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subjected to authority, and heresy suffered persecution. It matters little that the instruments of repression are changed; that orthodoxy relies not on the thumbscrew and the stake, but on political prosecution and the exercise of official patronage. Freedom of thought is equally menaced; it may even be doubted whether the substitution of secular for ecclesiastical authority is wholly a gain to modern Germany. The Medieval Church had behind it traditions of unique significance for the human spirit. The Prussian State can point to no such hallowed antecedents ; its record is not of martyrdom and sacrifice, but of the conquest of Silesia, the partition of Poland, the spoliation of Denmark and France, and the rape of Belgium and Serbia.
These reflections show how well-grounded was Nietzsche's foreboding that the victory of 1870 would prove in the event a signal defeat for German culture. Germany has forfeited her title to respect among the nations because she has been untrue to her high vocation. Her ambition to force a German culture upon the free peoples of the world is doomed by inherent contradiction. Catholicity is of the essence of truth : truth knows no national limitations. Sic vos, non vobis has been the note of intellectual progress in every age. To win knowledge, not for themselves, but for the world, was the goal of German thinkers in the past, and the world honours them for their service. The Germans of to-day have forsaken the truth of their fathers—forsaken a truth that is universal and for all mankind for a truth that is national and German, in other words, a truth that is no truth at all. It may be that, through defeat and disillusionment, they will gain the saving insight which alone enables a people to enrich the spiritual heritage of the world. But at present the promise of enrichment lies elsewhere. We turn from the tragedy of the German intellect to France, whose historic culture, compared with which that of Germany is but of yesterday, has ever been consecrated to the service of humanity; and to Russia, whose claim to labour in the same cause has found utterance in these noble words of Dostoieffsky :
*The significance of the Russian race is without doubt European and Universal. To be a real Russian and to be wholly Russian means but this : to be the brother of all men, to be universally human. To the true Russian, Europe and the affairs of the great
Aryan race are as dear as the affairs of Russia herself ; because our affairs are those of the whole world, and are to be obtained, not by the sword, but by the strength of fraternity and by our brotherly effort towards the union of mankind. In the long run I am convinced that we, that is to say, not we, but the future generations of the Russian people, shall every one of us, from the first to the last, understand that to be a real Russian must mean simply this : to strive towards bringing about a solution and an end to European conflicts; to show to Europe a way of escape from its anguish in the Russian soul, which is universal and all-embracing; to instil into her a brotherly love for all men's brothers, and, in the end, perhaps, to utter the great and final word of universal harmony, the fraternal and lasting concord of all peoples in accordance with the Gospel of Christ.'
If we have read aright the story of German hubris, it behoves us to carry home its warning to ourselves. It shows that the perils of peace may be no less hazardous than those of war, and that the touchstone of a people's greatness is their ability, in the hour of triumph, to discriminate between illusion and reality. German statecraft is known as Realpolitik, but in truth its aim is the most fantastic and chimerical that has ever beguiled a great nation to its downfall. Through lack of self-knowledge and self-mastery, a people gifted beyond the common with energy of mind, with habits of industry and discipline, and with efficiency in organisation, has bartered its intellectual and moral birthright for the wild dream of European domination. We in England, moved by the visible fruits of German science to examine into our national traditions, are in danger of learning only half our lesson. In the application of scientific knowledge to national economy we prepared to profit by Germany's example. We recognise that her fault lies not in the efficiency of her methods, but in the ends which these methods have subserved. But if it be true that England has been weak where Germany is strong, we must see to it that we are strong where she is weak. Let us not forget, when we emulate her efficiency, that the supreme interest of the State is to train its citizens to that ‘right judg'ment in all things which alone can save a nation from moral and intellectual disaster when it is called upon to face the responsibilities of power.
W. G. DE BURGH.
THE JEWISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT
1. Auto-emancipation. By Dr. L. PINSKER. Berlin. 1882. 2. Publications of the 'Bund' (Yiddish): I. What we demand.
II. The National Question. Geneva. 1905. 3. The Struggle of the Austrian Nations for the State.
By RUDOLF SPRINGER. Vienna. 1902.
HEN the reconstruction of Europe is undertaken on
the basis of Mr. Lloyd George's Carnarvon formulaone emancipated land from the Urals to the Atlantic'many unsuspected national problems will reveal themselves Among these, the claims of the Jewish nationality, which has more or less silently developed itself in Eastern Europe during the last thirty-five years, will take a much higher place than is generally anticipated. In Western Russia alone there are close on 7,000,000 Jews, while in the adjacent territories to which a new political geography will have to be given are little short of another couple of millions. Thus, in magnitude they constitute a nationality only third in rank among the peoples which, in some form or another, will claim their share in the fulfilment of the Prime Minister's rare and refreshing promise. They are, indeed, outnumbered only by the Ukrainians and the Poles; they are 33 per cent. more numerous than the Czechs and Slovaks, and they are nearly three times as numerous as the Serbs, with all their irredenta added. Nor is their national consciousness less intense, or their national aim less definite than that of any other of the many races who constitute the ethnographic whirlpool of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Even if complete national emancipation should, for obvious reasons, not prove practicable for them, their national claims will still offer a perplexity to the peace congress. This may be seen in the single problem of the reconstitution of Poland, in which they figure with about 14 per cent. of the population of the Russian section alone, including 40 per cent. of the townsfolk and between 45 and 50 per cent. of the artisan and trading classes.
The Jewish national movement is, however, of profound interest to the political student, for more abiding reasons. It is the latest manifestation of national self-assertion in Europe, and its appearance is that of quite a new nationality, deriving its consciousness, inspirations, methods, and even language less from inherited tradition and ethnographic peculiarities than from the example and isolating conditions of its immediate environment. The Zionist wing of the movement is never tired of claiming that it expresses an unbroken national yearning of over two thousand years, but it is very doubtful whether this claim can be substantiated. From the time of Bar Cochba, who raised the flag of Jewish revolt for the last time in the year 132, to our own days, there is scarcely a trace of Jewish national feeling, in the political sense of the term, in Jewish history and literature. The truth is that the Zionists confuse eschatology with politics. The Jews were always primarily, and above everything else, a religious community, and their national life in Palestine was only a phase, a social expedient, of their greater history as a Church. The religion could live without politics, and did. The exiled people, filled with the religion, its duties, and its problems, soon lost their political yearning, and merged their hopes of national restoration with the Messianic teachings of their prophets and sages. It is, of course, true, as the Zionists do not fail to remind us, that the Jewish liturgy is full of prayers for the restoration to Jerusalem, but this is precisely because the restoration prayed for was not the satisfaction of a worldly craving, but the fulfilment of a divine scheme of human redemption. Had it been otherwise, it would assuredly not have formed, as it does, the staple of the English Prayer Book and the refrain of its most solemn litanies.
There were other and more practical reasons why the Jewish national nostalgia died out so completely. In a double sense, the European atmosphere was unfavourable to it. The oppression and persecutions from which the Jews suffered cut them off from everything that was virile in their European surroundings, while it still more directly sapped their own instincts of self-assertion. But, even had they not been so isolated and crushed, it is doubtful whether the national sentiment could have survived in them. They are instinctively the most assimilative of peoples, and, during the
Middle Ages, and for some centuries later, they lived in lands where nationality, as we know it to-day, did not exist. There were certain monarchical and oligarchical bodies politic, made up of classes or estates of the realm, and, after the Reformation, there were divergent groups of religious monarchies similarly organised ; but, until the French Revolution, there were no self-conscious nations, properly so called, except perhaps, in a rudimentary form, in England and Holland. The Jews adapted themselves to this state of things, of which they almost became an integral part as an autonomous, but unrepresented, Fifth Estate. Now and again, a poet like Jehuda Halévi would sing of the past national glories of Israel, but he evoked no practical echo. Occasionally a pseudo
iah would appear on the scene, but he found few followers. It is true that one of these national leaders, Sabbethai Zevi, who made a sensational appearance in the Levant in 1660, did evoke a certain echo, and also found followers, but this was because his advent was regarded as Messianic, and not exclusively political. He was not so much a product of Jewish secular politics as he was a product, on the one hand, of the horrors of the Thirty Years War, and the consequent general belief that the reign of Christ on earth was at hand, and, on the other, of the frightful massacres of the Jews in Poland in 1655, and the widespread Jewish belief that this calamity, together with the ravages of the great war, were the appointed signs of the coming of a Redeemer. Moreover, Sabbethai was very widely excommunicated by the saner elements, both lay and clerical, in the Jewry of his time. At any rate, his squalid failure gave the death blow to any elements of secular nationalism that may have lingered among the Jews.
The effect was seen very clearly when the French Revolution created the French nation, and when Volney, Condorcet, Carnot, and Grégoire formulated the modern democratic doctrine of nationality. Not only did the Jews remain absolutely unattracted by the new doctrine, but they hastened, on their own behalf, to refuse to profit by it. When, as a result of the French Revolution, the Ghetto gates were for a moment thrown open throughout Europe, and Jews found themselves, for the first time, relatively free, they asked, not for national rights for themselves, but only for the right to be incorporated as nationals and equal citizens of the new free VOL. 225.