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Opinion of the Court.

234 U. S.

as temporary receiver of that court and directed that all the property be turned over to him to be transmitted to the trustee or trustees in bankruptcy of A. Musica & Son elected and qualified in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, to be disposed of under and subject to the orders of that court.

While the Musicas took the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals, no appeal has been sued out by them to this court, and the only questions here concern the intervention of Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus, who, on April 28, 1913, filed an intervening petition in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming $15,000 as attorney fees for services rendered the Musicas in the proceedings against them in the courts of Louisiana to protect their property rights and possession and for services to be rendered in representing them in proceedings in New York, if their services were there required. The decree of the District Court which was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, dismissed the petition in intervention of Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus, reserving their right to assert whatever claim they may have in the bankruptcy court of original and primary jurisdiction.

The filing of the petition and adjudication in the bankruptcy court in New York brought the property of the bankrupts wherever situated into custodia legis, and it was thus held from the date of the filing of the petition, so that subsequent liens could not be given or obtained thereon, nor proceedings had in other courts to reach the property, the court of original jurisdiction having acquired the full right to administer the estate under the bankruptcy law. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1; Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300. Under clause 3 of § 2 of the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, the receiver in the original case would have had the right, acting under authority of the court, to take possession in a summary

Opinion of the Court.

proceeding of the bankrupts' property, found as was this, in possession of those admittedly holding it for the bankrupts, and to hold the property until the qualification of the trustee or until the bankruptcy petition should be dismissed, if that should happen. Bryan v. Bernheimer, 181 U. S. 188; Mueller v. Nugent, supra. Prior to the amendment of June 25, 1910, c. 412, 36 Stat. 838, this court had held that in cases where the bankruptcy court of original jurisdiction could itself make a summary order for the delivery of property to the trustee or receiver the court of ancillary jurisdiction could do so (Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 102), and by clause 20, added to § 2 by the amendment of June 25, 1910, the bankruptcy courts were specifically given ancillary jurisdiction over persons or property within their respective territorial limits in aid of a trustee. or receiver appointed in any court of bankruptcy. Under this amendment there can be no question that the District Court in Louisiana had authority to appoint a receiver and to take summary proceedings for the restoration of the bankrupts' estate which was in the custody of people having no right to it, in order that the same might be turned over to the bankruptcy court having jurisdiction for administration. Under the circumstances here shown, there can be no question that this authority was properly exercised in this case.

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The property when seized was by virtue of the terms of the Bankruptcy Act held for and to be turned over to the court of original jurisdiction, and no right could be acquired in it by assignment subsequent to the filing of the petition which would defeat this purpose. Such assignment was a mere nullity, properly disregarded by the bankruptcy court, and notwithstanding which it could direct the delivery of the bankrupts' property to the receiver by summary order. Babbitt v. Dutcher, supra. There is no contention that Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus had any lien upon this property at the time of the appre

Opinion of the Court.

hension of the parties and the seizure of the property. Whatever rights they had are asserted to arise by virtue of the assignments made April 1, 1913, and after the filing of the original petition in bankruptcy.

For an attorney fee for services to be rendered in contemplation of bankruptcy the act makes specific provision in subdivision d of § 60, and the amount thus attempted to be used in contemplation of bankruptcy proceedings is subject to revision in the court of original jurisdiction and not elsewhere. See In re Wood and Henderson, 210 U. S. 246.

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The contention of the appellants and the proposition upon which they rely to sustain jurisdiction in this court is that by their intervention in the proceeding in the United States District Court in Louisiana they initiated a controversy in the bankruptcy proceeding, which is appealable to this court from the Circuit Court of Appeals, as are ordinary cases in equity where original jurisdiction does not rest on diverse citizenship entirely (Judicial Code, § 128). To maintain that proposition Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296; Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223; Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U. S. 545; Houghton, Receiver, v. Burden, 228 U. S. 161, and cases of that character are cited. In those cases it was held that controversies arising in bankruptcy, in the nature of plenary suits, concerning property claimed by others than the bankrupt do not come under the special provisions of the Bankruptcy Act governing petitions for review and appeals, but take the course of ordinary cases in equity and are not final in the Circuit Court of Appeals where other cases of a similar character would not be.

The Bankruptcy Act provides for review under § 24b of administrative orders and decrees in the course of bankruptcy proceedings which are not made specially appealable under § 25a.. And controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings, of the character of which we

Opinion of the Court.

have spoken, under § 24a, are appealable like other equity cases. See Matter of Loving, 224 U. S. 183. In this case merely ancillary jurisdiction in a summary proceeding in bankruptcy was invoked in the seizure of this property in the hands of those holding it for the bankrupts, and its character could not be changed or enlarged by the attempted intervention of Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus under alleged assignments of the property made after the filing of the petition in the original bankruptcy proceeding. We think the District Court was right in holding, and the Circuit Court of Appeals right in affirming its decision, that whatever claim Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus had under the circumstances here shown must be asserted in the court of original jurisdiction. The attempted intervention in the ancillary proceeding did not give jurisdiction over a controversy in bankruptcy appealable under the Judicial Code to the Court of Appeals and thence to this court. This conclusion must result in the dismissal of the attempted appeal here.

It is contended, however, that this motion is premature, because the record in this case has not been printed. It is true that ordinarily such motions made before the record is printed must be accompanied by a statement of facts upon which they rest or by printed copies of so much of the record as will enable the court to understand the case. Under the present practice it is permissible to file the record printed in the court below, and we have a printed transcript of the proceedings in the District Court. In this printed record matters which the briefs do not dispute are shown, and we think we are sufficiently advised as to the situation of the case to dispose of it now without doing injustice to the parties. National Bank v. Insurance Co., 100 U. S. 43.

We reach the conclusion that this appeal

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Must be dismissed.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

234 U.S.

STONE, SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 302. Argued April 23, 1914.—Decided June 8, 1914.

Where the contract contains a provision for a method of annulment and liquidated damages in case of a breach by failure to commence work and the Government avails of that provision it is only entitled to the liquidated damages and cannot recover damages for difference in cost on reletting the contract under a provision for failure to complete or abandonment after commencing the work. United States v. O'Brien, 220 U. S. 321, distinguished.

The benefit and burden of a provision in a Government contract giving a right to annul in consequence of a breach by failure to commence work must hang together and the Government cannot avail of the former without accepting the latter.

195 Fed. Rep. 68, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the liability of a contractor and its surety under a contract with the Government for excavation work, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William Marshall Bullitt, with whom Mr. Henry C. Willcox and Mr. T. M. Miller were on the brief, for plaintiffs in error:

The contract as construed in United States v. O'Brien, 220 U. S. 321, means: Clause A: If the contractor (1) fails to begin work on the day specified or (2) fails (in the judgment of the Government engineer) to prosecute the work faithfully, then the United States may annul the contract, i. e., refuse to perform it further; in which event the United States may keep all money or retained percentages in its hands, but shall have no further damages.

Clause B: On the other hand, if the contractor fails to

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