her husband to manage or control it. Ib.
Where an old man, having no children, and being possessed of considerable property, sold a farm to his niece, she agreeing to pay him a certain amount in cash and an annuity for his life, the income of the farm being sufficient to pay the latter, and on his death the payment of certain amounts to other heirs, and the niece went upon the land and paid for and improved the same, the transaction constituted a valid sale to the niece, and she is properly the owner of the property, and the creditors of her husband have no rights therein by reason of his be- ing employed by his wife to look after her business interests, and as such entitled to the profits thereof which went to pay for such prop- erty. Ib. The fact that the wife of a grantor does not sign a deed from her husband to her father in payment of her husband's debts, casts no re- flection upon the validity of the transfer or bona fides of the trans- action. Ib.
Relations between husband and wife which do not give his individ- ual creditors any right to subject the earnings of the business to the payment of his debts. Ib.
Since the act of March 19, 1887, Sec. 3114, Rev. Stat., a married woman has had power to contract which she would have if unmar- ried and for any debt contracted by her after that date, her property ac- quired after that date, and while a feme sole, is liable to be seized as her general property and subjected to the payment of her debts. Klinckhamer Brew. Co. v. Cassman. 141
A chose in action in the nature of a right of action against a railroad company for damages for personal injuries sustained by a married woman, is not such property as to which debts could attach. Nor can it be considered such separate es- tate as to give her the right to sue for care and physicians' bills on ac- count of such injuries, particularly where it does not appear that she expressly contracted and intended to charge her own estate therewith. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. v. Harber. 648 Section 3108, Rev. Stat., et seq., 93 O. L., 132, expressly declares
that the husband shall support his wife and provide her with neces- saries, and though the wife may enter into contracts for her own benefit, or in regard to her separate property, she can only do so when it is shown that at the time of en- tering into the contract, she so in- tended, and had a separate estate to charge. Ib.
A husband is entitled to recover damages for expenses of care and physicians' bills incurred by reason of injuries sustained by his wife through the negligence of others. Ib.
Section 3108, Rev. Stat., et seq., as amended in 1887, 93 O. L., 132, plac- ing a married woman on the plane of a feme sole, cannot be given re- troactive effect or applied to causes of action which arose prior to its enactment. Ib. Where a husband intends to abandon his wife, and, for the pur- pose of depriving her of alimony, procures her signature to a mort- gage upon his property upon repre- sentations that it is necessary to secure an indebtedness to his father, which the latter had not de- manded, and of which he had no knowledge at the time of its execu- tion, and four days after the execu- tion of the mortgage abandons his wife, such mortgage is a fraud up- on her marital rights and is invalid as against her claim for alimony, whether the son was indebted to his father or not. Chittenden v. Chit- tenden. 526 The obligation of a husband to support and maintain his wife is not only a common law obligation, but is fixed by express statute, Sec. 3110, Rev. Stat. The wife is to that extent a creditor of the husband and may enforce such right against his property unless the rights of others have intervened to exclude her. Ib.
A husband, soon after marriage, conveyed to his wife the homestead property which thereafter was al- ways treated and spoken of by him as her property, but four years later, and a week before he sep- arated from his wife, he filed for record a quitclaim deed by his wife to himsel for tne same property, claiming that the quitclaim deed was executed by her simultaneously with his deed to her for the prop- erty, but she denied the execution
Husband and Wife-Insolvency.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Continued. of such quitclaim deed and in fact knew nothing of having executed it: Held, that she never having know- ingly signed and executed such deed, the property in equity is still hers and is to be subjected last to the payment of mortgages given upon it and other property by her husband before marriage. Ib. Mortgages executed by the hus- band on part of his property, to his father, before his marriage, and four years before the separation from his wife took place, will not be set aside as far as the wife's right to alimony is concerned, although these mort- gages executed voluntarily without request therefor from his father and although it seems prob- able that in executing them he was looking forward to a time when he might be expected to respond in alimony to his intended wife. Ib.
were
Circumstances under which the father is bound, the fraud of his son and mortgage obtained is invalid as against the rights of the wife. Ib.
See also DOWER.
INJUNCTION-
A motion to dissolve an injunction restraining the county auditor and county treasurer from paying a cer- tain warrant will not be granted when the questions involved are all of sufficient importance to await the final disposition of the case, espe- cially where some of the questions depend upon testimony that may be given on the final hearing to deter- mine whether the injunction shall be permanent. State v. Cuyahoga Co. (Comrs.). 328
It is not necessary that the affi- davit for an attachment for a viola- tion of the order of injunction should state the pendency of the or- iginal action, the orders made, etc.; all that is required, in addition to what is already upon the record, is the affidavit of the violation of the order which occurred out of e pres- ence of the court. Ray v. Railway Co. 793
The assessment of the fine, under Sec. 5581, Rev. Stat., for a violation of the order of injunction, to the effect that "such party may be re- quired by the court or judge to pay a fine not exceeding $200," is an in- dividual matter, and where there are several defendants each must re-
spond for himself for the wrong he has done and the limit applied to each and not to the defendants col- lectively. Ib.
It is not necessary that persons accused of violating an order of in- junction, and brought before the court upon attachment, should be served with a copy of the affidavit or the order which they have dis- obeyed. Upon being served with the injunction they were supposed to inform themselves at once of what they were enjoined from doing. And where the record discloses, that in the contempt proceeding, that the charges were read to defendants in open court, it is sufficient. Ib.
Where there has been a violation of the order of injunction, it is not necessary to docket an independent action in contempt or proceed by an independent prosecution, to enforce the order made in the civil action. The court continues to hold and have control to enforce the order under Sec. 5581, Rev. Stat., providing that an attachment may be issued upon affidavit, etc. Ib.
An action for injunction in the superior court will bind both of two defendants united in interest, al- though only one is served; and such action speaks from the giving of the bond under the temporary restrain- ing order. Totten v. Hall. 724 See also CONTRACTS. INSANE-
See TRIAL.
INSOLVENCY-
A corporaton doing business at a profit whose available assets were practically equal to its indebtedness, and in such condition financially that had a sale been made of all its property at a fair market value it would have paid the debts of the concern with some profit to its mem- bers, is solvent, and the property transferred by a stockholder of such corporation cannot be followed into the hands of bona fide purchasers and subjected to the payment of the debts of the corporation which after- wards became insolvent. First Nat. Bank v. Rice. 121 Where an assigner for creditors had previously assigned a part of his claim against a party and his assignee for creditors collects the whole claim, judgment cannot be had
against the assignee for the part of the claim assigned, but the rights of the claimant must be worked out through the settlement of the as- signed estate in une probate court. Bonham v. Rempe & Son. 725
In assignments for the benefit of creditors, dividends are made only with respect to funds going to gen- eral creditors under Sec. 6356, Rev. Stat. Therefore, an order by the probate court that the assignee pay the proceeds of a sale of property encumbered by mortgage to the mortgagee in satisfaction of his claim, is not an order for payment of a dividend. Reed V. Terhune. 829
The fees and allowances of an as- signee for the benefit of creditors, for services rendered to the general estate, and for the benefit of the gen- eral creditors, are not to be paid from funds or property subject to specific liens which rest upon the property at the time the assignment is made.
Ib.
In an assignment for the benefit of creditors where the assignee has sold property encumbered by mort- gage, it would be reasonable and perhaps lawful to allow to the as- signee fair compensation for such services as he might perform of benefit to the mortgagee in bring- ing the property to sale and in bring- ing the proceeds applicable to the mortgage debt into court, but where it appears that the assignee has been allowed full compensation for that service, he is not entitled to further compensation from this fund for services to be rendered in winding up the estate, and services for the benefit of the general cred- itors. Ib.
In an action by an assignee to set aside an order of the probate court directing the application of a por- tion of the rents of certain mortgaged property coming into the assignee's hands to the payment of the mort- gagee's claim, the proceeds of the sale not being sufficient to extin- guish the lien, the burden is on the assignee, having received full com- pensation for services with respect thereto of direct benefit to the mort- gagee, to show that such rents are subject to the claims of general cred- itors.
Ib.
See also COURTS.
INSURANCE-
The fact that an insurance com- pany was doing business in this state when Secs. 3631-11, Rev. Stat., et seq., 92 O. L., 360, was passed, and continued to do business thereafter, but had failed for some time to file its annual report with the state in- surance commissioner, as required by Sec. 3631-12, Rev. Stat., will not in- validate a certificate of insurance in the hands of a beneficiary, and falling due before the statute was complied with. Klinckhamer Brew. Co. v. Cassman. 141
Section 2 of the act of April 25, 1898, making provision for the pro- tection of policy holders of life in- surance companies organized upon the stipulated premium plan, and Sec. 6 of the same act making pro- vision for a reserve fund, clearly show the intention of the legislature to compel policy holders and bene- ficiaries thereunder to trust to the companies and the protection af- forded them under the act itself, without making the trustees person- ally liable for losses thereunder. Kelley v. Bender.
181
Section 3 of the act of April 25, 1898, Sec. 3631, Rev. Stat., provid- ing that life insurance companies organized without any capital stock, upon the stipulated premium plan, shall be subject only to the provisions of such act excepting certain provi- sions of Chap. 8. Tit. 3, part 1. and Chap. 10. Tit. 2. part 2, Rev. Stat., applicable thereto. does not include Sec. 3261. Rev. Stat., relating to the liability of trustees of corporations not for profit.
Ib.
A condition in a policy of insurance that if the property insured becomes unoccupied without the assent of the company the policy shall be void, is not in conflict with Sec. 3643, Rev. Stat.. limiting the extent of liability upon policies, provided such condi- tion increases the risk, but the fact that premises are unoccupied does not in itself raise to any degree the presumption of increase of hazard of the risk. Security Fire Ins. Co. v. McFarland. 591
Allegations in the answer of an insurance company in an action for indemnity for loss by fire, that the insured suffered the premises to be- come vacant and unoccupied with- out defendant's consent, and thereby increased the risk, without allega- tion of fact to show how or in what
INSURANCE-Continued.
manner such risk was increased, are not sufficient and do not raise such a presumption as will amount to a defense. Ib.
No personal privilege is conferred upon the insured under Sec. 3643, Rev. Stat., defining the extent of lia- bility of insurance companies under their policies, which he may waive or qualify by agreement. The stat- ute is a part of the policy and is read into the contract of insurance there- in. Hence a company is bound to pay the loss whether total or partial and can not rebuild or replace. Ib.
Where the assured stated in the written application to the company for a policy of life insurance that he did not use intoxicating liquor at all, but was a total abstainer from the same, which statements were un- true, such statements, under Sec. 3625, Rev. Stat., will not defeat the right to recover unless it be clearly proved that the statements were not only wilfully false and fraudulently made, but that the same were ma- terial and induced the company to issue the policy. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Risley. 186
The question whether or not such answers were wilfully false and fraudulently made, and were mater- ial, and induced the company to is- sue the policy, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Ib.
Where the assured answered in the application that he did not use intoxicating liquor at all, any quan- tities or of any character, which an- swers were untrue, it was error for the court to charge the jury "That for a man to occasionally use intoxi- cating liquor or to use it in modera- tion and an occasional indulgence to excess does not render a person an Intemperate man." Ib.
INTEREST-
Where an officer of a bank entered into a contract with a merchant by which the latter was to purchase a stock of goods against which bank and the merchant both had claims which they desired to secure, and providing that the officer should pro- cure a loan from his bank for the merchant, in consideration of stip- ulated interest and payment of the bank's claim against the goods, the contract should be treated as an in-
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JUDGMENTS-
A finding by the tribunal created by Sec. 1545-24, Rev. Stat., 92 O. L., 446, the federal plan law of Cleve- land, consisting of the mayor, di- rector of law and president of the city council, that a 'police officer was guilty of using his influence in se curing votes for a certain candidate at an election, is conclusive and the circuit court will not, in a mandam- us proceeding seeking to reinstate such officer, go into the evidence as to what the real fact is as to the conduct of the officer, nor into facts as to what was done before such tribunal. State v. Barrett. 231
The fact that the evidence, as it appears in the reviewing court, is sufficient to arouse a strong sus- picion of fraud against a defendant in attachment, is not sufficient to warrant that court in disturbing a judgment discharging the attach- ment. Bernhard v. Schwartz. 183
A court would be justified in refus- ing to set aside a judgment by de- fault where the reason given for not filing an answer was that defend- ant's attorney was busy in attend- ing to professional business and by mistake of a clerk in his office, de- fendant's case was not called to his attention so that he did not know he was in default until after judg- ment was taken. French Wax Fig- ure Co. v. Baxter Co. 76
A judgment in an action against an estate based upon an agreement between a mother and sons, by which the latter were to work her farm and after the expenses were paid to have all the proceeds, is not res ad- judicata of a claim for compensa-
Judgments-Judicial Sales.
tion for services for working the same farm under an agreement, ex- press or implied, to pay for the same; the claims are separate and distinct, notwithstanding they are inconsistent. Ward, Est. of. 44 Judgment will not be reversed for sustaining an objection to a ques- tion asked in the direct examination of a witness, where the exception does not show what testimony was expected of the witness, and partic- ularly when the answer if given I could not have been competent or of any benefit to the party asking it. Shadle v. Illuminating Co. 37 Judgment will not be reversed on account of the admission of irrele- vant testimony where it cannot be said to have been prejudicial. Thus the admission of testimony of an agent of a lessor concerning a sur- render of leased premises, but which failed to establish a release, and therefore became irrelevant, is not ground for reversal. Price v. Cob- litz. 34 Where a judgment on a note is taken not only for more than is due, but against parties not liable, they are not confined to the remedy to open and vacate when a good de- fense is first established, but may appeal. Snyder v. Bank. 623
A judgment may be set aside for fraud although defendant was prop- erly served with summons, by copy left at her usual place of residence, and made no defense to the action, where a good and valid excuse is shown for not defending. Ullman Einstein & Co. v. Effinger. 746
A judgment procured against a party on account which she never vowed nor became either directly or indirectly liable for, may be set aside in a proper proceeding brought for that purpose. Ib.
A nunc pro tunc entry correcting the incorrect copying of a judgment as actually made, while relating back to the date of the jugdment as between the parties thereto, will not operate to deprive persons not parties of rights acquired before it was made. Burke v. Manufacturing Co.
734
Where a judgment is substantially correct and it appears that the judges who heard the case are not exactly agreed as to the points in- volved, the judgment is affirmed. Miller & Tafel v. Mannix. 536
See also ASSIGNMENTS; BONDS.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
See EVIDENCE.
JUDICIAL SALES-
The state and the public have such an interest in the existence and oper- ation of railroads as to require them to be sold in entirety, upon judicial sales, and not in sections. King v. Railroad Co. 551
The policy of the appraisement laws and the decisions of the courts, excluding growing crops from the sale of real estate, is to encourage agriculture and prevent farm lands from lying fallow and unproductive pending litigation and upon the theory that the land only is ap- praised, but the rule respecting the product of mines or oil wells is dif- ferent. In judicial sales of oil leases, the oil produced belongs to the purchasers from the day of sale, and if the sale is consummated and perfected by confirmation, such right and title relates back to the date that the sale is actually made by the officer of the court. Murphy v. Hardee. 837
The value of oil leases depend in a large measure upon the amount of oil that might be produced from lands covered by the leases. The sale of the lease carries with it the right to produce the oil and the pur- chaser obtains this right. There- fore, an appraisement in a judicial sale should include the value of the leases in view of their productive- ness.
Ib.
The purchaser of lands at judicial sale must suffer the loss of deterior- ation of the premises purchased oc- curring between the date of sale and confirmation and payment of the purchase money. Likewise, he is entitled to any gain, fruitage or ap- preciation thereof. Hence, an oil company, having obtained a decree of court subjecting to sale certain premises of which it has voluntarily remained in possession and which it has operated for oil from the day of sale to the day of confirmation, they must account for the net pro- ceeds thereof during such interim, less operating expenses. Ib.
In judicial sales of real estate the official making the sale, as the rep- resentative of the creditors inter- ested therein, has an option, upon unreasonable delay of the purchaser, to return "no sale," and prevent con- firmation, and proceed to resale and
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