ernment. In the administrative documents of Hellenistic Egypt, for example, we search in vain for that benevolence which was so conspicuous in early time, even in the Egypt of the Pharaohs. In the Roman empire Hellenistic conditions were perpetuated and extended. The Princeps stood toward the provincials as a shepherd to his flock (Tiberius) or as a

parent to his children (the Antonines); but in general his benevolence could not reach the peasants. Gradually they fell into serfdom, from which they were freed in early modern times; and it is only in recent years that laborers have been regaining the social, political, and economic advantages which they enjoyed under the Greek democracy.

The historians when they come to review this war will have something to say about the far-reaching effects of the teaching of history in Germany-and in America. It is not alone the Irish and the GermanAmericans who were reluctant to see our country fighting with Britain, but many of old American stock, who had not forgotten "Tarleton's men" or General Gage. That we had received a legacy of English institutions and traditions was a commonplace that had been almost forgotten, if ever realized, by many otherwise intelligent Americans. That fact the teachers of English history have a chance to emphasize, and so to remove some of the prejudices almost necessarily accumulated in the study of the American Revolution. In particular the teacher, in dealing with the seventeenth century-which comes logically as well as chronologically before the century of the Revolution-has a chance to lay the proper groundwork in the student's mind.

For those who would make clear what we owe to English institutions, the historical works are at hand. Men such as Andrews, Cheyney, Osgood, E. B. Greene, Channing and Beer have given us the text and comment. From their writings the teacher can gain the background from which to give American history its setting as well as to give English history a fuller meaning. The student can hardly be told too often that he is dealing with the first part of American history-school directors eager to eliminate English history from the program might be told as well. The connections must of course be illustrated. The relation between the English parish and the New England town-meeting offers an example, but there are many. If such matters are presented as simply as honesty will permit and with some color of historical imagination, the student will take hold of them. He may come to realize that the boats that brought Puritans to Boston and planters to Jamestown brought not only men and furniture, but less visible and more durable things.

Not only the heritage of England to America but her contribution to the world, orderly self-government, can be taught in connection with the seventeenth century. Usually the high school student at about the time he is studying English history is in the midst of civics and is finding it interesting. The teacher can

set forth three fundamental civic facts of English history that belong to a considerable degree in the seventeenth century; he can show the significance of the growth of the functions of parliament, of the beginnings of the party system and of the cabinet.

The rights of parliament were won, possibly to a greater degree than we always realize, in the century and a half before the American Revolution. The more we examine the parliamentary debates of late Elizabethan and of Stuart times, the more we suspect that the Tudor parliament was largely a registering body, doing pretty much what the Administration wished. If it complained sometimes, so does the Reichstag. It would not be a long cry from Peter and Paul Wentworth and the other disgruntled spirits of Elizabeth's parliaments to those discontented Social-Democrats, Herr Haase, Herr David and their friends-though we must not press the comparison to sovereigns. It was with the early years of James' reign that there grew up, owing to special circumstances, but circumstances that were almost sure to arise, a group of earnest pushing men who knew what they wished, who planned legislation-a new thing, really-and strove to put it through. When they found themselves thwarted by the Privy Counsellors, such men as Eliot, Hakewill, and Coke went around to the house of that antiquary and friend, Sir Robert Cotton, to consult his manuscripts; they went to the Tower, and tracked down the precedents that would support them at Westminster Hall. They dug back into the records of Lancastrian times-when parliament had been winning some concessions from the sovereign-and turned up many such precedents as they needed, precedents, which no doubt honestly enough, they magnified, until they had reconstructed a whole parliamentary system that had never existed-the tradition of which hardly escapes us to-day-and began holding up that system to the government. Upon that none too well grounded foundation they developed a theory of parliament and its rights. By their work, by the slow accretions of one slight victory after another, sometimes merely in trifles of procedure, by the rapid accretions of the Long Parliament, then by wars and the lessons learned from those wars, and at length by the most quiet of revolutions, parliament gained those rights of "functioning," which our Congress has long taken for granted.

Hardly less important is the beginning of the party system. The men who hunted down precedents under the early Stuarts met and worked together. From 1610 on they formed a kind of "Opposition" to his Majesty. Early in the reign of Charles I, as early indeed as 1626-we find them dubbed the "country party as contrasted with the "courtiers." Gardiner sees in the lines drawn on February 8, 1641, those between modern English parties. Is it carrying matters too far back to say that Sir Edward Coke, Sir John Eliot, Sir Dudley Digges, and their associates were the earliest Liberals, or Whigs-for they were more nearly the latter. Such teaching presupposes that the student understands the parties of to-day. And he should understand them, I think, long before he comes to recent history. The meaning of the play is better grasped-and the play is seldom less interesting—if the listener knows how it is going to end. If the student sees in the several groups that made up the two warring parties of the Civil Wars, the similarity to the groups that compose the parties to-day, he will have learned what will make the past and present more real, and he will be in a better position to understand the first part of American history.

The cabinet is no less significant, though less a part of the seventeenth century. About its working to-day we know much; about its evolution we are still learn

ing from the young American scholar, E. R. Turner, and from English scholars. The high school student is not too immature to appreciate the main features of the cabinet, as a responsible body, and to realize its wide use in the world, even the demand on the part of certain factions in Germany for its adoption. Here, too, the student must know the system as it works today-a boy likes to see the thing working and then hunt back. How it came to work so, is rather strong meat for those below collegiate grade. But the seventeenth century should not be passed without some efforts to trace the beginnings of that most flexible and smooth-working piece of machinery. It should of course be made perfectly clear that the close committees of James I and Charles I's Privy Councils, and the cabal of Charles II, all of them, fell far short of a cabinet.

Parliament, parties, and cabinet, these are obvious facts of English history, but their meaning seems to have escaped too many. What Americans owe to England has escaped them even more. If the meaning of these facts is ever to be appreciated in this country, it will have to be through the teachings of the high school. The teacher could hardly wish a better chance than to interpret them to young people who so easily accept and revere democracy and who so seldom understand its history.

In view of the present war and the way in which by successive steps, we were gradually forced to take up arms, it is interesting to note some parallels with our War for Independence.

The colonists, like ourselves, did not want war. It was for them, as for us, largely a question of going into it, or giving up principles which were felt to be right, and they chose the former. Even after the socalled Olive Branch Petition to George III, and his ministers had failed, and the people of the colonies found themselves in conflict with British arms, they had no clear notion, as Washington testifies, of severing themselves from the mother country. They saw a conflict of resistance for justification and it was only gradually that it dawned over them that the fight was an irreconcilable struggle which could only be settled by separation.

To any sane person the chances for success against the power of Great Britain must have seemed hopeless. The colonists had no central government, no army or navy, no money, no allies, and within their midst there was a large body of people who were hostile to the idea of entering an armed conflict with the mother country.

bodies of militia-that is groups of men subject to call for military service. In most cases, however, these men met irregularly and were imperfectly organized and poorly trained. When called, they assembled slowly and their training consisted of a few short drills, a day's musketry practice, and some sham battles. In some of the colonies they never came together at all. Massachusetts early urged Congress to take over the control of the army which was gathering about Boston, but Congress was slow in doing it. Finally, however, it did so and put Washington in charge of it. By this act the troops which had been drawn from the four New England colonies were made a continental army under the control of Congress and of a general appointed by it. When Washington took control everything was in great disorder. The equipment of the troops, their uniforms, the terms of enlistment, the methods of selecting officers, the size of the companies and the regiments, were as various as the colonies furnishing them.

another, in this great change of military arrangement, I never saw before, and pray God . . . I may never be witness to again." By January 1, 1776, the new Continental army was completely organized. Throughout the war bodies of militia from the various colonies gave it assistance and were in turn assisted by it. The Line was recruited by the volunteer system, but difficulties were soon encountered in getting a sufficient number. Bounties had to be resorted to and these were offered sometimes in the form of money, land or clothing. Large numbers of the men after getting their bounties deserted. Some of them enlisted again under different names and from different places in order to get another bounty. Washington had frequently to lament the abuses of the system.

Of greater difficulty even than getting an army was getting money to pay the army, to buy equipment and provisions, to secure ordnance and ships, and to meet the expenses of the government generally. As Congress had no authority to raise money by taxation, resort was had almost immediately to the issuance of paper money and before the war was over nearly $250,000,000 of this "continental" money had been issued. This had no specie behind it, but each state was supposed to make provision for a pro rata redemption. This some of the states did only partially, and others not at all. By 1780 it took forty paper dollars to get one silver dollar and by 1781 it took one hundred. Barber-shops were papered in jest with the bills; and the sailors, on returning from their cruise, being paid off in bundles of this worthless money, had suits of clothes made of it."

Another method of getting funds used by Congress was to requisition the states for certain proportionate amounts, but these sums seldom came in full and towards the close of the war ceased to be honored at all. In 1780 Congress had to resort to the method of asking the states to furnish supplies in kind instead of in money.

A third method of raising money was by domestic and foreign loans. To float the domestic loan, offices were established in each state and indentured notes to bear interest at 4 per cent., then at 6 per cent., were issued. The amount first attempted to be raised in this way was $5,000,000, but the subscriptions fell short of $4,000,000. When Congress succeeded in floating a foreign loan, however, the credit was improved and larger domestic loans were made possible. Money was obtained from abroad in the form of gifts or subsidies from France and Spain, and also in the form of loans from the same governments and from bankers in Holland. Little of actual money from these, however, reached this country, the proceeds being expended in buying supplies over there. This is, coincidentally, exactly what the countries of Europe are doing to-day, except that the action is reversed. Loans floated by England, France and Italy in this country to-day are not taken out of the country in money, but are used to buy supplies to be shipped over there.

A third experience of importance during the War for Independence was that with the disloyal element

which existed in our midst-composed of those commonly called Tories or Loyalists. These people, who were much more numerous than is commonly supposed, did everything in their power to thwart the revolting colonists from making the Revolution a success. Their deeds remind us of some of the doings of people who live among us at the present day. They sowed sedition, they proselyted, spread false news, depreciated the currency and threw discredit on the financial ability of the government, dissuaded people from subscribing to loans, stole powder, piloted hostile vessels, sold goods to the enemy, stole letters, plotted Washington's assassination, harbored spies, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.

At the beginning too much leniency was shown to these people, who, as Washington said, were "preying upon the vitals of the country." He further wrote that "my tenderness has been much abused" and repeatedly complained to state legislatures and friends of the diabolical and insidious arts and schemes carrying on by the Tories . . . to raise distrust, dissensions and divisions among us." Gradually it became clear to the colonists that the sternest kind of repressive measures would have to be taken against the Tories if the newly formed American state were to be successful.

In

The various provincial assemblies then began to pass test acts compelling all to take the oath of allegiance. Those who failed to do so were denied the rights of citizenship, of voting, and of holding office; lawyers were denied the right to practise, teachers the right to teach, druggists the right to dispense, and physicians the right to practise. They were denied any standing in the courts, could not collect their debts, serve as guardians, executors or administrators, they could not be jurymen, could neither buy nor sell lands, nor dispose of their fortunes at death, and their deeds of gift were invalid. In one state anyone who objected to taking the oath was given two hours to decide and upon refusal was cast into jail. others the obdurate were forbidden to travel or go near the enemies' lines, were disarmed, imprisoned, pilloried, their hair cropped; they were specially taxed, their property confiscated, attacked or burned, their houses subjected to visit and their letters opened to discover treasonable matter. They were gathered into groups and banished to districts where they could do little harm; many were placed in concentration camps, others were expatriated to Great Britain and to Canada, or banished to Europe and the West Indies. The Tory press was also severely restricted. To these severe measures Washington and his contemporaries gave their approval for they believed that sympathizers with the enemy must be treated as enemies of the state.

These are only a few aspects of American experience during the War for Independence which should be suggestive in the present crisis. Other illustrations which might be developed if space permitted are: The privations endured by the colonists; the

help rendered us by our allies; the rejection of appeals for peace; and the refusal to entertain the propositions of the British peace commission, sent over after

The Triple Alliance had its origin between the Peace of Frankfurt (1871) and the accession of Italy in 1882 to the alliance already consummated between Germany and Austria. Bismarck's policy after the Franco-Prussian war was influenced by the fear of a war of revenge and the desire to keep France weak and occupied with home affairs. He was glad to see France a republic, because a republic could less easily find alliances. He wished to prevent an alliance against Germany, but on the other hand desired that Germany herself should have allies-if possible, her old allies of the Holy Alliance, Austria and Russia, both nations politically conservative. During the years 1871 and 1872, through Bismarck's efforts and the interchange of royal visits, an understanding was reached between the sovereigns of the three states. The alliance dominated Europe and was too strong for any combination France might make.

But when France recovered rapidly and began to strengthen her army, Bismarck was alarmed. Whether he purposed war against France in 1875, or meant merely to browbeat her, is not certain. Both St. Petersburg and London used pressure in behalf of France. Bismarck realized that the Tsar wished to maintain the existence of France as a great power. The league of the three emperors, he felt, would not suffice.

Meantime the Eastern Question served to make Russia a less dependable ally. The insurrection in 1875 of Herzegovina and Bosnia against Turkey drew in Serbia and Montenegro, and endangered relations between Russia and Austria. The attempted arrangement between the emperors of Austria and Russia at Reichstadt in 1876 might have proved satisfactory had Serbia not been defeated and invaded by Turkish troops. When public opinion in Russia pushed the Tsar towards war, when the Turks failed to meet the demands for local autonomy and improvement of administration formulated at an international conference at Constantinople, Russia, assuring herself first of Austria's friendly if conditional neutrality, declared war. When Russia after serious defeats took Plevna and pressed on towards Constantinople, Turkey agreed to the Treaty of San Stefano. England and Austria, dissatisfied with that treaty, took steps threatening war, and Russia was forced to consent to the Congress of Berlin. There Russia's winnings were pared, and Austria gained control over Bosnia and Herzegovina; England brought back

"peace with honor and had gained Cyprus.

The outcome of that congress meant the further weakening of the alliance of the three emperors.

Austria, expanding to the southeast, was necessarily a rival of Russia, and Russia was humiliated and deeply offended. Bismarck realized not only that Russia would not give him a free hand against France, but that Germany must be guaranteed against Russian resentment. He probably felt, too, that Germany could not hope in an alliance with Russia to play the dominant role. He turned to Austria, and, in spite of the great reluctance of William I, arranged the Austro-German alliance of 1879.

The accession of Italy to that alliance was largely her own doing. The ties of common latinity between France and Italy did not avail to make the latter nation forget its grievances. It was hard for Italy to forget Napoleon III, his failure to restore Venice, his retention of French troops in Rome, his taking of Nice and Savoy. When France after the Congress of Berlin, with the consent of England and the favorable attitude of Bismarck, made Tunis a protectorate, Italy was roused to protests, frantic but unavailing. Weak and isolated, she turned towards Berlin and was directed to Vienna. To Vienna King Humbert went and gained a promise of the integrity of Italy's territory, but not what he also hoped, support for her position and ambitions in the Mediterranean. Austria's treaty with Italy was duplicated by that with Germany. On May 22, 1882, the two documents which together constituted the Triple Alliance were signed in Vienna. It was a triumph for Bismarck, and one for which he paid little.

Prof. Samuel P. Orth, of Cornell, in writing on "Kaiser and Volk" in the November "Century," argues that it is "high time the American people rid themselves of the fatal delusion that there is a distinction between the ambitions of the Kaiser and of his people. They are a terrible unity; neither will forsake the other," and backs his argument by historical precedent and personal observation.

"The Irish Convention-and After," by Mrs. John Richard Greene ("Atlantic" for November), is an able and interesting account by one of the great authorities on Irish history. She is a strong partisan of Ireland, but not so much so as to lose her sense of historical value. In conclusion, she says: "In the Irish view, the British have utterly failed in the imperial temper. Their statesmanship has not been such as to mark them as an imperially-minded race. The time has come for a new beginning. The creation of an alliance which the old methods have failed to produce now depends on the insight and the courage of the convention. . . . The imperialism of old days-the government of possession by a superior people--is gone, and with it the word itself is fast disappearing."

The following is a preliminary form of the program of the American Historical Association:

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27.

10.00 a. m.-General session, American history, Clover Room, Bellevue-Stratford.

Paper (subject to be supplied), Herbert N. Bolton, University of California.

“The English Customs Revenues up to 1275,” Norman S. B. Gras, Clark University.

6.30 p. m.-Subscription dinner for women members of the American Historical Association, New Century Club, 124 South Twelfth Street.

Topic for discussion, "The Effect of the War on Education."

The Background of American Federalism," Andrew C. McLaughlin, University of Chicago.

"The Significance of the North Central States in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," Frederick J. Turner, Harvard University.

"Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American Relations During the Civil War," Louis B. Schmidt, Iowa State College.

1.00 p. m.-Joint subscription luncheon by American Historical Association and Political Science Association, Ball Room, Bellevue-Stratford.

Address on "A Government Experiment in War Publicity," by Guy Stanton Ford.

3.00 p. m.-Conference of archivists, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1300 Locust Street. Chairman, Victor Hugo Paltsits, New York Public Library.

The Cosmopolitanism of the Religion of Tarsus and the Origin of Mithra," A. L. Frothingham, Princeton University. Discussion opened by Nathaniel Schmidt, Cornell University.

"Oriental Imperialism," A. T. Olmstead, University of Illinois. Discussion opened by Morris Jastrow, University of Pennsylvania.

"Greek Imperialism," W. S. Ferguson, Harvard University. Discussion opened by Clarence P. Bill, Adelbert College.

Roman Imperialism," G. W. Botsford, Columbia University. Discussion opened by S. B. Platner, Western Reserve University.

"The Decay of Nationalism Under the Roman Empire," Clifford Moore, Harvard University. Discussion opened by F. F. Abbott, Princeton University.

"The New Humanism," Francis W. Kelsey, University of Michigan. Discussion opened by W. L. Westerman, University of Wisconsin.

3.00 p. m.-English medieval history, Bellevue-Stratford. Chairman, Dana C. Munro, Princeton University. "English Medieval Taxation."

"Early Assessment for Papal Taxation of English Clerical Incomes," William E. Lunt, Haverford College. "The Taxes on the Personal Property of Laymen to 1272," Sydney K. Mitchell, Yale University.

"The Assessment of Lay Subsides, 1290-1334," James F. Willard, University of Colorado.

8.30 p.m.-Presidential address, Historical Society of "The Editorial Function in American History," Worthington C. Ford, Massachusetts Historical Society.

9.30 p. m.-Reception and dinner tendered by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania to the members of the American Historical Association.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28.

Sessions both morning and afternoon at the University of Pennsylvania.

10.00 a. m.-Medieval church history, joint conference with American Society on Church History, College Hall. Chairman, David S. Schaff, Western Theological Seminary, Pittsburgh, Pa.

"The Council of Constance: Its Fame and Its Failure." Presidential address of the American Society on Church History.

"The Conciliar Movement," Harold J. Laski, Harvard University.

"The Actual Achievements of the Reformation," Preserved Smith, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.

10.00 a. m.-American history, Room 200, College Hall. Joint conference with Mississippi Valley Historical Association.

Chairman, St. George L. Souissat, president of Mississippi Valley Historical Association.

"To What Extent Was George Rogers Clark in Possession of the Northwest at the Close of the Revolution?" James A. James, Northwestern University.

“The Spanish Conspiracy in Tennessee," Archibald Henderson, University of North Carolina.

'Stephen F. Austin," Eugene C. Barker, University of Texas.

'Populism in Louisiana in the Nineties," M. J. White, Tulane University.

10.00 a. m.-Military history and war economics, Houston Hall. Chairman, Robert M. Johnston, Harvard University.

"Role de la Section Historique dans un Etat-Major General," Lt. Col. Paul Asan, French Army.

"Notes on American Manufactures During the Civil War,' Victor S. Clark, Carnegie Institution, Washington, D. C. "The Reconstruction of the Southern Railroads," Carl R. Fish, University of Wisconsin.

"The Work of the Commercial Economy Board," E. F. Gay, Harvard University.

1.00 p. m.-Luncheon tendered to members of all associations by the University of Pennsylvania, Weightman Hall. 2.30 p. m.-Recent Russian history, Houston Hall.

"The Roll of the Intellectuals in the Liberating Movement in Russia," Alexander Petrunkevitch, Yale University.