductions.

Congress, in enacting the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which substantially replaced the prior Trade Agreements Act, directed that the benefit of U.S. tariff reductions not be made available to any Communist country. Unfortunately, section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, in directing the President to withdraw the benefit of trade agreement tariff reductions from Yugoslavia and Poland, used the words "as soon as practicable." These words have been seized upon and used to effectively thwart the stated intention of Congress in adopting section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1962 act became effective on October 11, 1962, the State Department has taken absolutely no action to withdraw the benefit of all our trade agreement concessions from Yugoslavia and Poland.

In March of this year, some 5 months after the effective date of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I wrote letters to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of State to find out what steps, if any, had been taken pursuant to section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Mr. Ben Dorfman, Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission replied as follows:

DEAR SENATOR THURMOND: This is in response to your letter of March 9, 1963, in which you ask what steps, if any, the President has taken pursuant to section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 with regard to imports from any country or area under Communist domination or control.

Section 257(e) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act provides that action taken by the President under section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and in effect on the date of enactment of the Trade Expansion Act, shall be considered as having been taken by the President under section 231. Therefore, products of all countries or areas designated by the President pursuant to section 5 as being under Communist domination or control, continue to be excluded from the benefits of most-favored-nation rates of duty by operation of section 257.

Products of Poland and Yugoslavia continue to receive most-favored-nation tariff treatment. Although no formal steps have been taken by our Government to discontinue this treatment, it is understood that the matter is under advisement by the administration. Section 231 provides that such action shall be taken "as soon as practicable." The Commission is not advised as to the fac

The Secretary of Commerce, the Honorable Luther H. Hodges, replied as follows:

DEAR SENATOR THURMOND: I refer to your letter of March 9, 1963, concerning section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which deals with most-favored-nation treatment of imports from Communist-dominated countries or areas.

This is a matter which directly involves our treaty relationships with other nations, and which therefore is of direct and immediate concern to the Department of State. That Department presently has under advisement the steps to be taken to carry out section 231, and I am forwarding a copy of your letter to Secretary Rusk, with the request that he furnish you full information concerning the matter. With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

LUTHER H. HODGES, Secretary of Commerce. And finally and most importantly, Mr. Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State, replied on behalf of the Secretary of State as follows:

DEAR SENATOR THURMOND: Thank you for your letter of March 9 to the Secretary asking what steps have been taken to implement section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This provision requires that the President take action "as soon as practicable" to deny the benefits of most-favored-nation tariff treatment to any country or area dominated by communism.

The only Communist countries which presently have most-favored-nation status are Yugoslavia and Poland. Yugoslavia has such status by virtue of the 1881 Treaty of Commerce with the Kingdom of Serbia, a predecessor state of the present country of Yugoslavia. Poland was denied this status in 1952, along with other Soviet-bloc countries, pursuant to the terms of section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. Poland was restored to most-favored-nation status effective December 16, 1960, following conclusion in July of that year of an agreement under which Poland is paying $40 million in compensation for the claims of American nationals against Poland.

The legislative history established during consideration of the conference report of the Trade Expansion Act indicates that the phrase "as soon as practicable" was intended to afford the President discretion in determining when action should be taken under the law. The timing of such action is under active consideration.

If I may be of further assistance to you please do not hesitate to call upon me. Sincerely,

FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.

Mr. President, it is apparent from these answers that not only had nothing been done to implement section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, but that no action on the part of the executive branch was contemplated. Even though the 1962 act became effective on October 11, 1962, the State Department, in more than a year's time, has taken absolutely no action to withdraw the benefit of our trade agreement concessions from Yugoslavia and Poland. This amounts to an utter disregard for the mandate of Congress and is in direct contrast to past occurrences.

In 1951, the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 contained a similar provision directing the President "as soon as practicable" to suspend the benefit of trade agreement concessions from all Communist countries. The 1951 act beThe 1951 act became effective on June 16, 1951. By August 3, 1951, less than 2 months later, President Truman had issued a proclamation taking the necessary action. The provisions of the act of 1951 were aimed at some 13 countries. In the proclamation which President Truman issued, he instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to assess the full rates of duty provided in the Tariff Act of 1930 on imports from named Communist countries. Some few months later, President Truman effected the withdrawal of trade agreement benefits from four additional Communist countries.

The State Department fought tooth and nail the enactment of section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 in the form in which it became law. After the State Department lost this legislative battle, it nevertheless determined that it would not carry out the directions of the Congress that most-favored-nation benefit of our tariff concessions be withdrawn from Yugoslavia and Poland.

The State Department recognized that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to secure the approval of the Congress for such legislation if the matter were brought up through normal legislative channels. Normal legislative channels would require that such a proposal first be considered by the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives and the Finance Committee of the Senate. In order to circumvent this normal procedure, the State Department strategy was to include a suitable provision in the foreign aid bill. Of course the foreign aid bill does not come before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives or the Finance Committee of the Senate. Instead, it comes before the Foreign Relations Committee which would more readily acquiesce in the wishes of the Department of State. For that reason, the determination was made that the use of the foreign aid authorization bill as a vehicle for overruling section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act would have a greater chance of success.

H.R. 7885, as it passed the House of Representatives, did not contain this provision overruling the mandate of Congress in section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It was, however, contained in the Senate version of this bill, S. 1276. The amount of testimony offered to the Foreign Relations Committee in connection with this particular section is negligible in comparision with its importance. The Secretary of State, the witness who should be required to carry the burden of proof, devoted only one small portion of his statement to this section of the bill. This can be found beginning on the bottom of page 14 and the top of page 15 of the printed hearings.

In addition to this, a memorandum was prepared for the use of the committee by the former Ambassador to Yugo

slavia, George F. Kennan. The meager amount of testimony which is available falls far short of that required for Congress to overrule its previous enactment which is contained in section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

Last year, a congressional study mission in Europe made a very enlightening report concerning the economic offensive which the Soviets are continually carrying on. The report of this study mission has been printed as House Report No. 32.

As a result of the group's on-theground study of the problem, it unanimously concluded that economic and trade warfare is being used as an important instrument of Soviet worldwide strategy. At this particular time, the principal commodity being used for this purpose is oil. In the past, aluminum and other commodities have been used. No one can predict with any degree of reliability which commodities or products the Soviet bloc will select in the future when it desires to disrupt the freeworld markets and weaken the industries of this or other countries in the Western World.

The Soviet bloc already possesses considerable economic and technological potential from disrupting Western markets and creating this type havoc. Foreign trade by Communist countries is conducted by State trading enterprises. These are merely puppets which are These are merely puppets which are manipulated by the Communist conmanipulated by the Communist conspiracy when the grand design for the spiracy when the grand design for the destruction of the United States and the destruction of the United States and the entire Western World makes it seem appropriate. In 1961, the Soviet bloc exported $15.6 billion worth of commodiported $15.6 billion worth of commodities. ties. As it happened, only a small percentage of these Communist exports were centage of these Communist exports were sent to the United States. The important point to remember, however, is that the Communist countries do possess a surplus production and an ever-present surplus production and an ever-present export potential. When the moment arrives for them to deal a blow to this country, they possess the means of selecting products of importance in the markets products of importance in the markets essential to the economic health of our strategic industries.

It is well known that the state trading enterprises of Communist countries are able to fix prices for export sales at able to fix prices for export sales at will. This power to set prices arbitarily permits Communist countries to dispose of surplus production by dumping it on the world market in a manner which suits their objectives. suits their objectives. The availability of the reduced trade agreement rate applicable to imports of such products helps plicable to imports of such products helps the Communists in their dumping operations.

The State Department's obstructionism in carrying out the will of Congress ism in carrying out the will of Congress as expressed in section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act is part of its program of Expansion Act is part of its program of wooing over Marshal Tito. wooing over Marshal Tito. The State Department's overture to Tito seems to Department's overture to Tito seems to be contrary to the views and recommendations of other branches of the executive department. In October 1962, Under Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler, in addressing the National DeFowler, in addressing the National Defense Executive Reserve on the subject of "Our Industrial Economy and Na

tional Security," pictured in very graphic terms the challenge of the Sino-Soviet bloc. By devoting its economic production to destructive purposes rather than to the benefit of its own people, the Soviet bloc is in a position at times of its own choosing to wage economic warfare on the strategic industries of the United States. Under Secretary Fowler realistically recommended the adoption by the United States of "a program covering ordinary normal trade with the bloc in a manner that will protect private trade from the abuses of bloc state trading techniques." One such measure is readily at hand simply by having the President overrule the State Department and obey the directive of the Congress in the Trade Expansion Act by withdrawing from Poland and Yugoslavia the benefit of the reductions in U.S. duties contained in our trade agreements.

It is important to note in this regard that none of these concessions was made in trade agreements with either Yugoslavia or Poland. We will not be violating any of the terms of the agreements with those Communist countries; rather, we will be suspending their enjoyment of trade concessions for which they paid nothing, which they do not reciprocate, and which facilitate their economic penetration of U.S. markets.

Mr. President, it seems that with the notable exception of the Department of State the whole world is completely aware of the destructive potential of the state trade techniques used by Communist countries, including Yugoslavia and Poland. No less an authority than the Executive Secretary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade discussed this objectionable feature of trade by Communist countries in an address delivered in Warsaw in June of 1961. He stated:

To many contracting parties it appears that the Polish trading system is such that Poland cannot in practice offer to their exporters the degree of nondiscriminatory access, subject only to a defined degree of tariff protection, as Poland would acquire as a contractual right under the general agreement.

It is significant that the United States is one of the few countries in the world which gratuitously extends to Poland and Yugoslavia most-favored-nation treatment. Poland is not now a member of GATT, and will not be entitled to most-favored-nation enjoyment of the reduced tariff duties of the member countries of GATT unless and until she becomes a member of that organization. When the President withdraws the benefit of our trade agreement concessions from Poland, as he is directed to do by section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act, the resulting situation will be no different than that which now confronts Poland in its trade with other countries of the West. To continue the quotation from the address delivered by the Executive Secretary of GATT, Mr. Eric Wyndham White:

Polish import policy is an integral part of its economic plan. The plan allocates to the import sector only that part of consumption which cannot be met by planned domestic production. There is therefore no

possibility of competing on equal terms with Polish domestic products, nor of penetrating Polish markets on the basis of competition in quality and price.

The GATT Secretary pointed out:

Both the volume and direction of trade (with Poland) is arbitrary and not subject to the play of market forces so much as to administrative and governmental decisions.

This exists not only on the import side but also in Poland's export trade. The GATT Secretary declared:

Export prices, too, present a problem for which normal antidumping provisions are inadequate, because the normal elements of price formation are lacking or difficult to establish. A control of imports from Poland is therefore necessary to make good this deficiency.

Mr. President, it is completely true, as the GATT Secretary, Mr. White, explained in his address in Poland, that

countries like the United States are powerless to defend themselves from destructive imports from these Communist countries. Our procedures, geared to the prevention of disruption in the marketplace where prices are established by business organizations, simply do not accomplish the job in dealing with products that are exported by state trading enterprises with the power deliberately to price them below any level of control that can be achieved in the country of destination.

For this reason, it is madness for the United States to facilitate destructive imports from Communist countries in the future by dismantling the tariff rates of duty which would apply if trade agreement concessions were not available to them.

Mr. President, it is true that Yugoslavia put a new general customs tariff applicable to all imports into effect in March of 1961. Furthermore, it must also be pointed out that Yugoslavia is applying most-favored-nation rates of duty to imports from all sources. It is also true, however, that Yugoslavia has retained a system of import and export controls superimposed upon the tariff. Imports, with some few exceptions, are subject to a licensing requirement. Foreign exchange is allocated and controlled in such a manner that these licenses

are sparingly granted. On the export

side, the Yugoslavian Government subsidizes the exportation of products representing a substantial part of Yugoslavia's total exports. These export premiums may be as much as 32 percent of the value of the product being exported.

In the final analysis, Yugoslavia remains essentially a state trading enterprise in foreign trade. As stated by the report of the GATT working party on its second annual review of relations with Yugoslavia, on December 7, 1961, the Yugoslav system is of a special nature; there are no private traders and there is no place for the concept of private ownership of the means of production or of the objects of commerce in the Yugoslav social system. And while the working party concluded that the Yugoslav system was not properly a monopoly or state trading, the fact of the matter is that the means of production and the fruits of production are owned by the

state and it is the agents of the state who make the decisions concerning decisions concerning prices and export policies. The recent GATT report on trade in agricultural products, in dealing with Yugoslavia, sets forth the views of members of Committee II, which conducted the study, that the state sets export prices for agricultural products, and that there are many interventions in the Yugoslavian system which limit the free play of market forces.

Mr. President, the Soviet bloc countries have a planning body called the Council have a planning body called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, known by the letters CMEA. That group worked out a set of principles for the International Socialist Division of Labor. It includes the following statement:

It is necessary continually to perfect the

system of price formation on the world

Socialist market in keeping with the requirements of the planned extension of the International Socialist Division of Labor, a steady expansion of trade, and the accelerated development of the world Socialist economy, while creating conditions for the gradual changeover to an independent price basis.

This statement, translated into ordinary language, means that for a long time to come the Communist countries will set prices deliberately at whatever level is required to further the Communist objective of expanding their economic system throughout the world. When it is no longer necessary for the Communist system to use arbitrary prices as a weapon of attack against the West, they will then consider some system of normal pricing, but not before.

Mr. President, the Senate of the United States is engaging in the futile exercise of wishful dreaming if it seriously thinks that granting a most-favored-nation treatment to these two Communist countries will successfully lure them away from the Communist bloc. The assertions made on the Senate floor by myself and other Senators which led to the inclusion of section 231 in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 are just as valid today as they were then. The State Department officials and others in the executive branch of the Gov

ernment have not changed their attitude

nor have they cited any new or additional information which tends to prove that their high-flown theory that both Yugoslavia and Poland are independent of domination by the international Communist conspiracy is accurate.

Having persuaded the President to agree to the inclusion of a provision dealing with section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act in the foreign aid authorization bill, the State Department has also asked for the power to broaden the authority that would be conferred on the President beyond merely Yugoslavia and Poland. The language of section 402 of H.R. 7885 would not only allow the President to extend most-favored-nation most-favored-nation treatment for imports from the Communist countries of Yugoslavia and Poland, but it would also empower him to grant that privilege to any Communist country when he decided that such action would promote the independence of that

Communist country from control by international communism. Of course, this power which is being given to the President would in actuality be delegated to the Department of State. In reality, they are asking for this power on their own behalf.

At the present time, the official State Department policy is to recognize the existence of an ideological struggle within the Communist world between Red China and the Soviet Union. The State Department, acting on behalf of the President, might well make a determination under section 402 that granting most-favorednation treatment to any of the Communist satellite countries would promote their lining up with the Soviet Union against China, or vice versa. In their view, this would promote the independence of the beneficiary nation from control by whichever of the two Communist giants, China or Russia, that the State Department felt at the time would most likely emerge victorious in the ultimate decision.

Mr. President, it is impossible for benefits to be extended to one Communist country which do not become readily available to the whole Communist conspiracy. All that is required is that goods originating outside of Yugoslavia or Poland be sent to those countries for transshipment. If the markings on the containers are changed to indicate that Yugoslavia or Poland is the country of origin, it would be impossible for U.S.

customs authorities to penetrate the Iron Curtain so as to establish the facts concerning the actual country of origin. Hence, no mistake should be made about the fact that granting most-favored-nation benefits to one Communist country extends it to all Communist countries for use at such times as Khrushchev's eco

nomic lieutenants decide that it would further the Soviet Union's or Communist China's common objective of burying the United States.

Section 402 of the foreign aid bill, therefore, is not only an attempt to overrule the public policy insisted upon by the Congress in the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962-namely, that the most-favored-nation benefit of our tariff concessions should be with

drawn from Yugoslavia and Poland—it also goes far beyond any previous line of demarcation on the subject of Communist eligibility for the most-favored

nation benefits which we grant the nations of the free world by permitting the President in his sole discretion, at times of his own choosing, to grant mostfavored-nation privileges to any Communist country.

The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, approving the foreign aid bill, refers to section 402 commencing at page 39. The report's treatment of section 402 is misleading. In its first sentence it indicates it is designed to permit the President to extend most-favored-nation treatment to Communist countries. The fact is that under the law these Communist countries already have most-favored-nation treatment and will continue to have it so long as the President continues to ignore

the mandate in section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act.

The report is weak in the emphasis it gives in the second paragraph to the fact that the President was directed to withdraw most-favored-nation treatment "as soon as practicable." He has failed to do so in more than a year. October 11 was the anniversary of the effective date of the Trade Expansion Act.

The final sentence in the first paragraph of the report is somewhat misleading, to the extent that it suggests that the effect of section 231 is only to penalize Yugoslavia and Poland. This section was not so restricted, but applies to all Communist countries, and when the force of this section is ruined by section 402, then the President has authority to decide it is in the interest of this country to extend the benefit of reduced duties to each and every Communist nation in the world, except possibly Russia.

The report makes out a very weak case for favoring Yugoslavia, particularly in the discussion of trade with Yugoslavia. On page 40 the report notes that U.S. imports from Yugoslavia amounted to $48.3 million and that U.S. exports to Yugoslavia amounted to $154.1 million.

This apparent balance of trade in our favor is effectively destroyed when there is deducted from our exports to Yugoslavia the estimated $131 million of exports which have been financed by the United States under various AID and other loan programs. To this extent, our exports to Yugoslavia have not been exports which offset imports in the true sense. The ultimate result is an adverse balance on commercial trade to the extent of approximately $25.2 million.

A similar calculation can be made in the case of Poland. The report shows that U.S. imports in 1962 from Poland were $45.6 million, and U.S. exports to Poland during 1962 were $94.5 million. But when there is deducted from the U.S. exports the estimated $64 million of exports which were financed by U.S. taxpayers, it is obvious that on commercial trade there is an adverse balance of

trade against the United States. In this case, it is approximately $15.1 million. Mr. President, there is no tangible reason why section 402 of the foreign aid bill should be enacted into law. It would be detrimental to the national security of our country. Even from a purely commercial standpoint, the enactment of this section would undoubtedly benefit the Commnist bloc. Unfortunately, Mr. President, the Senate rejected the amendment which was offered to eliminate section 402 from H.R. 7885. This action on the part of the Senate as a whole provides me with ample reason to vote against this measure even if the rest of the bill were acceptable.

However, the rest of this measure contains the same objectionable features which have been brought before the Senate in past years. Basically, the issue is one of economic stability versus bankruptcy. The United States, which is the last and strongest remaining bulwark of freedom, cannot continue to spend more money than it derives in

revenue year after year. Not only are we doing the people of the United States and future generations a grave injustice by attempting to do so, but we are also endangering the survival of freedom.

Mr. President, the October 21, 1963, Dan Smoot report contains some very revealing statistics concerning our forrevealing statistics concerning our foreign aid program. Mr. Smoot says:

The official public debt of the United States represents money already spent, in excess of revenue. It does not include contingent liabilities (literally trillions of dollars which the Government has committed itself to spend in future years). On December 31, 1962, the official public debt of the United States was $303,470,080,489-which was $24 billion more than the total indebtedness of all other nations on earth.

Yet, President Kennedy demands another $42 billion foreign aid bill. Why? Foreign aid has been the means of implementing the 1944 Bretton Woods scheme to give away our wealth until America is reduced to the status of a weak and dependent unit in an interdependent one-world Socialist system. From July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1963, the United States gave away abroad $148,456,333,000. The following tabulation, showing where the money went, does not include great sums of money and goods, in private giving, which have flowed from America to foreign lands. It does not include billions in aid which American industries have provided by building plants and making other investments abroad. A heavy percentage of the private American investments abroad has been artificially stimulated by our Government through guarantees against loss, underwritten by tax money, for the specific purpose of aiding the foreign nations. The following tabulation does not include billions of dollars' worth of agricultural goods which we have sold to foreign nations at subsidized prices, with American citizens paying the subsidies. The tabulation does not include all agricultural surpluses which we have sold to Communist nations like Poland and Yugoslavia and to neutralist nations like India, for local currencies. In such sales, we accept payment in the currenty of the nation which receives our goods. We can use a small amount of such local currency to pay operating expenses of missions and embassies, and to offset dollar accumulations, in those countries. Most of the local currency, however, is worthless to us and is spent on aid projects in the countries involved.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point in my remarks a tabulation of U.S. foreign aid to the different countries of the world from 1946 to 1962 which is contained in this issue of the Dan Smoot report.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. Aid to Western bloc nations (1946-62) Austria___

Belgium-Luxembourg.
China (Nationalist).
Denmark.---.

France--

French territories_--
Germany..

Germany (Berlin) -----
Greece---

Iceland___--
Ireland__
Israel___
Italy---
Japan

Netherlands..

Norway---.
Portugal------

-

$1,618, 300, 000 2, 166, 700, 000 4,789, 600, 000 887, 400, 000 11, 397, 300, 000 6, 000, 000 7,576,900,000 143, 900,000 3,943, 200, 000

78, 800, 000 146, 200, 000 1, 211, 400, 000 7,466, 800, 000 6, 146, 800, 000 2, 687, 400, 000 1, 159, 700, 000

136, 800, 000

Afghanistan__
Burma----
Cambodia..
Cameroon.
Ceylon..
Chad_.

Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Léopoldville)
Cyprus---
Dahomey--.
Ethiopia____

French Indochina__.
Gabon____.
Guinea-
India___
Indonesia_-_-
Iraq-.

Iran____
Ivory Coast..
Jordan---
Kenya--.
Korea..
Laos___
Lebanon..
Liberia__.
Libya----
Malagasy-
Malaya--
Mali___
Mauretania.......
Morocco--
Nepal---
Niger----
Nigeria---
Pakistan----
Philippines----
Rhodesia-Nyasaland.........

$275, 600, 000

138, 900, 000