blood Indians to their right to convey under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. Therefore all adult heirs of any deceased Indian other than a full blood might convey, but the full blood only with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. In this important provision the restrictions were removed as to all classes of Indians other than full bloods. In other words, there as here, the Indians were divided into two classes, full bloods in one class and all others in the second class.

Furthermore, the appellees' construction accords with the departmental construction, as shown by the facts stipulated. Such was the construction given by the Indian Commissioner to the treaty of September 30, 1854, supra, wherein provision was made for mixed blood Indians among the Chippewas, and the Indian agent at Detroit, Michigan, was instructed by the Indian Commissioner that the term mixed blood had been construed to mean all who are identified as having a mixture of Indian and white blood. Such was the interpretation of the Department of Interior, in the first place at least, in administering the matter under the Clapp Amendment. It is true that the Government representatives at Detroit, Minnesota, were of the opposite opinion, for the reasons we have stated above, and that the Second Assistant Commissioner in his reply, while reaching the conclusion we have, stated that he would confer with the Department of Justice.

While departmental construction of the Clapp Amendment does not have the weight which such constructions sometimes have in long continued observance, nevertheless it is entitled to consideration,-the early administration of that amendment showing the interpretation placed upon it by competent men having to do with its enforcement. The conviction is very strong that if Congress intended to remove restrictions only from those who had half white blood or more, it would have inserted in the

act the words necessary to make that intention clear, that is, we deem this a case for the application of the often expressed consideration, aiding interpretation, that if a given construction was intended it would have been easy for the legislative body to have expressed it in apt terms. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 689; Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 627; Tompkins v. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co., 125 U. S. 109, 127; United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U. S. 399, 410.

Congress was very familiar with the situation, the subject having been before it in many debates and discussions concerning Indian affairs. This was a reservation inhabited by Indians of full blood and others of all degrees of mixed blood, some with a preponderance of white blood, others with less and many with very little. If Congress, having competency in mind and that alone, had intended to emancipate from the prevailing restriction on alienation only those who were half white or more, by a few simple words it could have effected that purpose. We cannot believe that such was the congressional intent, and we are clearly of opinion that the courts may not supply the words which Congress omitted. Nor can such course be induced by any consideration of public policy or the desire to promote justice, if such would be its effect, in dealing with dependent people.

We reach the conclusion that the Circuit Court of Appeals rightly construed this statute, and its decrees are

Affirmed.

234 U. S.

Statement of the Case.

LAZARUS, MICHEL & LAZARUS v. PRENTICE, RECEIVER OF MUSICA.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 1012. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted May 4, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.

Under clause 20 of § 2 of the Bankruptcy Act as added by the amendment of June 25, 1910, the bankruptcy courts have ancillary jurisdiction over persons and property within their respective territorial limits in aid of a trustee or receiver appointed in any court of bankruptcy.

Property of the bankrupt when seized by an ancillary receiver or trustee is held by virtue of the terms of the Bankruptcy Act to be turned over to the court of original jurisdiction and no right can be acquired in it by assignment subsequent to the petition which can defeat this purpose.

Under subd. d of § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, attorney's fees for serv

ices in contemplation of bankruptcy are specifically provided for and are subject to revision in the court of original jurisdiction and not elsewhere. In re Wood and Henderson, 210 U. S. 246. The seizure of property of the bankrupt by an ancillary receiver is a summary proceeding and not a plenary suit and the decision of the bankruptcy court in the jurisdiction of seizure that an intervenor claiming by virtue of an assignment of the bankrupts made after the petition and in payment of attorney's fees must assert the claims in the court of original jurisdiction is an administrative order, and the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the same is not reviewable in this court.

A motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals will not be denied as premature because the record has not been printed if the record of proceedings in the District Court is here and this court is sufficiently advised as to the situation of the case to dispose of it without doing injustice to the parties. National Bank v. Insurance Co., 100 U. S. 43.

Appeal from 211 Fed. Rep. 326, dismissed.

THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from the Circuit Court of Appeals in cer

Argument for Appellants.

234 U.S.

tain classes of bankruptcy matters, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. H. Generes Dufour and Mr. Edwin T. Rice for appellees in support of the motion.

Mr. Henry L. Lazarus, Mr. David Sessler, Mr. Girault Farrar, Mr. Herman Michel, and Mr. Eldon S. Lazarus for appellants, in opposition to the motion:

This court has jurisdiction of the cause of the appellants. See in support of this proposition: Houghton v. Burden, 228 U. S. 161; Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U. S. 513; Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U. S. 545; Hewitt v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296; Bankruptcy Act, § 24a; acts of Congress, March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 828, c. 517, §6; Judicial Code, 1912, §§ 128, 241.

No printed record having been submitted to appellants or to the court, the motion to dismiss or affirm should be denied or be postponed until the regular hearing of this cause. Power v. Baker, 112 U. S. 710; Crane Iron Co. v. Hoagland, 108 U. S. 5; National Bank v. Ins. Co., 100 U. S. 43; Waterville v. Van Slyke, 115 U. S. 290.

A motion to affirm coupled with a motion to dismiss will not be entertained unless there is color of ground in the motion to dismiss. Chanute City v. Trader, 132 U. S. 213, and cases cited therein.

The question of jurisdiction in this case cannot be determined without opening the record and looking into the merits of the controversy, and hence the motion to dismiss should be denied or deferred to the hearing on the merits. Lynch v. De Bernal, 131 U. S. (Appendix) XCIV.

The questions raised by this appeal are serious and not frivolous.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a motion to dismiss the appeal of Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus, interveners in a certain bankruptcy proceeding in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, where the intervening petition was dismissed (205 Fed. Rep. 413), which order was affirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (211 Fed. Rep. 326). The interveners now attempt to bring the case to this court by appeal on the ground that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was not final in the proceeding.

The facts are not materially in dispute, and, as found by both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, appear to be: Antonio Musica and Philip Musica were partners in trade under the firm name of A. Musica & Son, importers of hair in the City of New York. They had become largely indebted and on the nineteenth of March, 1913, a petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York against the firm and the individual members thereof, and a receiver was appointed of the bankrupt estate, the partnership and its members being subsequently adjudicated bankrupts. On the same day the petition was filed the bankrupts and Arthur Musica were arrested as fugitives from justice in the City of New Orleans, and Lucy Grace Musica was held as a material witness. Upon search there was found upon their persons, variously distributed among them and concealed in divers ways, about $75,000 in money, and notes, mortgages and insurance policies amounting in value to some $50,000 more. Without going into detail, upon the admissions of the parties it became perfectly apparent that the property in question belonged to the bankrupt estate. The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, upon petition, confirmed the receiver