"NEW MEXICO," UNCLE SAM'S LATEST DREADNOUGHT, AS SHE APPEARED FROM AN AEROPLANE DURING THE RECENT NAVAL REVIEW ON

THE HUDSON RIVER.

BRAZILIAN NAVAL VISIT.-The naval squadron which Brazil dispatched to European waters in order to cooperate with the Allied Fleet, and which was expected at Portsmouth to-day, having been invited by the British Government to pay a visit to this country, will not arrive until January 24, as the ships are calling at Lisbon. The squadron, although small in point of numbers, consists of several new and powerful vessels, all of which were built in British yards. The commander of the squadron is Admiral Frontin, an officer of progressive and up-to-date views.

It will be remembered that when Brazil entered the war in October, 1917, on the side of the Allies, her government, as the result of a conference between Admiral Caperton, commanding the American South Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral A. de Alençar, the Minister of Marine, undertook the responsibility of patrolling the South Atlantic. Early in January of last year the further announcement was made of Brazil's decision to cooperate with the Allied Fleets in European waters, and it was reported that the force allocated for this purpose consisted of a squadron of cruisers and destroyers.

The squadron under the command of Admiral Frontin is composed of two light cruisers, the Bahia and the Rio Grande do Sul, with four 27-knot destroyers. The first-named vessels were built by the Armstrong firm at Elswick, and were completed in 1910. They have a length of 380 feet, a beam of 39 feet, and a mean draft of 14.5 feet. The displacement is 3,100 tons. Protection is given by an armored deck of 1.5 inches thickness, with 5 inches of armor on the conning-tower. The armament comprises ten 4.7-inch (50 cal.) guns, two of which are mounted to fire ahead, two right astern, and five on each broadside. There are also six 3-pounders and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. The machinery, manufactured by Messrs. Vickers, is of the Parsons' turbine type, operating three screws, and sup

plied with steam from ten Yarrow boilers. As designed, the engines were to develop 18,000 s. h. p., but this was exceeded on trial in both vessels, when the speed obtained was over 27 knots. The maximum quantity of coal which can be carried is 650 tons. The destroyers were built at the Yarrow yard, and displace 650 tons. Their dimensions are: Length, 240 feet; beam, 23.5 feet, and mean draft, 7.6 feet. The armament consists of two 4-inch guns, four 3-pounders, and two 18-inch torpedo-tubes. They have reciprocating engines, with Yarrow boilers, and, as designed, the engines were of 8000 i. h. p., to give a speed of 27 knots, which was considerably exceeded on trial.

From the United States the squadron came to Gibraltar where it arrived on November 10.-London Times, 15/1.

FRANCE

SIZE OF FRENCH NAVY.-At the time of Germany's request for an armistice, the French Navy consisted of 1,296 vessels of all classes, excluding transports and those ships which were either in reserve or in process of equipment or used for training purposes. Eight hundred and seventy-four units were armed for the war against submarines-namely, 735 vessels used for escort and patrol work and the protection of fisheries, and 130 submarine chasers, in addition to 192 mine-sweepers. Seventy vessels maintained the service of inspection of merchantmen at harbor entrances. The naval forces, made up of squadrons and large type vessels sent on special missions, numbered 117 battleships, cruisers, and large torpedo boats, which, since August, 1914, were almost continually away from France. Finally, 43 submarines took part in various naval operations. The French Navy also possessed 870 aeroplanes and 258 dirigible or captive balloons.-United Service Gazette, 9/1.

FRANCE'S WAR TONNAGE LOSSES.-According to a calculation by M. Paul de Rousiers, the French mercantile marine had a tonnage of 2,498,286 gross tons at the outbreak of the war. From the beginning till the close of hostilities, 1,037,773 gross tons of French shipping were lost. Of this total, 920,152 tons were destroyed through war's causes and 117,621 tons disappeared in consequence of ordinary sea perils. As during this same period, new vessels, aggregating 132,290 gross tons, were completed in French yards and ships representing 249,255 gross tons purchased from foreign owners, the French merchant marine totals at present of 1,842,058 gross tons.-Nautical Gazette, 1/2.

FRANCE'S MAN-POWER IN THE WAR.-The Ministry of War publishes statistics of the men mobilized for the army since the beginning of the war. Starting with the figures 92,838 officers and 3,781,000 other ranks on August 15, 1914, the strength of the army reached on January 1, 1918, the total of 128,372 officers and 5,064,000 other ranks. The new classes from 1914 to 1918 realized in all 1,098,000 men, the largest contingent being furnished by the 1915 class, which produced 265,000 men. Two combingouts in September, 1914, and in February, 1917, produced 575,000 men.— London Times, 1/23.

FRENCH AIR SERVICE.-It is now permitted to give details of the progress of French aviation since 1914. When the war started there were 21 squadrons, with 321 pilots and a total personnel of 4,342. By the end of 1917 the personnel had increased to 75,105, the pilots numbering 6,417 and observers 1,682. The aviation programme of July, 1918, brought up. the number of machines to more than 6,000.

The credits voted for the French Aviation Service in 1914 were just over two and a half millions sterling. This sum was quadrupled in 1916, and by 1917 had exceeded thirteen and a half millions.-London Times, 15/1.

GERMANY

GERMAN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION.-The utter collapse of German naval power had led to a heated discussion in the German press on the causes of the debacle. Capt. Persius attributes it mainly to the faulty construction and feeble armament of the capital ships and cruisers, but other officers demur, and the resulting debate has elicited some useful information. Writing as a long-standing contributor to Nauticus and Marine Rundschau, and as first officer of a battle-cruiser, in which capacity during the war I superintended gunnery for two years and took part in the Skagerrak battle," Captain Schelbe points out that a ship's type is in its complexity one of the most difficult of technical compromises. According to this authority, the German constructors in adjusting weight pursued a middle course in relation to armament, armor, resistance, speed, and bulk. England subordinated protection, security, and resistance to offensive attributes, gun armament and speed. "The touchstone of a weapon is battle. Granted," he continues, "that the caliber of our guns was almost below what was requisite, and that the 4. lin. gun in the light cruisers did not fully comply with military requirements; still, after our successes in battle, it can by no means be maintained that our material was universally 'inferior to the British and 'defective.' Admiral Lord Fisher was reproached, when the first dreadnought construction was announced, with these ships being ten-minute ships, that is, they would be overcome in ten minutes, for they did not possess the necessary resisting power. That more or less occurred. The cruisers Indefatigable and Invincible were blown to pieces some 15 minutes after fire was opened, and the cruiser Queen Mary after about half an hour. Our armament was in effect and accuracy superior to the British. The caliber of our guns proved sufficient. On the German side one capital ship, the Lützow, was put out of action, but it sank only during the return voyage. Ships with about 25 severe hits, and very dangerous damage below the waterline, got back to the home ports. The Seydlitz continued to fight to the end with undiminished speed, although struck by a torpedo in the forepart at the very beginning of the action." There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Captain Schelbe's version of the damage sustained by the German ships, or of his claim that they possessed remarkable powers of resistance. This is the first admission that the Seydlitz was torpedoed early in the battle, and the fact that she did not fall out of line is undoubtedly a tribute to the excellence of her internal protection. On the other hand, the large number of " severe hits" admitted by this authority testifies to the accuracy of the British fire. Though their massive armor and minute subdivision kept the German ships afloat, the British shells took a heavy toll among the personnel-one battleship alone had 300 casualties after being under fire only a quarter of an hour.-Engineer, 10/1.

PRE-DREADNOUGHTS USELESS.-Captain Schelbe denies that the High Sea Fleet owed its escape to the timely intervention of thick weather. Most of the damage to both sides, he asserts, was inflicted in the first part of the action, when very good visibility prevailed. He agrees that predreadnoughts cannot contend against ships of the all-big gun type, and proceeds: "The battle of the Falkland Islands cannot be adduced as proof that the German material was inferior, because in that case British ships of the dreadnought type were pitted against old German ships of the predreadnought era. The absolute inferiority of the pre-dreadnought type in comparison with the modern battleship is an obvious fact, which was apparent in the Skagerrak battle, when the old British armored cruisers were destroyed. But Coronel is a proof that the oldest German material also was superior to the older British material. It is stated that,' for a year it had been possible to speak of a German High Sea Fleet only in a restricted sense,' because a great many ships of the pre-dreadnought type