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terrible artillery. More than that, he had constructed iron-clad gunboats, and held his iron-clad batteries ready to bombard Venice or Trieste, if the issue of the war had remained long doubtful.

Great Britain awoke at last to the danger of her position. Who knew the day but that she, like Austria, might find her policy at variance with Bonapartist interests? Were we, too, to be rolled up in a three months' campaign? A general movement took place, and the energy and intelligence of the nation soon forced us, assisted by the engineering resources of England and Scotland, into a safe position upon the important point of rifled cannon. But how about the ships? And here came the old prejudice again. Oh! we only want steam line-of-battle ships, so much longer, so much deeper, so much faster, and, they might have added, so much more unwieldy than our sailing fleet of the same class. "The French have fifty line-of-battle ships -we must have as many," urged the public. The money was granted by Parliament; they were soon in the water. "The French have more steam-frigates than we have-we must have as many," again urged our wiseacres. The money was granted, and they likewise were soon seeking for water deep enough and seas wide enough to cruise in-and yet, what use are either of these to us to-day? We don't want the former for transports, and of the latter we may say with the Gosport waterman, "They are precious handsome, sir, but useless for doing frigate's work."

Whilst our yards resounded with the labour of shipwrights upon wooden line-of- battle ships and frigates, the French building-slips were vacant. The attention of the Emperor and his admirals was engrossed with the question of how to place the armour tested at Kinburn upon perfectly handy, seaworthy ships. Aided by a M. Dupuis de Lome, who had studied shipbuilding in England and Scotland, the subject was soon reduced to practical shape. The result of their investigations and experiments may

be briefly stated. It was decided that the lofty sides and vast area of line-of-battle ships was an error in these days of good gunnery: that a three-decker of wood offered an area of ten thousand square feet of inflammable and penetrable matter; whilst a frigate iron-clad would be invulnerable to all shells, hot shot, and nine-tenths of the solid shot in existence, whilst only offering an area of about four thousand square feet that the smoke of the guns in such single batteries would clear off sooner than in vessels of two or three decks: and that there were a multitude of advantages in the long low vessel, over the lofty castles called three-deckers. To carry a heavy battery as well as their coat of mail, the displacement of these vessels was required to be equal to that of wooden two-deckers; in fact, an iron frigate must be as big as our Agamemnon. The next thing done, was to commence upon the construction of ten frigates, which, if the calculation of those who believe in them be correct, are equal in force and fighting qualities to about thirty sail of the line. Had the capabilities of the French dockyards been equal to the genius and energy of the Emperor, the sudden apparition of such a force in the English Channel might well have occasioned a sensation at the Royal Exchange. There were, however, many questions that could only be solved by practical experi ments on board such ships; whilst, therefore, the shells or hulls of all the ten were progressing steadily, one frigate, the Gloire, was hastened as an experimental vessel. Speaking of her, Mr Scott Russell says, that, "in justice to M. Dupuis de Lome, the Gloire, although a great success, must not be considered her builder's chef d'œuvre. She was built to meet the peculiarities of the circumstances in which a builder in France at that date inevitably found himself placed. Had he lived in an iron country like England he would probably have adopted an entirely different construction, but, like a wise man, he made the best of the materials he had at hand, and has been rewarded with corresponding suc

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ancients; "utter failure, depend upon it Frenchmen ashamed of their Gloire; heart of oak is your real armour for British men-of-war, sir!" One morning the Times' correspondent from Paris wrote as follows, and there was sudden sorrow amongst the prophets :-"At a cabinet council held a few days since, at which the Emperor presided, it was resolved that a number of steel-cased frigates should be constructed, on the model of the Gloire; Admiral Hamelin, Minister of Marine, Vice-Admiral Bonet-Willaumez, and Rear-Admiral Dupony, spoke in favour of the measure. This was pretty conclusive, and set at rest, in the opinion of most of our younger officers, the question of the general sea worthiness of these ships in armour. They might not be perfect, but the probabilities were, that in qualities as sea-boats they were quite equal to the new steam-frigates and lineof-battle ships. They could hardly strain more in heavy weather; they might leak a great deal less, and their expenses for wear and tear in a cruise could not possibly be greater; and so far as fighting qualities went, it was a question capable of almost mathematical demonstration, that the odds at gun for gun were ten to one in favour of the Gloire.

We have thus brought the history of the French armour-clad ships up to the present day. Let us turn to our own land, the land of Athelstane the Unready, and see what we have been about. The state or strategical reasons-motives for the mystery in which many of the experiments have been wrapped-we will not presume to question; but if it, in some respects, render our history imperfect, the fault will rest with others; enough has been, however, made known, to enable us to arrive at conclusions as likely to be correct as the majority of deductions drawn from published data.

The conclusion of the Russian war left the Admiralties and War Offices of Paris and London in a most op

cess. I say this much because I have heard the question mooted of our proceeding to make imitations of the Gloire."

From this statement, together with what we hear in other quarters, it is to be inferred that the French architect advocated vessels built entirely of iron, but that the want of that metal, together with the comparative cheapness and abundance of wood, compelled the French to adopt wooden shells covered with plates of iron. There are many reasons why the structure of these armour-clad ships should be entirely of iron, when circumstances will admit it. The more rigid and unyielding the basis upon which the armourplates rest, the more impenetrable the plate. A four-inch plate covering a solid block of granite is said to be perfectly impenetrable. Then we know that a vessel or shell of iron of a thousand tons may be made to be lighter and stronger than one of wood. Safety may be better insured by iron-plate compartments in the interior, as well as a cellular skin, or ship-within-ship mode of construction; and lastly, iron vessels alone, it is found, can be sufficiently well fastened about their stern frames to stand the shaking of the screw propeller at a high speed without leaking very seriously.

The Gloire, as we all know, was launched, and went on her maiden cruise this summer in the Mediterranean. Those on board returned perfectly satisfied with her performances, and reported most highly of her. They said she more than realised every just expectation. The French press sounded any number of trumpets; we still doubted. "Oh! only let her be caught in a gale of wind," growled out our old sailors, "you will never hear any more of her, or of iron-plated frigates." Well, she was caught in a gale of wind while escorting the Emperor to Algiers. There was no flourish this time; the fact was, the French found we were beginning to be inquisitive. "Ah! told you so," chuckled the

* See Times' Paris Correspondence, October 15, 1860.

posite condition of mind as to the naval requirements of the two countries. Like those two eminent lawyers who accepted the same premises, used the same arguments, yet arrived at exactly opposite conclusions, the heads of the executive departments of the two countries differed entirely as to the utility or advantages of those iron-clad batteries which had been first tried in 1855. We remember, indeed, one of our best and most valuable admirals-one whose recent experience under fire added to the weight of his opinion-pointing to those French batteries, and assuring us that, in England, they could drive shot through and through them-at least he was told so. Yet he allowed something must be done to stop shell, hot shot, and rockets; and he cordially took up the invention of Captain Cowper Coles for shielding guns' crews with iron cupolas, and urged its adoption upon the attention of the Admiralty. Captain Coles had, in effect, adopted the shield of 4-inch iron, but with certain modifications and many decided improvements. That Lord Lyons and Captain Coles were not singular in the opinions they held, the annexed official report will show.*

We point to this raft of Captain Coles, because it shows that the

necessity for an iron shield to protect guns' crews had taken a firm hold of the minds of the naval officers immediately engaged in the operations before Sebastopol. Another officer recommended an adoption of this armour to our gunboats for the protection of the very exposed crews and engines. Sir Edmund, afterwards Lord Lyons, it will be seen, concurred in the necessity of both these measures; but the advice or opinion came from young officers, and, with the peace of 1856, these projects appear to have been dismissed as utterly unnecessary. The perseverance of the French Admiralty, War Office, and, above all, that troublesome Emperor-who not only keeps all his own people up to the mark, but makes us likewise continually wipe our spectacles—did not leave our builders of wooden ships quite at their ease. Rumours would ooze out of certain designs and projects, based upon very satisfactory experiments, by which our Gallic friends expected to render the ship in armour as fleet and as seaworthy, and fivefold more powerful, than the ship without armour.

We pooh-poohed the idea, and said it was one of the freaks of genius good in theory, bad in practice. Yet, somehow, there was not the

* "H.M.S. STROMBOLI, Kasatch, in the Black Sea, 13th November 1855.

"Pursuant to an order from Rear-Admiral Sir E. Lyons, Kt. G.C.B., Commanderin-Chief, &c. &c. &c., we, whose names are hereunto subscribed, have repaired on board H.M.S. Stromboli to inspect a gun-raft proposed by Commander C. P. Coles, R.N., and we are of opinion that the invention is one of the greatest practical value.

"It appears, by the model which Commander Coles produced, that the raft combines many advantages, amongst which are-1st, Light draught of water; 2d, Facility of propulsion; 3d, Simplicity and rapidity of construction; 4th, Great buoyancy-one heavy gun or mortar can be used on each with great precision of fire; 5th, Protection of the crew.

"Looking to the probable nature of future operations against our present enemy, we are further of opinion that this proposal merits the immediate attention of H.M. Government; and in order that the full benefit may be derived from it, we venture to think it desirable that Commander Coles should be directed to proceed to England and personally to explain his proposal to their Lordships.

"We further suggest that, under the present circumstances, secrecy is desirable.

"President.-Rear-Admiral Sir HOUSTON STEWART, K.C.B.,

Second in Command.

Capt. ARTHUR CUMMING, R.N.

Capt. E. A. INGLEFIELD, R.N.

Mr RUMBLE, Chief Engineer of H.M.S. Royal Albert.
Carpenter of H.M.S. Hannibal.

Captain H. HAY, H.M.S. Hannibal.”

perfect ease which people enjoy who feel they are thoroughly in the right. "Early in 1857," says Capt. Halsted, "preparations were made with a view of testing the sides of the Trusty at 450 yards." It is evident some one had misgivings. Nothing came of it, and a year passed without certain progress in one direction or the other. We suppose that some gallant artilleryman had again driven a hole through a 44-inch plate with a solid 68-pounder shot at 200 yards. There was feverishness, however, in spite of the pretended calm, and we are told in the Quarterly Review, by a writer who appears to be sure of his authority, that "as early as 1856 designs for an iron-plated corvette with fine lines, and destined for high speed, very similar to those now being constructed (in 1860), were submitted to the Admiralty." *

The clouds that were gathering over Italy towards the close of 1858 drew fresh attention to our defences, naval and military, and the question of the penetrability of iron plates again came up; but before we proceed to consider the fresh experiments, we must remind the reader that one fact had evidently been arrived at by all authorities, that shells, filled either with explosive or inflammable matter, were the projectiles with which speedily to bring woodenship actions to an issue; and that all batteries placed near the sea ought to be furnished with furnaces for heating shot. The inflammability of men-of-war, and the accessibility of their weak points-the engine-room and powder-magazine-were thus acknowledged. Seamen-gunners swore by shell-guns, and the 10-inch gun became quite a pet; its shell carried 5 lb. of powder; its explosion would silence for some time, we were told, any deck of guns on which it lighted. We armed the great frigates, built in imitation of the United States' Niagara and others, with this wonder-working gun; whilst our cousins across the Atlantic armed such line-of-battle ships in disguise with shell-firing guns alone. Some of

their vessels had actually no solid shot whatever on board, and we were fast following the example. We beg the reader to keep this in mind, for no one now denies that shells are useless against iron-clad ships. We will now relate how the Trusty and iron plates were next maltreated, in what, with all due deference to Woolwich and the Excellent, we consider a series of tests very unlike what a ship in armour would be subjected to in a naval action.

In January '59 the first experiment was made with an Armstrong gun, a 32-pounder, that had a range of 9200 yards, or 5 miles. Fourteen shots were fired with 6-lb. charges of powder at distances the maximum of which was 450 yards, and gradually closed towards the Trusty's sides, until there was an interval of only twenty yards! The shot used were cast-iron, wrought-iron, and steel ones. Only two of the steel balls succeeded in fixing themselves into the joints between the plates; and, says Captain Halsted, the Armstrong 32-pounder "was powerless to inju

injure seriously the complete protection of the ship's side." We own we were astonished at this statement, but don't wish to take advantage of it to any serious extent in support of our opinions, because we consider the attempt to drive in iron-plates, bolted on to wood, with Armstrong guns, even with his 3-pounders, at twenty yards, must in time have proved successful; but nothing could have been more unlikely than that an ironcoated ship should be subjected to any such treatment upon the high seas, except from another iron-coated opponent. A wooden vessel approaching the Trusty to try such an experiment would, in the language of sailors, have been sent "to glory"! - and if it was Fort Constantine that the Trusty was engaging, her captain must be an idiot to close it to such a distance as twenty yards, when the recent experiments on the Sussex martello tower with Armstrong's guns, as well as the breaching of Bomarsund, would tell him that stone and brick might be effectually treated at much greater distances. About the same time, it appears that some experiments were tried at Portsmouth upon the Alfred frigate, coated with 44-inch plates. In addition to the old fact that the ordinary spherical 68-pounder shot of wrought-iron would pass through such a ship at 450 yards, it was discovered that a Whitworth bolt of the same weight would do as much at the same distance. Now, unless Mr Whitworth can do more than this, we are not prepared to allow that he has done much. A sphere of iron weighing 68 lb. has a diameter of 8 inches, and consequently makes a hole through timber of that dimensions. Mr Mr W Whitworth rolls out the sphere into a long bolt, diminishing its diameter very considerably, thereby reducing the resistance toits entry. The consequence is, that his bolt makes a small hole, and the sphere a large one. This is a very important point in ship actions, so far as damage to either an iron-clad or purely wooden ship is concerned, and may be more easily understood by the inexperienced, when we assure them that we have seen timbers, planking, and spars, through which balls of three inches diameter have passed in action, and that the hole left was so small as to be almost difficult to detect, from the natural elasticity of the woody fibres filling up the aperture. We do not, however, purpose to write a treatise on the laws, nature, or action of projectiles, but to deal with them in a general sense. We say, therefore, that those first experiments upon the Alfred showed but slight advantage in Whitworth's weapon or projectile over the solid 68-pounder, as an annihilator of iron plates. Another series of experiments with the same Whitworth's bolts was subsequently made on the Trusty, one of the original batteries. The distance selected was 200 yards! There was, we are told, a breeze and a small sea on, as if either would be unnatural in a sea-action. Five shots in all

* See Quarterly Review, Oct. 1860.

were fired; and mark, only two fairly entered the ship through her side; two others struck obliquely, and stuck in the broadside; and one shot missed the Trusty. Thus only two out of five of these shots took full effect; and had the Trusty been playing her part, the probabilities are that a much smaller proportion would have gone to the good of Mr Whitworth's bolts. Let it not be forgotten either, that no gunboat or wooden ship in existence would be able to take up with impunity such a position, with respect to the Trusty, as his gun, or the ordinary 68-pounder, was placed in. So far as the ordinary sea-service 68-pounder gun is concerned, the question is a very simple one. Grant that, when brought up fairly abreast of, and at right angles to, a 4-inch plate, placed over and bolted to wood, it penetrates the plate at a distance of 200 yards. The ball, however, must be an especial one, made of wrought-iron: not. as all cannon-balls are, of cast-iron. The expense of this becomes at once a serious objection, coupled with doubtful advantages. The cannon itself is the most rare and most unwieldy piece of ordnance we have in the navy; it weighs with its carriage more than five tons, and may not be cast loose for action in anything approaching to a heavy seaway. Our present frigates and ships of the line can only carry a few of them. The gunboats which are fitted for them only embark their 68-pounders in smooth water; and as a general sea-service ordnance, it is anything but desirable. Amongst many objections we will enumerate the following:- Its great weight calls for a crew of sixteen powerful men; its training and elevation are necessarily slow W the ports required are so big, that, in these days of rifles, the gun's crew would be swept away by sharpshooters; the increased weight of the shot, 68-pounders against the ordinary 32-pounders for sea-service ordnance, will necessitate more capacity in shot-lockers and magazines-ergo, larger ships. One 56-cwt. 32-pounder, with its hundred rounds of shot and

* Captain Halsted denies that this was the case in the experiments he witnessed.

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