tution. That was practically the situation in the Pullman cases when they tried to get the employees of the railroad companies to refuse to handle the Pullman cars. That is an unlawful thing. The employee, so long as he remains an employee, has no right to refuse to do a part of his work, and certainly not when this is the work which is required to be done by statute; and yet under this bill the protecting power of the court of equity is to be withdrawn in a case like that, and strikers are to be permitted, without limitation, to persuade railroad company employees to refuse to do a part of their work, although that refusal is unlawful because this not only relates to the termination of employment but it relates also to ceasing to perform any work or labor. The two things are mentioned, so evidently they do not mean the same thing. It is one thing to terminate a relation of employment and thereby cease to be an employee, and another thing for an employee to cease doing a part of his duty while he continues an employee. Under this bill, while continuing as an employee, the employee may be persuaded to cease to perform a part of his work, because this bill provides "that no injunction shall prohibit advising or persuading others by peaceful means tò cease to perform any work or labor."

I was just pointing out that it would be unlawful for a railroad employee, while continuing in the relation of an employee, to refuse to switch a car which the interstate commerce act required a railroad company to switch, and therefore it would be unlawful for strikers to persuade him, even by peaceful means, even by noncoercive means, to do that unlawful act, in that such suggestion or persuasion and inciting on the part of the strikers could be enjoined under the present law. That is a matter of very great importance to the railroad companies in connection with the discharge of their statutory duties, but this bill wipes out that remedy entirely, because it permits the strikers by peaceful means to persuade any man to stop work under any circumstances, whether those circumstances are lawful or unlawful.

The bill destroys the remedy for a railroad employee refusing to handle cars as required by the act to regulate commerce.

Going further the cases recognize that so long as an employee continues in that relation it is his duty to do all branches of his work and certainly those branches which are required by statute. Therefore, if an employee who does not choose to terminate the relation of employment continues at work and refuses to handle certain cars, which the strikers may designate as scab cars, the court of equity will enjoin him from refusing so long as he stays at work. That right to injunction is abolished by this bill; it forbids any injunction prohibiting any person to cease to perform any part of his duties, although he continues in the relation of an employee.

The bill destroys the remedy for inciting or aiding railroad employees to go on an unlawful strike for the purpose of forcing the railroad to violate the act to regulate commerce.

Most of my discussion of the last paragraph of this bill has related to lawful strikes. That is, a strike for a lawful purpose. Generally speaking, the lawful purpose of a strike is to better the condition of the strikers; they have a right to stop work in order to get better wages or better hours. Some strikes, however, are unlawful,

and while a court of equity will not enjoin men from terminating their employment, even when the purpose of a strike is unlawful, nevertheless a court of equity under proper circumstances will enjoin persons from persuading people to stop work for an unlawful purpose. For example, it would be unlawful for the employees of a railroad company to strike for the purpose of compelling the railroad company to refuse to handle the cars of an institution which was under the ban of the labor union. While no court of equity would make the men continue to work if they chose to terminate their employment, yet a court of equity would step in and say to the strikers against this other institution " you shall not come around the railroad and use even peaceful persuasive methods to induce these railroad employees to go out on an unlawful strike." That is a very important protection which the railroad companies have under the law as it stands, but it is a protection which is swept away by this provision, because there is no restriction upon the proposition under this bill that no injunction shall prohibit any person from persuading any other person to terminate any employment, whether the object of the persuasion is to bring an unlawful strike in violation of the statute, or to bring about a lawful strike in furtherance of some lawful purpose. The Debs strikes, the A. R. U. strikes, which it was said this morning were in 1894, were of that character where employees of railroad companies were persuaded to go on strike for the purpose of compelling the railroad company to refuse to handle cars of a corporation which was in a dispute with its employees; it was an absolutely unlawful strike, and such methods of persuasion, even if peaceful in character, were unlawful, and the courts of equity were open to afford relief to the railroad and the transportation service of the country by enjoining such persuasion and inciting to do an unlawful act. All of that is swept away by this bill.

As another illustration of that absolute ignoring of the unlawful purpose of the strike, there is a general provision that no injunction. shall prohibit any person from paying or giving to or withholding from any person engaged in such dispute any strike benefits or moneys or things of value. I realize that under some conditions persons to whom the money is given may have an interest therein by reason of its being a fund to which they are entitled. There may possibly be circumstances under which the moneys might be paid, even though it was an unlawful strike, but there is absolutely no restriction about this. Under this bill strikers could finance an absolutely unlawful strike, they could give money to which the strikers were not entitled, they could give money to the employees of a railroad company who had no interest in the fund, no right to claim it, just a purely voluntary donation for the purpose of enabling these employees of the railroad company to force it to refuse to comply with its duties under the interstate commerce act, by receiving cars from some particular institution. In other words, in so far as financial aid is concerned, under this bill there is no restriction on the extent to which persons may go in aiding an unlawful strike on a railroad, although the purpose of that strike is to compel the railroad company to violate the regulations of the interstate commerce act. I do not believe a court of equity at this time would permit the financial support of an absolutely unlawful strike of that character unless

possibly in a case where the persons to whom the money was given had some sort of claim to the fund, as, for example, by reason of being members of the organization to which the fund belonged. But that is simply an illustration that this paragraph of this bill ignores absolutely the question of the legality or illegality of the strike and permits in furtherance of an illegal strike everything which the law now permits in the furtherance of a legal strike.

The bill is a long step backward; it wipes out essential remedies so as to give a special class greatly increased power to injure the entire public.

Generally speaking, Mr. Chairman, with respect to this bill, I submit that it is a long step backward. We seem to be reaching a condition in this country where there is a growing appreciation of the responsibility of each class of society to every other class, and a disposition to prevent any class of society from adopting acts in furtherance of its own purposes which are contrary to the general welfare. But the whole theory of this bill from beginning to end is that labor interests hereafter shall have special privileges and special opportunities to injure the welfare of the general public, promoting their interests not only by lawful means, but by unlawful means. · The bill draws no distinction virtually, between what is lawful and what is unlawful; it takes away remedies with respect to trespass, with respect to nuisance, with respect to coercion, with respect to inciting to unlawful conduct, and all for the evident purpose of giving to one class of society an additional opportunity for injuring the public for the benefit of that particular class of society. The railroad companies are particularly subject to the disabilities which will be created by this bill. They operate under conditions which facilitate interference by strikers; their lines are scattered over vast territory; the persons who endeavor to bring about conditions of strife are scattered over a vast territory, and it is extremely difficult even with the equitable relief which is now afforded for a railroad company in time of strife to continue to perform the public service which is absolutely necessary to the comfort and health of the public. So that if these extraordinary restrictions are put upon the equitable power and the court of equity is deprived of all right to deal with these great wrongs which are practically legalized by the last paragraph of this bill, it will be the railroads which will suffer, perhaps, more than any other class of employers, but through the railroads there will be the public which will suffer in its inability to get food and fuel, in its inability to enjoy the freedom of travel, and in its inability to enjoy the commercial intercourse that is indispensible to business prosperity.

So, I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this measure means vastly more than appears on the face of it. It carries a special menace to the railroads of the country and through them to the public and represents a purpose of favoring a particular class of society by facilitating unlawful acts on its part which will operate directly to injure the entire public, because the entire public is dependent for its health and comfort and freedom and prosperity upon the keeping open of the channels of railroad transportation.

Thereupon at 4.35 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until 10.30 o'clock a. m., Thursday, June 13, 1912.

5.

APPENDIX A.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW RELIED UPON AND AUTHORITIES
SUSTAINING THESE PROPOSITIONS.

1. PERSONS WHO MAY BE IN CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF INJUNC

TION.

In the case In re Reese (107 Fed., 942, 945, Cir. Court of Appeals, seventh circuit, 1908) the court, through Seaman, circuit judge, said: It is entirely consonant with reason, and necessary to maintain the dignity, usefulness, and respect of a court, that any person, whether a party to a suit or not, having knowledge that a court of competent jurisdiction has ordered certain persons to do or to abstain from doing certain acts, can not intentionally interfere to thwart the purposes of the court in making such order. Such an act, independent of its effect upon the rights of the suitors in the case, is a flagrant disrespect to the court which issues it, and an unwarrantable interference with and obstruction to the orderly and effective administration of justice, and as such is and ought to be treated as a contempt of the court which issued the order. Such contempts, however, are totally different offenses from those which the parties to the case commit when they disobey a direct order made in a case for the benefit of the complainant. The one is an offense against the majesty and dignity of the law; the other is a violation of the rights of a particular suitor, at whose instance and for whose protection the particular injunctive order disobeyed was issued by the court.

In Garrigan v. United States (163 Fed., 16, Cir. Court of Appeals, seventh circuit, 1908) the court, through Seaman, circuit judge, said:

In any view of the charges of contempt and evidence so received, it is unquestionable that the only issues of fact were: (a) Whether the accused had knowledge of the injunction; and, if such knowledge appeared, whether he committed acts, either (b) in aid of its violation by the parties enjoined, or (c) in plain defiance of its terms-and thus in contempt of the authority and commands of the court. As it is neither charged nor proven that the plaintiff in error was one of the parties enjoined, he is not chargeable for breach or violation of the injunction, in the well-recognized sense of those terms applicable to parties. He was bound alike with other members of the public to observe its restrictions when known, to the extent that he must not aid or abet its violation by others, nor set the known command of the court at defiance, by interference with or obstruction of the administration of justice; and the power of the court to proceed against one so offending and punish for the contemptuous conduct is inherent and indisputable. (Seward v. Paterson, 1 L. R. Ch. Div. (1897) 545, 554, 76 Law Times (N. S.), 215; In re Reese, 107 Fed., 942; 47 C. C. A., 87, 90.) We believe the above-mentioned distinction in contempt proceedings, between disobedience of the injunction by parties and privies and the conduct of the others in contempt of the authority and commands of the court, to be elementary, and the sufficiency of the evidence in the case at bar to support the conviction must be tested thereunder.

In Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co. (194 U. S., 324, 329) the court pointed out that while Bessette had been punished for violating a restraining order, he was not a party to the suit. The court proceeded:

Yet being no party to the suit, he was found guilty of an act in resistance of the order of the court. His case therefore comes more fully within the punitive than the remedial class. It should be regarded like misconduct in a court room or disobedience of a subpoena, as among those acts primarily directed against the power of the court

* * *

The court held that since such contempt proceeding was in the nature of a criminal case there might be a review in the circuit court of appeals by writ of error.

2. INTERVENTION OF EQUITY TO PROTECT PERSONAL FREEDOM AND CIVIL

RIGHTS.

In 6 Pomeroy's Eq. Jurisprudence, section 599, it is said:

The primary right that one's personal liberty should not be interfered with by combinations of persons is protected by equity. Thus the interference with the right of the laborer to travel on the highway by means of numbers of men or by physical force will be enjoined where its continuance is threatened.

In American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers', etc., Unions (90) Fed., 608, 613; Cir. Ct. N. D. Ohio, 1898), where an injunction was granted against defendants restraining them from illegal interference with the employees at plaintiff's mills, the court, in speaking of plaintiff's right not to have its employees intercepted in going to work by unlawful means, said:

It is the right not so much of property as of that liberty which every man enjoys in this country as his birthright, which is not confined to political rights alone, but extends as well to personal activities in and about one's daily business, be he laborer or capitalist; it is this right which lies at the foundation of the striker's own freedom when they would work or refuse to work on any terms but their own; it is a right the striker lawfully can not deny to the "scab "—the right to pass freely through the streets and highways to his work. In 2 High on Injunctions, section 20, it is said:

The subject matter of the jurisdiction of equity being the protection of private property and of civil rights, courts of equity will not interfere for the punishment or prevention of merely criminal or immoral acts unconnected with violations of private right.

In Attorney General v. Tudor Ice Co. (104 Mass., 239, 240), the court indicated that while a court of equity is without jurisdiction to enforce the criminal law or to restrain acts merely against public policy, nevertheless a court of equity has jurisdiction to protect civil rights, and in that capacity may restrain public nuisances which affect or endanger the public safety or convenience.

3. INTERVENTION OF EQUITY TO PROTECT INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC. In the case of In re Debs (158 U. S., 564), it was held that a court of equity had the power at the suit of the United States Government to issue an injunction to restrain defendants, members of an association known as the American Railway Union, from unlawfully interfering with the employees of certain interstate carriers for the purpose of rendering effective a boycott against the Pullman Car Co. growing out of a dispute between the Pullman Co. and its employees, intervention of a court of equity being sustained on the ground that the acts of defendants amounted to a forcible obstruction of interstate transportation of persons and property as well as the carriage of the mails.

The court, through Mr. Justice Brewer, said:

* * *

Neither can it be doubted that the Government has such an interest in the subject matter as enables it to appear as party plaintiff in this suit. It is said that equity only interferes for the protection of property, and that the Government has no property interest. We do not care to place our decision upon this ground alone. Every Government intrusted by the very terms of its being with powers and duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other, and it is no sufficient answer to its appeal to one of the courts that it has no pecuniary interest in the matter. The obligations which it is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court (p. 583).