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man foreign office for about two years (1912– 14) kept as its representative in London, Prince Lichnowsky, who was unquestionably in favor of a friendship between the two Governments. His efforts in this direction were cordially received and reciprocated by Sir Edward Grey, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, in the opinion of Lichnowsky, was anxious to have the differences between his country and Germany settled just as had been done in the case of Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian disputes. That the Balkan question had as yet found no satisfactory solution has to be admitted, but the powers that had sustained the greatest grievances in connection with it had accepted, though protestingly, the settlement of the treaties of London and Bukarest (1913).
There was then no question facing Europe in 1914 that a desire for peace and wise diplomacy could not solve. It seems evident, therefore, that the direct causes of the war are more important than the indirect for apportioning the guilt of this great crime. The principal immediate cause of this war was Teutonic aggression in the Balkans. This aggression began as early as 1878, became dangerous in 1908, and criminal in 1914.2
All of Parts II and III, except Chapter XIII 2 S., 1007; Lichnowsky Memorandum, Inter. Conciliation, No. 127, pp. 33, 130.
and a few other pages, has been written entirely from the documents given out by the various belligerents. The principal collections of official papers used are the following: The translations made by the New York Times and other documents published by the American Association for International Conciliation; Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, edited by James Brown Scott and published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War and Miscellaneous Correspondence, printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915; the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, official English translation; Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights published by our State Department; and supplements to volumes 9 and 10 of the American Journal of International Law.
In presenting this digest of the source material on the causes of the war, my aim is not to argue the case, but only to give and systematize the evidence—not all the evidence on all the points, but only adequate evidence on the main points. In this second edition I have been able in some cases to make positive statements where in the original work I could only express
opinions. This has been made possible by the recent publication of some documents that were not known when the first edition came out last year.
I want to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professors Charles Downer Hazen and Carlton J. H. Hayes of Columbia University, and Frank Maloy Anderson, of Dartmouth College, for the very valuable suggestions and criticisms that they have kindly offered. My thanks are also due to my colleagues, Professor David Dale Johnson, of the English department, and Dean James M. Callahan, head of the department of history, who have read portions of my manuscript and have made helpful suggestions and criticisms.
Inasmuch as so many books have already been written on the causes of the war, I feel that I should offer an explanation, if not an apology, for adding to the list even a small volume. My only excuse for so doing is the hope that a brief work will prove useful to college students and others who do not have time to read the fuller accounts. My own experience as a teacher of current European history has caused me to feel the need of such a work.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Serbian reply not acceptable to Austria-Hungary 84