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Government pursuant to which he undertakes to maintain his Canadian production and sales at their highest historic level and guarantees a fixed, increased annual amount of Canadian production-for export to the United States-in years to come. In short, duty-free treatment on imports into Canada will only be extended to those who guarantee that Canada's share of the home Canadian market for automotive products remains intact and that the Canadian share of the U.S. market will increase. Thus, the agreement is completely one-sided in favor of Canada to the detriment of U.S. companies and their workers.

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER].

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I will speak on this bill from a somewhat different vantage point than its bearing on our flourishing trade with Canada. I have not gone into all of the economic details of the legislation-I rely fully on the distinguished chairman of the committee for my information on that subject. However, with my colleagues of the House delegation to the United States-Canadian Interparliamentary Group, I am deeply interested in the great benefit this legislation will bring to United States-Canadian economic and political relationships generally.

It is standard procedure to talk about the unique relationship between the United States and Canada, and some people may find this an overworked concept. But our relationship with Canada is a very special one and I think that it is immensely important for us both that we make certain that it works smoothly

and well.

Two distinguished diplomats-former U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, and former Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Arnold Heeney-have recently reported on the United States-Canada relationship and on the principles that can be used to guide it for the future.

The two Ambassadors state that the "volume and variety of mutual involvement of the two countries and their peoples are without parallel." And that is the key to our relationship with Canada. Never in human history have two sovereign nations been linked together so closely-not merely by the inescapable

fact of geography, but by a huge flow of

trade, by investment, by financial relationships, by culture, by family ties, by sports, above all by a common interest in the preservation of a way of living as democratic peoples.

We have been at peace for 150 years, without a break. Our border is undeOur border is undefended. The record of harmonious joint occupancy of this vast continent is one of the political wonders of the world.

We are bound together in partnership. As the Ambassadors put it:

The network of joint arrangements between the two governments and their military services is striking evidence of the degree to which the two countries are involved

with one another in the ultimate and fundamental business of national security.

In our defense partnership, we have agreed that North America must be considered, in effect, as a single unit if we are to assure our common security.

Defense is not the only aspect of our relationship that requires a North American view. As the technological revolution races on, as the hazards of the 20th century continue to threaten us both, we are going to find more and more problems that will demand a continental approach in the interest of the common prosperity and security of the American and Canadian peoples.

The automobile industry is very clearly one of those places where we must have a North American look. We make and drive the same automobiles, within our countries and across our long border. It is perfectly evident that the efficient way to run this particular industry-in both nations' interest-is as a North American industry.

The agreement which has been worked out and which has been signed by the President and by Prime Minister Pearson is an imaginative answer to a situation crying for just such an answer.

We have heard arguments that the arrangements made with Canada do not benefit the United States alone. If this is true, it is probably as it ought to be. We cannot deal with a good friend and tough negotiator on a matter like this and expect to have it all our way. But there is one basic economic and political fact we must not forget and that we should not minimize: I mean that Canada was headed toward the creation of a home-grown Canadian automobile industry which would have seriously reduced the opportunity for sales in Canada of United States parts and vehicles made by United States workers. Now Canada has given up that idea and has agreed to remove the barriers to a single North American industry. This is a truly outstanding event in the good relations of our two countries. I believe it will benefit both our countries. It far outweighs any minor imperfections any of us may find in the details of the arrangements. It is an event we should seize on with great satisfaction.

I do not believe, Mr. Speaker, that we will stop here. There are other industries and other facets of our relations with Canada where we have to find North

American solutions in the years ahead.

As we see in the present bill, and as we see in our defense arrangements, we can do so within a relationship between sovereign and independent countries. It is the particular genius of Americans and Canadians that they have learned to find practical answers to practical situations, leaving political theorizing to somebody else. In enacting this bill, we shall be telling the President and Prime Minister Pearson to keep on working, as good neighbors, good partners, and good North Americans, toward the kinds of practical, constructive understanding that will continue to make the United States-Canadian relationship the political miracle of the age.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS].

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, wondrous are the ways of the Ways and Means Committee. We are asked again, as with other bills that come from the Committee on Ways and Means, to swallow the offering whole, no matter what our ability to digest it.

It has become fashionable, it seems, to bring bills in, any bill out of the Committee on Ways and Means, it does not make much difference what it deals with, under a gag rule. I can conceive of no reason whatever why this bill is on the floor under a gag rule so that the House cannot work its will. There is no explanation from anyone as to why the House is again being short-circuited by the Committee on Ways and Means.

Evidently the President has his doubts about this legislation and its effect upon the workers of the automobile industry and the related auto parts industry, for he says on page 3 of the report:

To provide appropriate relief, the bill I propose will make applicable the adjustment assistance of title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

In other words, compensatory payments out of the Federal Treasury, not from the automobile industry, not from the parts industry, but out of the U.S. Treasury-compensatory payments to workers who may be displaced by Canadian labor from enactment of this legislation-from the implementation of a Presidential treaty.

The chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. MILLS], when the coffee bill came before the House of Representatives, assured us it would not result in an increase in the price of coffee. Later he amended that statement to say that he regretted that it had resulted in a price increase. I will say to you that the coffee we use in our home, the same brand, the same pound can, has gone from 77 cents a pound to 90 cents a pound as a result of the Ways and Means Committee legislation that implemented the international coffee cartel.

in this bill, except that the compensaWe are getting the same kind of deal tory coffee payments are being paid over the dinner tables and breakfast tables of this country to the Brazilians and other coffee producing countries in Latin America. If we are going to enact

legislation of this kind, then it is about time we got legislation to the floor of the House to give those of you who support this legislation today the opportunity to likewise vote to provide for the construction of American ships in Japanese shipyards. Why not? Why Why not? not build our ships in Japanese yards? I am one of those who has been voting for subsidies to build American ships in American yards because I know that employed American labor is the best consumer of American agricultural products. I want to protect American industry and I want to protect American labor. I am not going to be caught voting for this bill or any other bill that

gives away the American market for American labor, American farm products, American industry and business. That is exactly what you will be doing if you vote for this bill today.

If anyone can give me a solid reason why we should turn over any part of our automotive production to Canada I want to hear it. Such reason has not been forthcoming up to this point.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the gentleman from Arkansas, the chairman of the committee, whether he wishes to yield time?

Mr. MILLS. I do not have any requests for time now and I would like the gentleman from Wisconsin to conclude the debate, if he would.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, the problem confronting the automobile industry, that is the producers of automobiles and the producers of parts, as a result of the situation that has existed for the past several years, is not a simple one nor is the solution of that problem a simple one. I do, however, rise in support of this legislation. I rise quite frankly with some misgivings but I would say I would have even graver misgivings as to the consequences of withdrawing from this agreement that our Government has entered into with the Government of Canada. Frankly, I think that is the thing we have to bear in mind.

We should discuss, and I am glad there were discussions, of the problems and the departures from our established trade policy in the course that the administration pursued in undertaking this agreement. I wholeheartedly agree with the comments made by my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri, in regards to the matters that concern him. I subscribe wholeheartedly to the words of caution contained in the Republican supplemental views accompanying this report. But the issue is, it seems to me, where are we now, and where will we be should we withdraw from this agreement, what would be our position if the Congress should refuse to give the President the authority to do what he undertook to do in his agreement with the Canadian Government?

As I see it, these are the alternatives that we face. You will either have unilateral action by the Government of Canada to increase its share of the automobile market in Canada, by taking whatever action Canada decides upon to reduce the exportation of parts from the United States to Canada-and parts are in considerable volume-and to reduce the exportation of new automobiles from this country to Canada. Or we can meet the problem as is proposed here by a bilateral action through a meeting of the minds, in recognition of the fact that both countries have an interest in the automobile industry and its economic welfare.

I believe that the course adopted here is the wiser course to pursue. By this action, at least, we have some understanding with Canada. The cards are

all out on the table. We know the terms of the supplemental agreements between the automobile manufacturers and the Canadian Government. We know what is proposed as the increase in the operations of the automobile industry in tions of the automobile industry in Canada. If we revert back to the former situation we will not know what unilateral or individual action Canada may take in order to increase the part it plays in automobile manufacturing.

Let us make up our minds, whether we like it or not, the Canadian Government as a matter of policy has determined that as a matter of policy has determined that it will play a larger part in the manufacture of automobile parts and of autoture of automobile parts and of automobiles that are consumed in the Canadian market. That is their policy. nadian market. That is their policy. We can disagree with that policy. I certainly do not stand here defending the Canadian policy, but they are the ones who made the decision. It was as a result of that decision that we sought negotiations with Canada to find out what could be done. This particular agreement is the outcome.

I believe this history of the situation is rather important in order that we know where we are today and what we should do in the case of this legislation. should do in the case of this legislation.

Canada was and still is faced with a balance-of-payments problem and a debalance-of-payments problem and a desire to increase employment for its labor sire to increase employment for its labor force. In seeking to alleviate the problem, the Canadians were influenced by the unfavorable balance of trade in automobile products between the United States and Canada. This unfavorable balance was almost equivalent to the balance was almost equivalent to the unfavorable balance-of-payments problem which they faced. In addition, the lem which they faced. In addition, the Canadians anticipated that the CaCanadians anticipated that the Canadian market for automobiles would expand at a rate greater than the rate of growth of the Canadian economy as a whole. This would mean that the unfavorable balance of trade in automotive products would increase unless steps were taken by Canada to expand the productaken by Canada to expand the production of automotive products. So they said, "We are going to do something about it."

They started first with the "value added" concept. Canada required that added" concept. Canada required that about 60 percent of the value of automobiles sold in Canada represent Canadian production. That was beginning in 1962. This was intended to stimulate automotive production in Canada.

In addition, the Canadians offered in 1962 a rebate of duty on automobiles and parts imported into Canada measured by the value of the automobiles and ured by the value of the automobiles and parts exported from Canada. This was part of the scheme to increase Canadian production.

We protested. The only thing we could do-and I believe we were forced to do do-and I believe we were forced to do it under the law-was to impose countervailing duties. But that would not foreclose further action by Canada to increase the value of Canadian labor and parts going into the production of automobiles.

Following the inauguration of the Canadian program, the value of the Canadian exports of automobile parts Canadian exports of automobile parts to the United States increased from $9

million in 1962 to $30 million in 1963 and then to $65 million in 1964. During this same period, Canadian exports to the United States of completed motor vehicles also rose sharply. The annual value increased from $3 million in 1962 to $4 million in 1963, and then to $24 million in 1964.

That is the course that Canada was pursuing unilaterally. The agreement is preferable in that at least we get some benefit from the situation, because we remove the high Canadian duty that applies to automotive products exported from the United States to Canada. In exchange, we eliminate a much lower duty which applies to Canadian automotive products coming into this country in the form of finished automobiles or parts.

Mr. Chairman, I say that in spite of the misgivings that we all may have, and in spite of certain objections we have to the way this agreement was initiated, and even in spite of the retroactive effect of the agreement and the other various aspects of the agreement to which I have serious reservations-in spite of our objections and our reservations, we have today before us legislation affecting a very vital industry in this country, namely, the automobile industry. We all recognize the importance of that industry. If it goes on strike or something happens to it, everybody becomes concerned. The automobile industry is a vital part of our economy. Our choice is clear. We can either turn our backs on the problem and let Canada take unilateral action, restricting the importation into Canada of American parts and automobiles, or we can take this bilateral action which at least keeps the matter somewhat under control and accepts the philosophy that there is going to be a normal increase in the Canadian sales and consumption of automobiles, and that the Canadians will have a greater share in that increase, but we will also share in it.

One of my regrets is that we have not pursued this type of action in areas where we need to get concessions from the Canadians on the restrictions and duties that they put on our exports. I think it is regrettable that these negotiations have been confined to one industry, but I would say now that that is not what we have before us. The question is: What do we do as far as this industry is concerned?

I am convinced in spite of the misgivings and in spite of this horn of the dilemma that we are on, we are better off to take that course which gives us the least misgivings and in which we have the least concern that it might be damaging to this country's interests. I believe we should take that course rather than the other course, which we all agree could have grave consequences, of simply leaving this matter up to Canada itself as to what they were going to do as far as restricting American participation in their automobile industry is concerned, because we know it is their policy to increase the automotive industry in Canada itself.

Mrs. HANSEN of Washington. Mr. Chairman, the problem of trade and tariffs is before us today and I have no wish to disrupt the orderly process of trade and friendship between our Nation and Canada, our northern neighbor, who has been and will undoubtedly continue to be one of the great bulwarks of democracy in a world sometimes filled with controversy and disagreement.

However, there are many problems which should be discussed between the two nations relative to policies that effect the economy of areas such as my own. My district has been dependent upon forest products for many years. This This year we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first tree farm in the United States.

Logging, lumbering, and the processing of forest products has long provided the economic stability and vitality of southwest Washington. However, as time passes we find that due to changing circumstances our forest products economy has not always been as healthy as possible.

a serious import crisis which is effectively gnawing away at the economic security of every forest-based community in our Nation, threatening unemployment and economic insecurity for our citizens.

The pending measure was a sharp reminder of this valiant struggle of our own domestic lumber industry against imports of a Canadian product.

It is my hope that our Government will do something to help the domestic softwood industry and its employees overcome the disadvantage of these imports and rebuild our economic health.

Because I think the facts about Canadian timber resources would be of interest, I am including for the RECORD: First, data on 1964 lumber production in First, data on 1964 lumber production in Canada by Province; and second, the timber potential by Province.

I am also including for the United States: First, data on 1962 lumber proStates: First, data on 1962 lumber production by region in the United States; and second, the net volume of sawtimand second, the net volume of sawtimber on commercial lands on January 1,

1963:

Net volume of growing stock

Middle Atlantic____ Lake States.. Central_____.

One of the major problems in the Northwest at the present time is the New England----. question of our exports of raw logs to Japan. The second thing is the inability of our American forest products to compete with the importation of softwood from Canada.

It might be well for Members of Congress to look at the record.

In 1960, such imports totaled over 3.6 million board feet; in 1961, some 4 million board feet; in 1962, over 4.5 million board feet; in 1963, some 5 million board feet; and in 1964, almost 5 million board feet again. For the first quarter of 1965, softwood lumber imports are slightly ahead of the same period of last year. When we bear in mind that over 95 percent of U.S. total softwood imports come from Canada, it becomes readily apparent that the Canadian softwood producer enjoys a very fruitful market in our country.

It is difficult, Mr. Chairman, to isolate a single item which gives Canadian producers a preferred position over domestic producers. One of the most important, however, relates to the facts that governmental cooperation through realistic appraisal prices of Government-owned timber assists the Canadian forest industry to export. As a matter of Government policy, raw material costs are kept in line with prevailing economic conditions in the United States. Timber sales from the national forests in our country are generally not conducted with comparable consideration of market conditions and community stability.

The British Columbia government, which owns the Provinical timber in Western Canada, effectively assists Canadian wood products promotion. The mills of British Columbia also have a regional advantage over U.S. producers in the amounts paid in salaries and wages. British Columbia lags behind in fringe benefits as well.

The bill before us today brought to mind the American softwood lumber industry's struggle during the past 5 years for survival against Canadian imports. That industry continues to be faced with

South Atlantic_.
East Gulf___-.
Central Gulf____
West Gulf___

Pacific Northwest.
Pacific Southwest__.
Northern Rocky Mountain_
Southern Rocky Mountain....

Total West-----
Total all regions..
Net volume of sawtimber
New England-----
Middle Atlantic_---
Lake States.
Central------
South Atlantic_
East Gulf-
Central Gulf....
West Gulf._

Pacific Northwest_
Pacific Southwest.
Northern Rocky Mountain.......
Southern Rocky Mountain._.

Total West__.
Total all regions__.

Net volume of sawtimber

Central Gulf-----
West Gulf.----
Pacific Northwest--

Pacific Southwest-----
Northern Rocky Mountain_.
Southern Rocky Mountain_.

Total___

30,695 46, 611 31,896

136, 469 40, 516 24, 663 30, 359 38, 548

203, 085 55, 518 271, 192 147, 200

357, 327 627, 882

54,428 103, 704 59,705 91, 937

117, 554 69, 890 93, 619 131, 007

1,091, 929

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In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say again that it is extremely difficult to isolate any one product or any one segment of American manufactured goods and make it the ostensible basis of trade or discussion. Our entire import policy should be reviewed in the context of development of a better internal policy and a more satisfactory external trade policy with our Canadian neighbors.

Mr. BURKE. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to add my support to this bill which will implement the historic agreement signed last January by President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson. This agreement is a further major step toward the closer integration of the United States and Canada.

The United States and Canada are good and close neighbors. We are each other's greatest trading partners. Last year, we exchanged goods valued at more than $9 billion. Our trade in automotive products alone almost totaled $1 billion. United States investment in Canada now totals more than $20 billion. Canadians have invested some $4 billion in the United States.

Our relations are closely entwined in other ways as well. In matters of our mutual defense, we have established the closest of ties. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, established in 1940 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister MacKenzie King, treats the defense of the North American Continent as a 304, 634 whole. The North American Air Defense Command-NORAD is a joint defense command with an American as its commander and a Canadian as its deputy. The DEW line the distant early warning network-jointly established and maintained by the United States and Canada, has its objective the defense of the entire North American Continent.

271, 192 147, 200 1,814,955 2, 536, 799

18,832 102, 994 198, 797 48, 664 17,981

1,574

398, 935

The timber cut from sawtimber

New England.
Middle Atlantic_----
Lake States___.
Central

South Atlantic_-_
East Gulf..
Central Gulf___
West Gulf___
Pacific Northwest..
Pacific Southwest_--_.

Northern Rocky Mountain__-
Southern Rocky Mountain__.

Total all regions--

1,348,000 1,759,000

1, 300, 267 1,718, 697 4,790, 209 2, 824, 230 3,811, 027

A year ago, President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson celebrated the ratification ratification of the of the Columbia River Treaty. This treaty provides for the construction of dams in Canada which will protect the United States against flood damage and will provide electrical generation for our joint use.

Mr. Chairman, I could cite many other instances where the United States and Canada have established and maintained the very closest of ties. So, I think it only natural that provision should now be made to treat the great automotive industries in the United States 961, 331 and Canada as a single unit. That is what the agreement signed last January 48, 401, 017 and this bill will do. By removing trade

3,949, 166 17, 138, 140 5,922, 608 2,878, 342

barriers between the two countries, auto manufactures who, in almost all cases, have plants on both sides of the border will be able to produce in their most efficient manner without regard to arbitrary and unnatural barriers. The automotive agreement speaks well for the future of our relations with Canada. I believe that everyone on both sides of the border will benefit from it-workers, manufacturers, and, ultimately, consumers. I think our economy and that of Canada will benefit generally. Mr. Chairman, I supported and voted for this bill in the Committee on Ways and Means and I shall vote for it here today.

Mr. TUPPER. Mr. Chairman, I urge in the strongest terms an affirmative vote by the House on H.R. 9042, the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. A significant amount of goods now move duty free between the United States and Canada. A free market for manufacture and sale of automotive products should prove to be an economic gain for both our country and Canada.

Canada has already acted to remove the impediment to trade in automobiles and original equipment.

The Canadian Parliament has voted to remove all duties on import of automobiles-171⁄2 percent and parts-up to 25 percent.

Congress must act to match this expression of good faith.

This bill, growing out of an agreement last January by President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson, will remove barriers to the creation of a single North American automotive industry. Canada has thus abandoned its purpose of creating a separate competitive auto industry.

U.S. automobile companies will be able to treat their Canadian and United States plants as a single industry thereby increasing the efficiency of their operation. Parts manufacturers will have opportunities for new business with removal of tariffs. It should bring fuller employment in the U.S. automobile and parts industry. Moreover, it will help preserve a favorable balance of trade with Canada of over one-half billion dollars per year.

In the event of temporary injury to an individual firm and its workers through increased imports or loss of exports, adjustment assistance under the provision of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will apply. Since it reduces duties 100 percent immediately, adjustment assistance is more generous than in any cases of dislocation under the 1962 act.

Instead of engaging in retaliatory tariff measures, the United States and Canada must commence to look at trade between the two countries with the maturity the mid-sixties demand.

Even where it is determined that an agreement helps one country more than the other, as long as it does not harm either nation, the friendship between the peoples of the two countries ought to

dictate terms for a reasonable agreement. Just as there must be intelligent compromise in diplomacy, there must be an intelligent give and take in trade policies.

Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this bill as I did more vocally a few weeks ago on a proposal for a universal divestiture of tariffs in nickel. Today we have not a unilateral action but a bilateral action predicated again on the interest of a substantial portion of a single industry which is completely inconsistent with all our grandiose objectives and plans and statements for a "grand design" of a peaceful and closely knit world bound together by the sinews of a freer trade. Once again the exigencies of the moment and the demands of a single powerful industry subvert this "grand design." Once again we prove to the world that "freer trade" is not a broad freeway with benefits flowing in both directions but is a one-way street with American producers and American labor giving much and receiving little. No effort is made to equalize the competitive disadvantages in which our lumber and woods products industry finds itself vis-a-vis the Canadians. No effort is made to relieve the log export problem presently bearing so heavily on our own Pacific Northwest nor to equalize the flow of logs across the border between Washington and British Columbia which seem to our producers to flow only in one direction.

How can the administration and the Congress blatantly announce that this agreement is in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and then ask for and vote for this bill? The mostfavored-nation doctrine, must be applied and the benefits accruing to Canada must be spread among our trading partners of the free world. We are faced here with a specter not just of Canadian production, 90 percent of which, we are told, is American owned-but Canadian manned-but production from Japan, Germany, England, France, Italy, Sweden, and who knows what other nations, all of whom are entitled to most favored nation. We have many friends in the world when approached on this basis, and it will mean little to any of them when we try to explain our especial relation to Canada as a justification for breaking the agreement.

Our Government tells us that they intend to ask for a waiver. A waiver A waiver should be obtained before the deed is done for what do we do if the waiver is not forthcoming. I reiterate again my belief that our greater prosperity and that of the world lies in the direction of freer trade. I cannot help but agree with the gentleman from Missouri, [Mr. CURTIS] who prophesied gloomily that the road down which we are moving with bilateral agreement following unilateral agreement in odd juxtaposition can but lead us back to the confusion, the barriers, and the stagnation of "Smoot Hawley." The intense pressures of a single industry or the troubles of even so close The intense pressures of a single a friend as Canada ought not be per

mitted to divert us from our goal.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all Members desiring to do so may be permitted to re

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(2) to authorize the implementation of such other international agreements providing for the mutual reduction or elimination of duties applicable to automotive products as the Government of the United States may hereafter enter into.

TITLE II-BASIC AUTHORITIES

Implementation of the Agreement

to proclaim the modifications of the Tariff SEC. 201. (a) The President is authorized Schedules of the United States provided for in title IV of this Act.

(b) At any time after the issuance of the proclamation authorized by subsection (a), the President is authorized to proclaim further modifications of the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide for the dutyis original motor-vehicle equipment (as defree treatment of any Canadian article which fined by such Schedules as modified pursuant to subsection (a)) if he determines that the importation of such article is actually or potentially of commercial significance and that such duty-free treatment is required to carry out the Agreement.

Implementation of other agreements

SEC. 202. (a) Whenever, after determining that such an agreement will afford mutual trade benefits, the President enters into an providing for the mutual elimination of the agreement with the government of a country duties applicable to products of their respective countries which are motor vehicles and fabricated components intended for use as original equipment in the manufacture of such vehicles, the President (in accordance with subsection (d)) is authorized to proules of the United States as he determines to be required to carry out such agreement.

claim such modifications of the Tariff Sched

(b) Whenever, after having entered into an agreement with the government of a

country providing for the mutual eliminaafter determining that such further agreetion of the duties applicable to products described in subsection (a), the President, ment will afford mutual trade benefits, enters

into a further agreement with such government providing for the mutual reduction or elimination of the duties applicable to automotive products other than motor vehicles. and fabricated components intended for use as original equipment in the manufacture of

such vehicles, the President (in accordance with subsection (d)) is authorized to proclaim such modifications of the Tariff Schedules of the United States as he determines to be required to carry out such futher agree

ment.

(c) Before the President enters into the negotiation of an agreement referred to in subsection (a) or (b), he shall

(1) seek the advice of the Tariff Commission as to the probable economic effect of the reduction or elimination of duties on industries producing articles like or directly competitive with those which may be covered

by such agreement;

(2) give reasonable public notice of his intention to negotiate such agreement (which notice shall be published in the Federal Register) in order that any interested person may have an opportunity to present his views to such agency as the President shall designate, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe; and

(3) seek information and advice with respect to such agreement from the Departments of Commerce, Labor, State, and the Treasury, and from such other sources as he may deem appropriate.

(d) (1) The President shall transmit to each House of the Congress a copy of each agreement referred to in subsection (a) or (b). The delivery to both Houses shall be

on the same day and shall be made to each House while it is in session.

(2) The President is authorized to issue any proclamation to carry out any such

agreement

(A) only after the expiration of the 60day period following the date of delivery,

(B) only if, between the date of delivery and the expiration of such 60-day period, the Congress has not adopted a concurrent resolution stating in substance that the Senate and House of Representatives disapprove of the agreement, and

(C) in the case of any agreement referred to in subsection (b) with any country, only if there is in effect a proclamation implementing an agreement with such country applicable to products described in subsection (a).

(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), in the computation of the 60-day period there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain or an adjournment of the Congress sine die.

Effective date of proclamations SEC. 203. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the President is authorized, notwithstanding section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C., sec. 1514) or any other provision of law, to give retroactive effect to any proclamation issued pursuant to section 201 of this

Act as of the earliest date after January 17,

1965, which he determines to be practicable.

(b) In the case of liquidated customs entries, the retroactive effect pursuant to subsection (a) of any proclamation shall apply only upon request therefor filed with the customs officer concerned on or before the 90th day after the date of such proclamation and subject to such other conditions as the President may specify.

Termination of proclamations

SEC. 204. The President is authorized at any time to terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation issued pursuant to section 201 or 202 of this Act.

TITLE III-TARIFF ADJUSTMENT AND OTHER AD

JUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

General authority

SEC. 301. Subject to section 302 of this Act, a petition may be filed for tariff adjustment or for a determination of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance under title

III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C., sec. 1901-1991) as though the reduction or elimination of a duty proclaimed by the President pursuant to section 201 or 202 of this Act were a concession granted under a trade agreement referred to in section 301 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Special authority during transitional period under the agreement

SEC. 302. (a) After the 90th day after the date of the enactment of this Act and before July 1, 1968, a petition under section 301 of this Act for a determination of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance may be filed with the President by

(1) a firm which produces an automotive product, or its representative; or

(2) a group of workers in a firm which produces an automotive product, or their certified or recognized union or other duly authorized representative.

(b) After a petition is filed by a firm or group of workers under subsection (a), the President shall determine whether

(1) dislocation of the firm or group of workers has occurred or threatened to oc

cur;

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(B) exports from the United States to Canada of the United States automotive product concerned produced by the firm, or an appropriate subdivision thereof, and of the United States automotive product like or directly competitive therewith, have decreased appreciably, and the decrease in such exports is greater than the decrease, if any, in production in Canada of the Canadian automotive product like or directly competitive with the United States automotive product being exported.

(c) If the President makes an affirmative determination under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (b), with respect to a firm or group of workers, he shall promptly certify that as a result of its dislocation the firm or group of workers is eligible to apply for adjustment assistance, unless the PresiAgreement has not been the primary factor dent determines that the operation of the in causing or threatening to cause dislocation of the firm or group of workers.

(d) If the President makes an affirmative determination under paragraph (1) but a negative determination under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (b), with respect to a firm or group of workers, the President shall determine whether the operation of the Agreement has nevertheless been the primary factor in causing or threatening to cause dislocation of the firm or group of workers. If the President makes such an affirmative de

termination, he shall promptly certify that as a result of its dislocation the firm or group of workers is eligible to apply for adjustment assistance.

(e) (1) In order to provide the President with a factual record on the basis of which he may make the determinations referred to in subsections (b), (c), and (d) with respect to a firm or a group of workers, the President shall promptly transmit to the Tariff Commission a copy of each petition filed under subsection (a) and, not later than 5 days after the date on which the petition is filed, shall request the Tariff Commission to conduct an investigation related to questions of fact relevant to such determina

tions and to make a report of the facts disclosed by such investigation. In his request, the President may specify the particular kinds of data which he deems appropriate. Upon receipt of the President's request, the Tariff Commission shall promptly institute the investigation and promptly publish notice thereof in the Federal Register.

(2) In the course of each investigation conducted under paragraph (1), the Tariff Commission shall, after reasonable notice, hold a public hearing, if such hearing is requested (not later than 10 days after the date of the publication of its notice under paragraph (1)) by the petitioner or any other ject matter of the investigation, and shall person showing a proper interest in the subafford interested persons an opportunity to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard at such hearing.

(3) Not later than 50 days after the date on which it receives the request of the President under paragraph (1), the Tariff Commission shall transmit to the President a report of the facts disclosed by its investigation, together with the transcript of the hearing and any briefs which may have been submitted in connection with such investigation.

(f) (1) The President shall make each final determination under subsection (b), (c), or (d) with respect to a firm or group of workers only after he has sought advice from the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and the Treasury, the Small Business Administration, and such other agencies as he may deem appropriate.

(2) The President shall make each such final determination not later than 15 days after the date on which he receives the Tariff Commission's report, unless, within such period, the President requests additional factual information from the Tariff Commission. In this event, the Tariff Commission shall, not later than 25 days after the date on which it receives the President's request, furnish such additional factual information in a supplemental report, and the President shall make his final determination not later than 10 days after the date on which he receives such supplemental report.

(3) The President shall promptly publish in the Federal Register a summary of each

final determination under this section.

(g) Any certification with respect to a group of workers made by the President under this section shall—

(1) specify the date on which the dislocation began or threatens to begin; and

(2) be terminated by the President whenever he determines that the operation of the Agreement is no longer the primary factor in causing separations from the firm or subdivision thereof, in which case such determination shall apply only with respect to separations occurring after the termination date specified by the President.

(h) Any certification with respect to a firm or a group of workers or any termination of such certification, including the specification of a date in such certification or termination, made by the President under this section shall constitute a certification or termination, including the specification of a date therein, under section 302 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C., sec. 1902) for purposes of chapter 2 or 3 of title III of that Act.

(i) If a firm which has been certified under this section applies for tax assistance as provided by section 317 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the reference in subsection (a) (2) of such section 317 to a trade or business which was seriously injured by increased imports which the Tariff Commission has determined to result from concessions granted under trade agreements shall be treated as referring to a trade or business which was

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