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Opinion of the Court.
transportation impossible; that to stop an express train on its trip from New York to Boston at the Connecticut line in order that passengers may leave the cars heated as required by New York, and get into other cars heated in a different mode in conformity with the laws of Connecticut, and then at the Massachusetts line to get into cars heated by still another mode as required by the laws of that Commonwealth, would be a hardship on travel that could not be endured.' But the court ruled that these 'possible inconveniences' could not affect ‘the question of power in each State to make such reasonable regulations for the safety of passengers on interstate trains as in its judgment, all things considered is appropriate and effective.' 165 U. S. 632, 633.
In thus deciding, the court applied the settled principle that, in the absence of legislation by Congress, the States are not denied the exercise of their power to secure safety in the physical operation of railroad trains within their territory, even though such trains are used in interstate commerce. That has been the law since the beginning of railroad transportation. It was not intended that pending Federal action the use of such agencies, which unless carefully guarded was fraught with danger to the community, should go unregulated and that the States should be without authority to secure needed local protection. The requirements of a State, of course, must not be arbitrary or pass beyond the limits of a fair judgment as to what the exigency demands, but they are not invalid because another State in the exercise of a similar power may not impose the same regulation. We may repeat what was said in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 481, 482: “It is to be remembered that railroads are not natural highways of trade and commerce. The places where they may be located, and the plans according to which they must be constructed, are prescribed by the legislation of the State. Their operation requires the use of instruments
Opinion of the Court.
and agencies attended with special risks and dangers, the proper management of which involves peculiar knowledge, training, skill, and care. The safety of the public in person and property demands the use of specific guards and precautions. The rules prescribed for their construction and for their management and operation, designed to protect persons and property, otherwise endangered by their use, are strictly within the limits of the local law. They are not per se regulations of commerce; it is only when they operate as such in the circumstances of their application, and conflict with the expressed or presumed will of Congress exerted on the same subject, that they can be required to give way to the supreme authority of the Constitution." See also, Nashville &c. Rwy. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, supra; Lake Shore & M. S. Rwy. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Missouri Pacific Rwy. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612; Missouri Pacific Rwy. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 402, 410.
234 U. S.
If there is a conflict in such local regulations, by which interstate commerce may be inconvenienced-if there appears to be need of standardization of safety appliances and of providing rules of operation which will govern the entire interstate road irrespective of state boundaries -there is a simple remedy; and it cannot be assumed that it will not be readily applied if there be real occasion for it. That remedy does not rest in a denial to the State, in the absence of conflicting Federal action, of its power to protect life and property within its borders, but it does lie in the exercise of the paramount authority of Congress in its control of interstate commerce to establish such regulations as in its judgment may be deemed appropriate and sufficient. Congress, when it pleases, may give the rule and make the standard to be observed on the interstate highway.
Opinion of the Court.
It is suggested that Congress has acted in the present instance. Reference is made to the act of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531, relating to power driving-wheel brakes for locomotives, grabirons, automatic couplers and height of drawbars; to the act of March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, amending the act of 1893; to the act of May 27, 1908, c. 200, 35 Stat. 317, 324, 325, authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to keep informed regarding compliance with the Safety Appliance Act and to investigate and report on the need. of any appliances or systems intended to promote the safety of railway operations; to the act of May 30, 1908, c. 225, 35 Stat. 476, relating to locomotive ash pans; to the act of April 14, 1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298, relating to sill steps, hand brakes, ladders, running boards and hand holds and providing that the Interstate Commerce Commission should after hearing designate the number, dimensions, location and manner of application of these appliances and of those required by the act of 1893; to the detailed regulations prescribed by the Commission, on March 13, 1911, pursuant to this authority; to the act of May 6, 1910, c. 208, 36 Stat. 350, requiring the Commission to investigate accidents and make report as to their causes with such recommendations as they may deem proper; and to the act of February 17, 1911, c. 103, 36 Stat. 913, relating to locomotive boilers.
But it is manifest that none of these acts provides regulations for locomotive headlights. Attention is also called to the investigations conducted by what is known as the 'block-signal and train control board' (organized by the Commission) and the reports of that board with respect to sundry devices and appliances, including headlights. It does not appear, however, either that Congress has acted or that the Commission under the authority of Congress has established any regulation so far as headlights are concerned. As to these, the situation has not been altered by any exertion of Federal power and the
234 U. S.
case stands as it has always stood without regulation unless it be supplied by local authority. The most that can be said is that inquiries have been made, but that Congress has not yet decided to establish regulations, either directly or through its subordinate body, as to the appliance in question. The intent to supersede the exercise of the State's police power with respect to this subject cannot be inferred from the restricted action which thus far has been taken. Missouri Pacific v. Larabee Mills, supra; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533. The judgment is affirmed.
234 U. S.
APPEAL FROM THE COMMERCE COURT.
THE LOS ANGELES SWITCHING CASE.1
No. 98. Argued January 14, 15, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.
An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring railway companies to desist from exacting charges for delivering and receiving carload freight to and from industries located upon spurs and sidetracks within the switching limits of a terminal city when such carload freight is moving in interstate commerce incidentally to a system line haul is not open to the objection that it rests upon a construction of the Act to Regulate Commerce which would forbid a carrier from separating its terminal and haulage charges on the same shipment.
Quære, and not involved in this decision, whether the rate which the Act to Regulate Commerce requires to be published is a complete rate including not only the charge for hauling but also the charge for the use of terminals at both ends of the line.
1 Docket title of this case is Interstate Commerce Commission, The United States of America, Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles, and Pacific Coast Jobbers and Manufacturers Association, appellants, v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Southern Pacific Company, and San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Company.
Statement of the Case.
The delivery and receipt of goods on an industrial spur-track within the switching limits in a city is not necessarily an added service for which the carrier is entitled to make, or should make, a charge additional to the line-haul rate to and from that city when that rate embraces a receiving and delivery service for which the spur-track service is a substitute.
Industrial spur-tracks established within the carrier's switching limits, within which the team tracks are also located, may constitute an essential part of the carrier's terminal system; and whether or not delivery on the spur-track is an additional service on which to base a charge or merely a substituted service, which is substantially a like service to that included in the line-haul rate and not received, is a question of fact for the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine. Findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the character and use of industrial spur-tracks within the switching limits of a city are conclusions of fact and not subject to review. Although the Interstate Commerce Commission may not have found that a switching charge if legal was unreasonable in amount or that the shippers had objected thereto, as the service must be performed according to the law of the land, the shippers are not estopped from bringing the matter before the Commission to the end that the carrier's charges should not be unjustly discriminatory.
It is permissible for a railway company to establish a terminal district; and it is for the Commission to determine according to the actual conditions of operation, whether an extra charge for spur-track delivery within that district, regardless of the variations in distance, is either unreasonable or discriminatory.
This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Interstate Commerce Commission upon matters of fact within the province of the Commission.
The order of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the carriers desist from making a switching charge for carload freight moving in interstate commerce to industrial spur-tracks within the switching limits of Los Angeles, California, sustained.
Pursuant to the act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, judgments of the Com
merce Court reversed by this court are remanded to the District Court of the United States for the district where the case would have been brought had the Commerce Court not been established. 188 Fed. Rep. 229, reversed.
THE facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission in regard to switching